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Abstract 
Posttraumatic stress disorder is a prevalent and disabling disorder that can occur 
following experience of trauma.  Contemporary clinical models of PTSD assert that 
memories for trauma are poorly elaborated and inadequately integrated into 
autobiographical memory (AM).  Recent work of cognitive psychologists suggests, 
however, that trauma memories remain highly accessible and form a cognitive reference 
point for the organisation of autobiographical knowledge, leading to the development of 
trauma-centred identity.  The current study sought to explore further the relationships 
between PTSD symptoms, the phenomenological properties of AM for trauma, and 
trauma-centred identity.  A community sample of 82 participants (male, n = 24; mean age 
= 36.10 years, SD = 10.82) was recruited. A within-subjects, correlational design was 
employed.  Participants completed online questionnaires relating to PTSD symptoms, the 
phenomenological properties of a trauma memory and negative memory, and centrality of 
event to identity.  Participants also provided written narratives of both a trauma and 
negative event.  Differences between traumatic and negative memories, and relationships 
between trauma memory features and both PTSD and centrality were assessed using 
computerised textual analysis and self-report measures.  Results indicated that trauma 
memories were significantly less coherent, less detailed, and contained fewer spatial 
references but more cognitive process terms than negative memories.  PTSD symptoms 
correlated significantly with fragmentation of trauma memories and with use of the 
present tense in trauma narratives. A sense of reliving when remembering trauma and use 
of present tense were both significantly associated with centrality of event.  Results were 
thus primarily consistent with contemporary clinical theories of PTSD with certain 
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elements of the centrality position also demonstrated.  Findings were discussed in relation 
to the study’s methodological limitations, including difficulties encountered through 
LIWC’s lack of consideration of context when counting lexical items. Theoretical 
implications regarding the measurement of constructs such as fragmentation were 
outlined.  Findings supported current treatment guidelines. 
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CHAPTER 1 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is a prevalent and disabling disorder that can 
occur following exposure to trauma (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).  Trauma-
focussed psychological therapy is currently recommended as the most effective treatment 
for PTSD (NICE, 2005).  Such therapeutic interventions have been developed from 
prominent clinical models of the disorder (e.g., Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996; 
Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Foa & Rauch, 2006).  These conceptualisations of PTSD highlight 
several psychological processes as implicated in the development and maintenance of the 
disorder. One such process that has generated much debate is autobiographical memory 
(AM), and in particular, the contextualisation and integration of trauma memories within 
AM.  Leading clinical models of PTSD (e.g., Ehlers & Clark, 2000) assert that memory 
for trauma is poorly elaborated and inadequately integrated within AM.  Cognitive 
psychologists (e.g., Berntsen & Rubin, 2006, 2007) have recently proposed, however, 
that traumatic memory is invariably clearer and better remembered than non-traumatic 
memory, resulting in the development of ‘trauma-centred identity.’  Empirical findings 
regarding the disorganisation and fragmentation of trauma memories, properties deemed 
to illustrate their inadequate integration within AM, are mixed (e.g., O’Kearney & 
Perrott, 2006).  It has been suggested that methodological differences in how information 
about the trauma memory is obtained (self-report versus textual analysis) may determine 
whether or not certain properties of memory are established (e.g., Brewin, 2013).  To 
date, there exists little evidence pertaining to the relationships between PTSD symptoms, 
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trauma-centred identity, and the phenomenological properties of trauma memory.  
Moreover, few studies have examined trauma memory features using both self-report and 
textual analysis measures.  The current study thus aimed to explore trauma-centred 
identity, AM, and posttraumatic adjustment using both subjective (self-report) and 
objective (textual analysis) measures.   
This introductory chapter begins with an overview of PTSD and AM.  Prominent 
clinical theories and models of PTSD are outlined, and current practice regarding 
treatment of the disorder described.  The construct of AM and its role within PTSD is 
explored with recourse to Conway’s (2005) Self-Memory System model, while Ehlers 
and Clark’s (2000) cognitive model and Brewin et al.’s (1996) Dual Representation 
Theory (DRT) provide theoretical frameworks for the conceptualisation of the disorder.  
These clinical models are contrasted with the ‘centrality’ position put forward relatively 
recently by cognitive psychologists (Rubin, Berntsen, & Bohni, 2008).  Empirical 
evidence supporting each theory of PTSD is outlined and critiqued while strengths and 
limitations of the models in question are acknowledged.  The chapter concludes with a 
rationale for the current study and outlines the study’s research questions.     
1.2 Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
1.2.1 Definition of trauma and its prevalence. 
The American Psychiatric Association (APA, 2013, p. 271) defines a traumatic 
event as one involving “exposure to actual or threatened death, serious injury or sexual 
violence.”  Examples of trauma include events such as serious road traffic accidents, 
exposure to war, threatened or actual physical or sexual assault, torture, and natural or 
human-made disasters (APA, 2013).  Both direct experience and witnessing others’ 
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experience of such events may constitute a trauma (APA, 2013).   Life-time prevalence 
rates for experiencing a trauma are estimated at approximately 70 per cent in the general 
population (Resick, 2001).  While the majority of individuals who experience a trauma 
adjust remarkably well and do not suffer long-term adverse effects, a significant number 
of trauma survivors develop posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD).  Indeed, Kessler and 
colleagues (1995) found that the risk of developing PTSD after a traumatic event is 8.1 
per cent for men and 20.4 per cent for women. 
1.2.2 Clinical features of PTSD. 
PTSD is a debilitating psychological disorder characterised by four core symptom 
groups: intrusion, avoidance, negative alterations in mood/cognitions, and arousal (APA, 
2013).  Recurrent, intrusive, involuntary re-experiencing of the traumatic event is 
considered the hallmark symptom of PTSD.  Such intrusive symptoms may take the form 
of thoughts, images, sensory experiences, marked physiological reactions to internal or 
external cues relating to the trauma, flashbacks, nightmares, and dissociative experiences 
(APA, 2013; Brewin & Holmes, 2003).  Avoidance symptoms, such as avoidance of 
trauma-related situations, thoughts and cues, further characterise PTSD.  Alterations in 
cognitions and mood associated with the trauma include: an inability to remember an 
important aspect of the event; fragmented, disjointed voluntary memories of the trauma; 
persistent, exaggerated, negative cognitions, beliefs and expectations about oneself, 
others and the world, and/or about the causes and consequences of the traumatic event; 
feelings of detachment or estrangement from others, and a persistent inability to 
experience positive emotions.  Alterations in arousal or reactivity associated with the 
trauma may manifest as irritable behaviour and angry outbursts, hypervigilance, problems 
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with concentration, and sleep disturbance (APA, 2013).  In order to qualify for a 
diagnosis of PTSD, these symptoms must be present for more than one month following 
the traumatic event and must be causing clinically significant distress or impairment in 
functioning (APA, 2013).   
1.2.3 Epidemiology of PTSD. 
The universality of PTSD as a response to trauma, affecting people from diverse 
cultural backgrounds and individuals who have experienced different types of traumatic 
events, is increasingly being documented in the literature (e.g., Foa, Keane, Friedman, & 
Cohen, 2009; Mehta, Vankar, & Patel, 2005).  Twelve-month prevalence rates for PTSD 
vary nonetheless across studies and across cultures from 1.3 per cent in Australia 
(Creamer, Burgess, & McFarlane, 2001) to 3.5 per cent in the United States (Kessler, 
Berglund, Demler, Jin, Merikangas, & Walters, 2005).  In the United States, results from 
a National Comorbidity Survey (Kessler, Sonnega, Bromet, Hughes, & Nelson, 1995) 
indicate a lifetime prevalence of approximately 6.8 per cent, with higher figures for 
women (9.7 per cent) than men (3.6 per cent).  Research has shown that survivors of 
trauma in developing countries, particularly those experiencing warfare and political 
unrest, suffer increased levels of PTSD (e.g., Margoob et al., 2006), while ethnic minority 
groups and asylum-seekers in Western countries have also been shown to demonstrate 
significant difficulties with posttraumatic adjustment (Norris, Perilla, Riad, Kaniasty, & 
Lavizzo, 1999).   
Empirical findings indicate that responses to trauma and the subsequent 
development of PTSD may vary as a function of the type of trauma experienced.  For 
example, prevalence rates of PTSD in rape survivors are estimated to be 30 per cent (e.g., 
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Breslau, 2001; Foa & Street, 2001;) and figures are similarly high among combat 
veterans (Richardson, Frueh, & Acierno, 2010), while rates of up to 50 per cent have 
been found in survivors of torture (Yehuda, McFarlane, & Shalev, 1998; see Johnson, 
Maxwell, and Galea, 2009, for a detailed review of the epidemiology of PTSD).  
High rates of comorbidity have been shown with 80-85 per cent of sufferers of 
chronic PTSD (lasting longer than six months) meeting criteria for at least one other 
psychiatric diagnosis (APA, 2013; Creamer at al., 2001; Kessler et al., 2005).  Comorbid 
anxiety disorders, particularly panic disorder and social phobia, are especially common, 
as are depression, bipolar disorder and substance use disorders (APA, 2013; Chung, 
Symons, Gilliam, & Kaminski, 2010; Owens, Steger, Whitesell, & Herrera, 2009).  
Research has also demonstrated high levels of comorbid physical health problems, 
particularly chronic illness and chronic pain (e.g., Otis, Keane, & Kerns, 2003; Schnurr & 
Green, 2004) and impaired immune functioning (e.g., Uddin et al., 2010).  Data from 
several sources suggest that individuals who continue to meet PTSD criteria 
approximately six months post-trauma are likely (in the absence of effective treatment) to 
show a chronic course, with symptoms lasting for many decades (e.g., Kessler et al., 
2005).   
1.2.4 Socio-economic impact of PTSD. 
 Given the debilitating nature of PTSD and high rates of comorbidity associated 
with the disorder, it is unsurprising that it engenders substantial social, as well as personal 
costs.  PTSD can significantly impair an individual’s interpersonal functioning and 
capacity for occupational engagement (APA, 2013).  In the UK, the National Institute for 
Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) estimates the overall cost of ‘neurotic disorders’ 
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to the National Health Service (NHS) at over £5,600 million per year (NICE, 2005).  
Moreover, it is estimated that 91 million working days each year in the UK are lost 
through stress-related illness, at a cost to industry of £3,700 million (NICE, 2005). In 
2003-2004, social and welfare costs of claims for incapacitation and disablement from 
severe stress and PTSD amounted to £103 million, £55 million more than was claimed 
five years previously (NICE, 2005).  As such, it is indisputable that PTSD presents a 
considerable burden for individuals, families, communities, the NHS, and society as a 
whole. 
1.2.5 Psychological processes implicated in PTSD. 
PTSD is associated with disturbances in an extensive range of psychological 
processes and phenomena, including memory, attention, beliefs, appraisals, coping 
strategies, social support, and identity (see Brewin, 2011; Brewin & Holmes, 2003).  Of 
these, the well-documented ‘paradox’ of memory disturbance in PTSD (i.e., enhanced 
involuntary, intrusive trauma memories but impoverished voluntary retrieval) is thought 
to distinguish the condition from other psychological disorders (Brewin, 2011).  Indeed, 
PTSD has long been considered a disorder of memory, an understanding reflected in both 
classical and contemporary psychological theories of the condition (Brewin, 2011; van 
der Kolk, McFarlane, & Weisaeth, 2007).  Research investigating the complex 
interrelations between memory and PTSD has highlighted the multifaceted nature of the 
phenomenon.  Consequently, this has led to many questions regarding those specific 
aspects of memory that are altered in PTSD, including those which may be pre-existing 
vulnerability factors for the disorder, and those which influence how PTSD develops and 
is maintained following a traumatic event (Brewin, 2011).    
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Whilst several aspects of the complex relationship between memory and trauma 
have been elucidated, there remain certain controversies and areas of significant debate 
(Brewin, 2011).  One such topic that has received considerable attention and prompted 
much research and discussion is that of autobiographical memory (AM).  AM is personal 
memory for facts and events concerning the self (Conway, 2005).  Current theorising and 
research on the subject continues to explore questions such as whether or not traumatic 
memories are inherently different from other types of autobiographical memories, 
whether memory for trauma is enhanced or impaired compared to memory for non-
traumatic events, whether memories of traumatic events can be forgotten and then 
recalled later in life, and whether special mechanisms, such as repression or dissociation, 
underlie such forgetting (Brewin, 2007).   
The current study aims to explore the question of whether or not memory for 
trauma in those with PTSD symptoms is integrated and contextualized within AM, and 
the implications of this integration (or lack thereof) for posttraumatic adjustment and 
one’s sense of identity.  In light of this aim, the following section will explore the concept 
of AM.  Thereafter, currently influential theories and models of PTSD, along with 
empirical findings supporting each, will be described. The models’ different positions 
regarding the integration of memory for trauma within AM will be highlighted 
throughout.  
1.2.6 Autobiographical Memory (AM). 
AM refers to memory for events recollected from an individual’s life, drawing on 
both episodic memory (i.e., memory for personal experiences and events, associated 
emotions and other contextual knowledge, experienced at a particular time and place, 
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such as remembering one’s fifth birthday party) and semantic memory (i.e., memory of 
personal knowledge, understandings, and other concept-based knowledge related to the 
self, such as knowing what secondary school one attended; Rubin, 1988).  AM is deemed 
fundamental to human functioning, essential to an individual's sense of self and to one’s 
ability to remain oriented in the world and pursue goals effectively through learning from 
past problem-solving experiences (Cohen, 1998; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).   
1.2.6.1 The functions of AM. 
AM serves four key functions: directive, social, self (Bluck, Alea, Haberman, & 
Rubin, 2005; Pillemer, 1992), and adaptive (Williams, Conway, & Cohen, 2008).  The 
directive function of AM refers to how AM utilises past experiences as a framework for 
solving current problems and guiding present and future thought and behaviour (see 
Bluck et al., 2005).  The social function of AM involves developing and maintaining 
social bonds as AM provides material for conversation through which people share 
meaning and thereby experience a sense of connectedness (Cohen, 1998; Nelsen, 1993; 
Pillemer, 1998). The self function draws on personal memories to create and maintain a 
coherent sense of identity over time (Barclay, 1996; Brewer, 1986; Bluck & Levine, 
1998; Conway, 1996).  Finally, the adaptive function operates by recollecting positive 
personal experiences to maintain/improve well-being (Williams, Conway, & Cohen, 
2008). Whilst only a small number of studies have to date reported empirical evidence of 
the four functions of AM (e.g., Hyman & Faries, 1992; Pasupathi, Lucas, & Coombs, 
2002;), these categories are considered to be both theoretically sound and intuitively 
logical (for further information about these functions see Bluck et al., 2005). 
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The self function is of particular pertinence to the current study’s exploration of 
the interrelations between AM and trauma-centred identity.  Conway (1996) highlights 
the importance of AM in its ability to support and promote continuity and development of 
the self, a function which, in healthy individuals, typically preserves a coherent, stable 
sense of self over time (Barclay, 1996; Conway, 2005).  This relationship between AM 
and the self is thought to be dynamic and reciprocal; each is both constituted by and 
constitutive of the other (Conway, 2005). Such an association forms a “coherent system, 
in which […] beliefs about, and knowledge of, the self are confirmed and supported by 
memories of specific experiences” (Conway, 2005, p. 595).  Likewise, the self influences 
the encoding, storage, and retrieval of AMs.  The self and identity guide or divert 
attention to/from different objects, events, and feelings, thus regulating the meaning and 
weight attached to different experiences and how these are interpreted and recorded or 
discarded (Conway, 2005; Howe, 2004; Wang & Conway, 2004).   
1.2.6.2 AM and PTSD. 
Importantly, AMs are recalled from the perspective of the current self (Conway, 
2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).  Such recollection is essentially a process of 
reconstruction of AMs in keeping with current goals, self-images and self-beliefs at the 
point of retrieval (Conway, 2005).  How an individual experiences their self and identity 
as a function of such processes is of great significance to the study of the 
autobiographical remembering of trauma and psychological theories of PTSD (e.g., 
Brewin, 2011; Ehlers & Clark, 2000).   However, as considered further below, the 
interplay between one’s sense of self and AM within the context of the trauma memory is 
a complex and much-debated phenomenon (Brewin, 2007; 2011).   
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As noted above, the hallmark symptom of PTSD is the intrusive recollection of 
AMs of the trauma (Brewin et al., 1996).  Paradoxically, this elevated involuntary access 
to memories of the trauma is often accompanied by compromised voluntary access to 
coherent accounts of what happened during traumatic experiences (Brewin, 2011).  
Hence, the phenomenological properties of trauma narratives, reflecting how trauma 
memory is perceived and experienced, often include fragmentation, temporal 
disorganisation, and a predominance of sensory-perceptual features (Brewin 2011; 
Brewin et al., 1996; Foa, Molnar, & Cashman, 1995; Jelinek, Randjbar, Seifert, Kellner, 
& Moritz, 2009; Jones, Harvey, & Brewin, 2007; O’Kearney & Perrott, 2006).  The 
models of PTSD, explored further below, assert that these memory disruptions and 
distortions arise due to the inadequate integration and poor contextualisation of the 
trauma memory (Brewin et al., 1996; Conway, 2005; Ehlers & Clark, 2000). As a 
consequence of these processes, it is proposed that the involuntary trauma memory is less 
associated with verbal access than non-trauma memories, and thus is difficult to retrieve 
voluntarily and is characterised by particular disruptions in certain phenomenological 
properties of the trauma memory (e.g., the memory is fragmented and laden with sensory-
perceptual features) (Brewin et al., 1996; Conway, 2005). 
These AM difficulties have been found to extend beyond the trauma memory to 
more global autobiographical remembering.  For instance, research has found that those 
with PTSD have significant distortions in their memories of experiences that reflect and 
inform one’s identity.  Such empirical studies have demonstrated that those with PTSD 
tend to retrieve significantly more personal memories and goals that are related to their 
trauma experience than those who do not develop PTSD, i.e., their identities and personal 
22 
 
memories tend to have become ‘trauma-centred’ (e.g. Jobson & O’Kearney, 2006, 2008; 
McNally, Lasko, Macklin, & Pitman, 1995;; Sutherland & Bryant, 2005).  A growing 
number of studies have similarly found a significant connection between alteration in 
self-concept following trauma and PTSD symptoms (e.g. Berntsen & Rubin, 2006).  Such 
theoretical and empirical explorations of ‘trauma-centred’ identity have highlighted the 
ramifications of construing a trauma as central to one’s sense of self in terms of the 
impact it has on one’s overall identity and AM in general (e.g., Berntsen & Rubin,  2006; 
McNally et al., 1995; Sutherland & Bryant, 2005).   
Reconciling the trauma memory with previously held assumptions about the self 
can prove highly problematic; the trauma memory thus greatly affects the self as it 
dominates mental life while the individual struggles to resolve these discrepancies 
(Brewin, 2011; Ehlers & Clark, 2000).  Certain theorists argue however that the fact that 
the trauma experience can become central to identity indicates that the trauma memory is 
not inadequately integrated into AM and thus a poorly integrated trauma memory is not 
fundamental to the development of PTSD, as suggested by the PTSD models (e.g., 
Brewin & Holmes, 2003; Brewin, 2011; Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Foa et al., 1995). Rather, 
such theorists assert that the trauma memory is overly integrated into one’s AM and sense 
of self and that this centrality of the trauma memory lies at the heart of PTSD (Berntsen 
& Rubin, 2006; Rubin, Bernsten, & Bohni, 2008).   
Further consideration of these opposing views necessitates exploration of a 
number of currently influential psychological theories of PTSD as well as consideration 
of the neural correlates of the disorder.  The following section will therefore commence 
with a brief outline of findings from neuropsychological research relating to the latter, 
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leading to a more comprehensive discussion of AM as conceptualised in the Self-
Memory System model (Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway & 
Williams, 2008) and an overview of both Ehlers & Clark’s (2000) cognitive model of 
PTSD and Brewin et al.’s (1996) Dual Representation Theory (DRT).  
1.2.7 Neural Correlates of PTSD.  
Recent years have seen a marked increase in research investigating the 
neurophysiological substrates underpinning PTSD (for a comprehensive review see Shin, 
Rauch, & Pitman, 2006).  This research has contributed to our understanding of the 
neuroanatomical structures implicated in the disorder, and has elucidated, in particular, 
the role of these structures in the so-called ‘paradox’ of memory in PTSD.  More 
specifically, neuroimaging research has helped to elucidate the structure, neurochemistry 
and function of three regions of the brain considered to play a role in the development 
and maintenance of PTSD, namely the amygdala, medial prefrontal cortex and 
hippocampus (Shin et al., 2006).   
The amygdala plays an integral role in the process of fear conditioning and the 
assessment of threat-related stimuli (e.g., Davis & Whalen, 2001; LeDoux, 2000).  Given 
that hypervigilance concerning potential threat in the environment comprises one of the 
core clinical features of PTSD, it is unsurprising that the amygdala has been shown to be 
hyperresponsive in the disorder.  Amygdala hyperresponsivity in PTSD has been 
observed during the presentation of personalised traumatic narratives (e.g., Shin et al., 
2004) and cues (Driessen et al., 2004), combat sounds and photographs (e.g., Hendler et 
al., 2003) and trauma-related words (Protopopescu et al., 2005).  Interestingly, in PTSD, 
the amygdala has also been shown to be hyperresponsive to trauma-unrelated affective 
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material, for example, fearful facial expressions (e.g., Williams et al., 2006). This 
suggests that major trauma may impair normal patterns of both medial prefrontal cortex 
(see below) and amygdala regulation, again highlighting the far-reaching effects of poor 
adjustment to trauma.  Indeed, several studies have reported a strong positive correlation 
between amygdala hyperresponsivity (to both traumatic reminders and more general 
affective stimuli) and PTSD symptom severity (e.g., Armony et al., 2005; Bryant et al., 
2005).    
A second brain region implicated in PTSD is the medial prefrontal cortex, an area 
that is highly connected to the amygdala and involved in the process of extinction of fear 
conditioning and the retention of such extinction (Milad & Quirk, 2002; Morgan, 
Romanski, & LeDoux, 1993).  The extinction process is impaired when the medial 
prefrontal cortex is damaged (Morgan et al., 1993).  Sufferers of PTSD demonstrate both 
persistent inappropriate fear responses in daily life and diminished extinction of 
conditioned fear responses in laboratory settings, indicating that the medial prefrontal 
cortex may be adversely affected by PTSD (Orr et al., 2000). Shin and colleagues (2006) 
outline how neuroimaging research has shown that in PTSD the medial prefrontal cortex 
appears to be volumetrically smaller (e.g., Fennema-Notestine et al., 2002), and is 
hyporesponsive during both symptomatic states and during engagement in emotional-
cognitive tasks (e.g., Britton et al., 2005).  Moreover, the authors stress, several studies 
have demonstrated a negative correlation between medial prefrontal cortex responsivity 
and PTSD symptom severity (e.g., Williams et al., 2006, cited in Shin et al., 2006).   
A third region of pertinence is the hippocampus which is involved in explicit 
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memory processes and the encoding of context during fear conditioning (e.g., Corcoran 
& Maren, 2001, cited in Shin et al., 2006).  Of note, the hippocampus is thought to 
interact with the amygdala during the encoding of emotional memories (e.g., Dolcos, 
LaBar, & Cabeza, 2004), a process that is particularly relevant to the study of PTSD 
(Shin et al., 2006).  In animals, hippocampal cell damage and memory impairment can 
result from extreme stressors and high levels of stress-related hormones (e.g., Sapolsky et 
al., 1990).  PTSD (in humans) has been associated with memory impairment as well as 
reduced hippocampal volume and abnormal hippocampal function (Bremner et al., 2003; 
Gilbertson et al., 2002; Gurvits et al., 1996).   
In summary, neuroimaging research findings indicate that in PTSD the amygdala 
is hyperresponsive, the medial prefrontal cortex hyporesponsive, and both the medial 
prefrontal cortex and the hippocampus appear to fail to inhibit the amygdala (Shin et al., 
2006).  This results in heightened fear responses and hypervigilance to threat. As will be 
outlined below, certain currently influential clinical models of PTSD have incorporated 
these neuropsychological understandings of the disorder into their frameworks and are 
increasingly drawing on evidence from cognitive psychology to illustrate and support 
their assertions (e.g., Brewin et al., 2010), thus lending substantial weight to their 
arguments.  The following section will comprise a brief description of the prominent 
contemporary models and theories of PTSD informing current practice.  An overview of 
some of the main empirical findings supporting each theory will be provided and clinical 
applications of the models, as well as the limitations inherent in each, highlighted. 
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1.2.8 Models and theories of PTSD. 
1.2.8.1 The self-memory system. 
 As a conceptual framework for understanding AM, the Self-Memory System 
(SMS) is distinct from other models of memory in its focus on the role of the self and 
goals in remembering (Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).  The SMS is 
described as a superordinate system comprising three core elements: a working self, 
conceptual self and autobiographical knowledge base (Conway, 2005).  In association 
with the conceptual self, the working self functions produce ‘patterns of activation’ in the 
autobiographical knowledge base (Conway, 2005; Conway & Jobson, 2012; Conway, 
Meares, & Standart, 2004; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).  These transient patterns of 
activation are what are experienced by the individual as ‘memories’ (Conway, 2005; 
Conway & Jobson, 2012).   
1.2.8.1.1 The working self. 
The working self consists of a hierarchy of goals and sub-goals which regulate 
cognition and behaviour, thus enabling an individual to function successfully in the world 
by achieving certain desired ends and remaining consistent with preferred self-images 
(Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).  In this sense, the working self refers to the currently 
active goal hierarchy, the purpose of which is to “reduce discrepancies between desired 
goal states and the current state” (Conway, 2005, p.597).  The working self has a 
reciprocal relationship with the autobiographical knowledge base allowing for integration 
of experience with existing knowledge (Conway, 2005).  New knowledge enters long-
term memory through the goal hierarchy of the working self and it is also via this 
pathway that access is gained to pre-existing knowledge and memories are formed.  As 
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such, the goal hierarchy of the working self functions to determine “encoding, 
accessibility of knowledge in long-term memory, and the construction of memories”  
(Conway, 2005, p. 597).   
1.2.8.1.2 The autobiographical knowledge base. 
The autobiographical knowledge base accommodates a three-level hierarchy of 
knowledge, ranging from event-specific, episodic memories at its base through to more 
general event knowledge in the middle to abstract ‘self-conceptual knowledge’ at its apex 
(Conway, 2005).  These three levels together serve to structure autobiographical memory 
themes to form a broader life story.  Just as the working self determines the accessibility 
of memories in the autobiographical knowledge base, the latter informs and constrains 
the self-images and goals of the working-self (Conway, 2005).  
1.2.8.1.3 The conceptual self. 
The conceptual self, alongside the working self, further serves to regulate 
autobiographical remembering.  Conway et al. (2004) propose that the conceptual self is 
comprised of non-temporally-specified, abstract, conceptual self-structures, including 
personal scripts, possible selves, self-with-other units, internal working models, relational 
schema, self-guides, attitudes, values, and beliefs.  Conway (2005) highlights that these 
abstract processes and phenomena exist independently of episodic memories and 
autobiographical knowledge, but are nonetheless linked to both in order to stimulate the 
construction of memories and experiences that reinforce, illustrate and give substance to 
the fundamental, underlying themes of the conceptual self (Conway & Jobson, 2012).  
 Within the conceptual self lies the ‘life story,’ a narrative-like account of the 
individual’s life, which is thought to also contain templates and understandings of 
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cultural phenomena, such as ‘life scripts’ (Bluck, 2003; Bluck et al., 2005; Bluck & 
Habermas, 2001; Pillemer, 1998).  The latter are understood to be socially accepted 
expectations and norms regarding the typical path of an individual’s life, for example, 
going to school, university, getting a job, buying a house, getting married and having 
children (Berntsen & Rubin, 2004).  As part of the conceptual self, these structures (life 
stories and life scripts) highlight the social aspect of AM and the interrelations between 
self, others, and the social, political and cultural systems within which all individuals and 
groups are embedded, and which therefore inevitably impact upon how memories are 
constructed and identities formed (Bruner, 1990; Conway et al., 2004; Pasupathi, 2001).  
1.2.8.1.4 Autobiographical remembering in the SMS. 
The SMS proposes two routes for the construction of AMs from the 
autobiographical knowledge base: generative and direct (Conway, 2005).  Generative 
retrieval involves a deliberate search through the levels of the autobiographical 
knowledge base, prompted by a motivational goal of the working self.  Direct retrieval 
occurs when a memory is unintentionally triggered by an associated cue; this type of 
retrieval does not involve a systematic search, rather it leads directly to event-specific 
knowledge.  Typically, everyday, non-traumatic memories are integrated into the 
autobiographical knowledge base in such a way that they are linked to and embedded in 
lifetime periods, general events and general knowledge (i.e., all levels of the 
autobiographical knowledge base).  This integration allows for a detailed, contextualised 
memory, amenable to voluntary recall via the first retrieval route (generative) while 
simultaneously serving to inhibit the second route (direct retrieval) (Conway, 2005). 
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1.2.8.1.5 PTSD and the SMS. 
The SMS conceptualises PTSD in terms of the working self’s failed attempts to 
reconcile traumatic experiences with current plans and goals (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 
2000).  Trauma violates previously held assumptions about the self, others and the world 
(e.g., Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Janoff-Bulman, 1992), and therefore cannot be 
accommodated or interpreted by one’s corresponding goal hierarchy (Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).  As such, the trauma memory cannot be integrated into the 
autobiographical knowledge base so instead remains associated with the working self and 
is triggered when the individual’s goals are activated,  resulting in the intrusion 
symptoms of PTSD.  The lack of contextualisation and elaboration of the trauma memory 
results in increased retrieval via the direct route; trauma memories are thus typically 
experienced intrusively in response to associated cues and possess a ‘here and now’ 
quality, often lacking temporal and/or spatial detail (Ehlers & Clark, 2000).   Moreover, 
the PTSD trauma memory is not grounded in information relating to what happened 
following the event, and crucial details, such as “I did not die,” remain inaccessible, 
thereby increasing the perception of current threat and sense of reliving.  Furthermore, as 
the trauma memory is not contextualised or integrated within the autobiographical 
knowledge base, generative retrieval is highly problematic, i.e., sufferers of PTSD often 
have difficulty intentionally recalling their trauma memories.  
1.2.8.1.6 Clinical application of the SMS and empirical findings. 
Conway (2005) proposes that SMS-informed treatment approaches to PTSD 
necessitate integration of the trauma memory into one’s self-concept.  The author 
highlights how this may involve exploring and correcting memory distortions.  To 
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elucidate, Conway (2005) proposes that the SMS is motivated to protect itself from 
change in order to maintain coherence; such an incentive may induce alterations 
(distortions) in memory during traumatic experiences which overwhelm the self and thus 
threaten the individual’s coherence of identity/self-concept.  Conway (2005) gives 
examples of the self-system responding to trauma by “lower[ing] the accessibility of 
memories of the event […] or even distort[ing] the memories” (p.599).  Conway’s SMS 
posits as such that the control processes of the working self may serve to edit memory 
content or indeed generate false memories in order to resist change and, in doing so, 
preserve goal coherence.  Conway (2005) notes that such distortions may in some cases 
maintain an illusion of coherence, but invariably this is “at the cost of psychological 
illness” (2005, p. 599).  Conway (2005) also proposes that over time, the need for self-
consistency may necessitate alteration in the individual’s self-image/conceptual self, 
which in turn may lead to the development of a sense of identity centred on being a 
victim of trauma, and/or emphasising self-change since the event.  
There is substantial evidence that personal memories tend to concur with reported 
goals (e.g., Demiray & Bluck, 2011; Singer & Salovey, 1993).  Furthermore, research has 
shown that PTSD sufferers have significantly more concerns and goals involving trauma-
focussed themes than those without PTSD (Sutherland & Bryant, 2005),  that trauma 
survivors with PTSD selectively retrieve memories related to their trauma (McNally et 
al., 1995; Sutherand & Bryant 2005, 2008), and that discrepant self-image appears to 
“drive the nature of autobiographical memories that enter the awareness of trauma 
survivors” (Sutherland & Bryant, 2008, p. 557). 
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1.2.8.1.7 Critique of the SMS. 
Whilst certain theorists and researchers have drawn on the SMS to explore AM 
within the context of PTSD, the model nonetheless remains a broad, cognitive model of 
AM, which, although providing valuable conceptualisations of the processes 
underpinning PTSD, currently offers limited direct clinical application.  The SMS does 
not claim to be a theory or model of PTSD but rather is an account of AM that can be 
applied to PTSD.  It is therefore unsurprising that it does not fulfil all requirements of 
such a theory (cf. Brewin & Holmes, 2003).  Brewin and Holmes (2003) assert that a 
valid theory of PTSD should incorporate explanations of processes in PTSD that are both 
specific to the disorder and more general, as well as processes that are considered 
automatic (for example, helplessness and dissociation) and those that are more strategic 
(for example, appraisals of the trauma event and selected coping mechanisms). 
The SMS also poses certain methodological challenges for researchers; it is 
difficult, for example, to reliably measure an individual’s goal hierarchy at any given 
point in time (Demiray & Bluck, 2011).  To date, relatively few studies have explicitly 
linked clinical models of trauma memory and theoretical approaches to examining the 
hierarchical structure of AM outlined in the SMS.  It is thought that such an approach is 
critical to the validity of empirical investigation of proposals about the nature of trauma 
memories in PTSD (O’Kearney, Hunt, & Wallace, 2011).   
It is further noteworthy that the SMS does not account for cognitive factors 
beyond disturbance in AM which contribute to the development and maintenance of 
PTSD, again highlighting that it cannot in its current form constitute a model of PTSD.  
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Such factors are considered in detail in frameworks such as Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) 
cognitive model of PTSD and Brewin et al.’s (1996) DRT. 
1.2.8.2 The cognitive model. 
Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) cognitive model of PTSD provides a comprehensive 
account of how symptoms of the disorder are maintained.  The authors contend that 
PTSD is maintained in individuals who process the event in a manner that produces a 
sense of current threat.  They propose that PTSD symptoms are a manifestation of such 
current threat perception and of the anxiety and coping strategies engendered by this 
sense of threat.  The model identifies two key processes which lead to the experience of a 
current sense of threat: individual differences in the appraisal of the trauma and/or its 
sequelae, and individual differences in the nature of the memory for the trauma and its 
link to other autobiographical memories (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). The authors’ 
conceptualisation of the latter process draws heavily on Conway’s model of AM, the 
Self-Memory System (see section 1.2.8.1 above) and Brewin et al.’s (1996) DRT (see 
section 1.2.8.3 below), while their work on negative appraisals expands that of Foa and 
Rothbaum (1998) and Jones and Barlow (1990).    
Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) model purports that once activated, the perception of 
current threat is accompanied by intrusions and other re-experiencing symptoms, as well 
as symptoms of arousal, anxiety and other forms of negative affect.  Moreover, the 
perceived threat prompts behavioural and cognitive responses aimed at reducing the 
sense of threat and alleviating distress (for example, avoidance of trauma-related cues 
and situations), which while somewhat effective in the short-term ultimately prevent 
cognitions from being challenged and changed in the longer term, thereby maintaining 
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PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 2000).  The cognitive model thus accounts for all of the 
established symptoms of PTSD, as described in current criteria for diagnosis of the 
disorder (APA, 2013).   
1.2.8.2.1 Negative appraisals. 
Negative appraisals of the trauma and/or its sequelae can relate to external 
phenomena and experiences (e.g., “The world is an unsafe place” / “Others are not to be 
trusted”), or internal, self-referential cognitions (e.g., “It’s my fault that this happened” / 
“I will never be the same again”).  Negative appraisals may take various forms, such as 
overgeneralisations (e.g., “nowhere is safe”); overestimation of the probability of 
repeated occurrence of trauma (e.g., “I attract disaster therefore something bad will likely 
happen to me again”), and negative appraisals of one’s own actions during the trauma 
and its aftermath (e.g., “I should have tried harder to break free,” “I’ll never recover from 
this”).  
Two appraisals that have been found to be both associated with and predictive of 
PTSD, and also related to the self, thus of pertinence to the current study, are ‘mental 
defeat’ and ‘permanent change’ (Ehlers, Maercker, & Boos, 2000). Mental defeat, 
thought to occur during the trauma, is defined as the “perceived loss of all autonomy, a 
state of giving up in one’s own mind all efforts to retain one’s identity as a human being 
with a will of one’s own” (Ehlers et al., 2000, p. 45).  Permanent change is described as 
the perception of alienation from oneself whereby the trauma causes an apparently 
irrevocable transformation of the trauma sufferer’s life goals, personality, or former life 
(Ehlers et al., 2000).  As such, appraisals of mental defeat and permanent change have a 
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profound and debilitating effect on an individual’s identity and sense of self (Brewin & 
Holmes, 2003).  
1.2.8.2.2 The nature of the trauma memory. 
The nature of the trauma memory is the second key element identified by Ehlers 
and Clark (2000).  The cognitive model, like the DRT (Brewin et al., 1996) and 
Conway’s SMS, proposes that memory disturbance in PTSD is due to impairment in 
memory processing and encoding.  Ehlers and Clark (2000) cite the ‘paradox of memory’ 
in PTSD (i.e., intrusive, vivid unintentional recall coupled with impaired, fragmented, 
disorganised intentional recall) as evidence of the faulty mechanisms of memory 
processing at play.  To elucidate their position, in keeping with Conway’s SMS, Ehlers 
and Clark (2000) assert that trauma memories are poorly elaborated and inadequately 
integrated into the AM base, thus lacking temporal and spatial context, and disconnected 
from other non-trauma-related autobiographical memories.  Ehlers and Clark explicate 
the difficulties associated with voluntary recall observed in PTSD in terms of the absence 
of a generative retrieval route due to the poor integration and elaboration of such 
memories into the autobiographical memory base. The here-and-now quality to intrusive 
trauma memories is considered to be indicative both of the absence of a temporal and/or 
spatial context, due again to lack of integration, and of the necessary direct retrieval route 
as the only retrieval route available, triggered by trauma-related cues (Conway, 2005; 
Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Ehlers & Clark, 2000).  The authors highlight how 
such intrusive re-experiencing symptoms appear to lack one of the defining features of 
episodic memories, autonoetic consciousness, defined as the ability to place oneself in the 
past, the future, or hypothetical situations (Baddeley, Eysenck, & Anderson, 2009).  Re-
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experiencing symptoms typically consist of sensory impressions rather than thoughts.  
These sensory features of the trauma memory are experienced as though happening in the 
present and the emotions accompanying them are the same as those experienced at the 
time of the trauma (Brewin et al., 1996; Foa & Rothbaum, 1998).   Moreover, Ehlers and 
Clark (2000) draw attention to a phenomenon they term ‘affect without recollection’ 
which refers to how individuals with PTSD may re-experience sensations or emotions 
associated with the trauma without recalling the event itself.   Related to this concept of 
‘affect without recollection,’ Ehlers and Clark (2000) propose that strong stimulus-
stimulus and stimulus-response associations are formed for traumatic material.  In this 
way, contact with stimuli linked to the original trauma increases the probability of the 
occurrence of cue-driven, intrusive, re-experiencing symptoms.   
1.2.8.2.3 Cognitive and behavioural coping strategies. 
Ehlers and Clark (2000) illustrate how PTSD symptoms are maintained by 
cognitive and behavioural coping strategies employed by the individual to (temporarily) 
alleviate distress by reducing anxiety.  Examples of such strategies include effortful 
suppression of memories, rumination, distraction, avoidance of trauma reminders, taking 
excessive precautions to prevent future trauma, engaging in ‘safety behaviours’ 
(Salkovskis, 1996), use of alcohol or drugs, selective attention to threat cues, and 
hypervigilance.  These attempts to reduce the sense of current threat prevent change in 
both the individual’s appraisals of the trauma and/or its sequelae and the nature of the 
trauma memory itself.   Such behaviour thus serves ultimately to heighten anxiety and 
increase the sense of current threat (Ehlers & Clark, 2000).  
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1.2.8.2.4 Empirical findings. 
Substantial supportive evidence for the conceptualisation of PTSD outlined in 
Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) cognitive model has been gleaned from a large body of 
research carried out in the area since the authors’ publication of their framework.  This 
includes empirical findings indicating a strong relationship between PTSD symptoms and 
mental defeat (Ehlers et al., 2000); negative interpretations of the trauma (Dunmore, 
Clark, & Ehlers, 1997; Dunmore, Clark, & Ehlers, 1999); negative interpretations of 
initial PTSD symptoms (e.g., Clohessy & Ehlers, 1999; Mayou, Bryant, & Ehlers, 2001); 
perception of permanent change in self or life goals (Dunmore et al., 1999; Ehlers et al., 
2000), and safety behaviours and avoidance (Dunmore et al., 1999).    
Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) claim that trauma memories are poorly elaborated and 
inadequately integrated into autobiographical memory is supported by findings 
demonstrating the fragmentation and disorganisation of trauma memories of those with 
PTSD.  As this poor integration/contextualisation of the trauma memory within AM is 
fundamental to all of the PTSD models informing current practice, empirical findings 
relating to the subject are discussed in greater detail below (see section 1.2.8.4).  
1.2.8.2.5 Critique of the cognitive model. 
Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) model is currently considered by many as the most 
comprehensive and useful model of PTSD, which both accounts for maintenance of the 
disorder and informs an effective treatment protocol, summarised below in section 1.2.9 
(Brewin & Holmes, 2003; Taylor, 2006).  As noted, several features of the model and its 
corresponding treatment programme have accumulated a strong evidence base (e.g., 
Duffy, Gillespie, & Clark, 2007; Ehlers, Clark, Hackmann, McManus, & Fennell, 2005).  
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Ehlers and Clark (2000) have also been commended for incorporating other valuable and 
influential theories of PTSD into their framework, thereby adding to its explanatory 
power (Taylor, 2006).  The introduction and elaboration of the concepts of ‘affect 
without recollection’ and ‘mental defeat’ has further been deemed insightful (Brewin & 
Holmes, 2003; Taylor, 2006).    
Certain aspects of the cognitive model have nonetheless been criticised.  It has 
been proposed that the framework is lacking in parsimony when compared to other 
models of PTSD, such as Brewin et al.’s (1996; 2010) DRT (Taylor, 2006).  It has also 
been suggested that the cognitive model does not offer a persuasive explanation of certain 
PTSD symptoms, including emotional numbing and dissociation (Dalgleish, 2004; 
Taylor, 2006).   
Despite these limitations, Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) model is a highly productive 
theoretical tool for the generation of research (Dalgleish, 2004) and is considered by 
many to be of significant clinical value (e.g., Brewin & Holmes, 2003; Dalgleish, 2004; 
Taylor, 2006).  Moreover, by emphasising appraisal processes, the model provides one of 
the most comprehensive accounts available of how various types of cognition influence 
the aetiology and maintenance of the disorder (Dalgleish, 2004).  A final noteworthy 
strength of Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) model is its direct theory-practice links; for 
example, the model provides a powerful argument for the use of cognitive therapy 
techniques to aid recovery from PTSD (Dalgleish, 2004). 
1.2.8.3 The Dual Representation Theory (DRT). 
As in the SMS (Conway, 2005) and Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) cognitive model, 
the DRT conceptualises PTSD in terms of memory disturbance, highlighting the paradox 
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of memory in trauma whereby intentional recall is often impaired, disorganised and 
fragmented, while intrusive, re-experiencing symptoms tend to be vivid and detailed 
(Brewin et al., 1996).  The DRT draws on the seminal works of Horowitz (1976) and 
Janoff-Bulman (1992) with respect to the impact of trauma on one’s ability to integrate 
the memory into one’s identity and self-narrative, proposing that the manner in which 
traumatic events are attended to, encoded and represented in memory leads to the 
development and maintenance of PTSD symptoms.   
The DRT posits that there are two memory systems which operate in parallel, but 
that one may predominate in certain situations (Brewin, 2001; Brewin et al., 1996). The 
two systems are the ‘verbally accessible memory system’ (VAM) and the ‘situationally 
accessible memory system’ (SAM).  In the recently revised version of the DRT (Brewin, 
Gregory, Lipton, & Burgess, 2010), these systems have been renamed as the contextual 
memory system and the sensory-based memory system, and are proposed to 
accommodate abstract, contextualised representations of memory (C-reps) and inflexible, 
sensory-bound representations of memory (S-reps), respectively.  This updated model is 
informed by evidence from cognitive psychology and neuroscience indicating distinct 
neural substrates underpinning the two systems (see Brewin et al., 2010). 
The original DRT (Brewin et al., 1996; Brewin, 2001) described the VAM 
(contextual memory) system as representing verbal information that was consciously 
perceived and attended to.  Such information is typically expressed in oral or written 
narratives of the traumatic event, thus contextualized in time and space.  The amount of 
information that can be contained in the VAM system is nonetheless limited because 
input is restricted by mechanisms relying on the finite attentional capacities of the 
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individual, which are further reduced by high levels of arousal associated with the 
experience of trauma.  As such, the VAM/contextual memory system can only encode 
elements of the event that the individual attends to, such as peri-traumatic evaluations and 
re-evaluations following the event, which have received sufficient processing to be 
encoded and stored in long-term memory. VAM representations/C-reps can thus be either 
automatically or intentionally retrieved and edited, and are thought to interact with the 
general autobiographical memory base in such a way that the memory is integrated 
within the individual’s broader life-story, comprising one’s past, present and future 
(Brewin, 2001; Brewin et al., 2010).  VAM memories may therefore be accompanied by 
both primary emotions originally experienced during the trauma and secondary emotions 
engendered by retrospective cognitive appraisals of the event (Brewin et al., 1996).  This 
concept echoes that of ‘generative retrieval’ of event-specific, episodic memory that is 
integrated within the autobiographical memory knowledge base, as described in 
Conway’s SMS (Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) and later expanded in 
Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) cognitive model of PTSD.  The VAM/C-reps system is thought 
to depend on prefrontal areas of the brain involved in higher-order functions as well as 
medial temporal lobe structures, such as the hippocampus (Brewin, 2001).  As noted 
earlier in section 1.2.7, neuropsychological research has demonstrated impaired 
functioning in these regions of the brain in individuals with PTSD.  
 The SAM (sensory-based memory) system contains information that is not 
recorded in the VAM/contextual memory system.  The information represented in the 
SAM system is the product of extensive, lower level, perceptual processing of 
information “apprehended too briefly to be consciously recalled” (Brewin, McNally, & 
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Taylor, 2004, p. 105).  Brewin et al. (1996) highlight that the information presented 
during a traumatic event may potentially be crucial to future survival, and is therefore 
recorded in a crude but efficient fashion in the form of large amounts of sensory and 
perceptual images, which lack temporal and spatial contextualisation.  The resulting 
trauma memories represented in the SAM system are typically highly detailed but can 
only be accessed involuntarily when triggered by internal or external cues related to the 
trauma.  As a result, S-reps can be highly difficult to control, especially when the 
individual is not aware of the triggers/cues prompting their reconstruction, as is often the 
case with intrusive symptoms in PTSD.  
The SAM system records and stores images (a term used to refer to all sensory 
modalities), including information about the individual’s physiological responses to the 
trauma, which are inextricably linked to the emotions experienced at the time of the event 
(i.e., primary emotions) (Brewin et al., 1996).  The DRT posits that these sensory-bound 
memory representations (S-reps) form the basis for intrusive PTSD symptoms, such as 
nightmares and flashbacks, and are typically more detailed and emotion-laden than 
ordinary, non-traumatic memories.  The neurophysiological substrates thought to 
underpin S-reps are those of subcortical structures, such as the amygdala and brain areas 
directly involved in perception, such as the temporal lobes, rather than areas dedicated to 
higher level functions (Brewin et al., 2010).   
Traumatic memories in the form of S-reps are experienced as though they are 
happening in the present because they lack contextualisation in time and space. This is 
proposed to be related to the lack of involvement of structures such as the hippocampus 
in the processes underpinning the encoding of these memories (Brewin et al., 2010).  
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Moreover, the SAM system does not use a verbal code therefore the content of S-reps is 
typically difficult to communicate to others; trauma survivors tend to produce 
impoverished or confused descriptions of the traumatic event despite claiming that the 
images they experience are vivid and detailed (Brewin et al., 1996).  S-reps appear to lack 
associations with general autobiographical memory and therefore cannot be updated or 
integrated in an adaptive fashion.     
Importantly, both the VAM and SAM systems are conceived of as part of normal 
memory but as functioning in a disturbed manner in PTSD (Brewin, 2001). Typical 
encoding processes in healthy individuals involve the creation of C-reps and S-reps with 
strong interconnections.  In contrast, the pathological encoding purported to characterise 
PTSD leads to the creation of relatively stronger S-reps, relatively weaker C-reps, and 
defective interconnections (Brewin et al., 2010).   Brewin (2001) explains that the SAM 
and VAM systems compete with each other with the result that the more strongly 
activated memory system predominates and subsequently either activates or inhibits fear 
responses.  When VAM memories take precedence, inhibitory pathways from the 
prefrontal cortex prevent inappropriate amygdala activation and the accompanying re-
experiencing of primary emotions, such as fear (Brewin et al., 1996).  It is proposed 
however that S-reps which contain information that is poorly represented in the 
VAM/contextual memory system invariably show a ‘retrieval advantage’ when 
confronted with cues relating to the trauma; this type of memory retrieval induces 
amygdala activation.  
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1.2.8.3.1 Clinical application of the DRT. 
The DRT posits that recovery from PTSD necessitates resolution of both intrusive 
symptoms and negative cognitions associated with the disorder.  Two mechanisms are 
proposed to facilitate such resolution: actively revisiting the trauma memory to generate a 
communicable narrative, and using cognitive reattribution techniques to integrate trauma 
experiences with prior beliefs.  Detailed descriptions of the neural bases to these 
processes and related empirical evidence are provided in the revised DRT (Brewin et al., 
2010), but given the scope of the current study it is not possible to recount these findings 
here.  
1.2.8.3.2 Empirical evidence in support of the DRT. 
As in the case of Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) cognitive model, there is substantial 
support for the DRT, discussed below in section 1.2.8.4. 
1.2.8.3.3 Critique of the DRT. 
Despite the proposed clinical applications of the DRT outlined above, the theory 
is not linked to a specific therapeutic programme, as in the case of Ehlers and Clark’s 
(2000) cognitive model (Brewin & Holmes, 2003; Taylor, 2006). The DRT is nonetheless 
considered a highly valuable, insightful model of PTSD, particularly in its current, 
updated form (Brewin et al., 2010).  Moreover, the DRT incorporates evidence from 
cognitive psychology and neuroscience indicating distinct neural bases to both C-reps 
and S-reps.  As with the cognitive model, the DRT’s assertion that trauma narratives are 
typically fragmented and disorganised remains nonetheless controversial, particularly as 
the evidence supporting this position is inconclusive (O’Kearney & Perrott, 2006; 
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O’Kearney, Hunt, & Wallace, 2011).  This issue is discussed in detail in section 1.2.8.4 
below.  
Certain critics have highlighted that the original DRT focuses primarily on 
flashbacks, considered the rarest of PTSD symptoms (APA, 2013), but does not address 
more common symptoms such as emotional numbing (Taylor, 2006).  Dissociation is also 
relatively neglected as is the increased conditionability observed in PTSD (Brewin & 
Holmes, 2003).   The original DRT has further been criticised for its failure to elucidate 
delayed onset PTSD; this phenomenon is briefly discussed however in the updated 
version of the model with recourse to neuropsychological findings regarding the capacity 
of the hippocampus to contextualise memories changing over time, although the authors 
concede that the hypotheses in question are as yet speculative (Brewin et al., 2010).  
In conclusion, though not without its limitations, the DRT is thought to have 
substantial explanatory power and to be a highly useful theoretical tool in the generation 
of research and the development of clinical interventions for the treatment of PTSD 
(Dalgleish, 2004).  
1.2.8.4 Empirical support for lack of integration of the PTSD trauma memory. 
Prominent PTSD models (Brewin et al., 1996; Dalgleish, 2004; Ehlers & Clark, 
2000; Horowitz, 1976; Janoff-Bulman, 1988), as discussed above, propose that the PTSD 
trauma memory is not well integrated or contextualised within autobiographical memory, 
thereby resulting in a trauma memory that is disorganised and fragmented.  Of note, 
while certain clinicians and researchers differentiate between the two terms, 
fragmentation and disorganisation are frequently used interchangeably in the literature 
(O’Kearney & Perrott, 2006).  Importantly, the phenomenological properties of both 
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disorganisation and fragmentation have been operationalised as a lack of narrative 
coherence in accounts of the traumatic event upon intentional recall (e.g., Jelinek et al., 
2010; O’Kearney & Perrott, 2006).  Indicators of such narrative incoherence in PTSD 
include confused temporal order, spontaneous shifts from past to present tense verbs, a 
lack of contextual markers, an inability to recall significant aspects of the trauma, low 
levels of complexity of the narrative, lack of detail, repetition, unfinished thoughts and 
speech fillers (Foa et al., 1995; Halligan, Michael, Clark, & Ehlers, 2003; Jelinek et al., 
2010), and a relative lack of organised thoughts/statements “indicating realisation, 
decision-making, or planning” (Foa et al., 1995, p. 682; Halligan et al., 2003).   
One of the earliest studies of these properties of trauma memories was Foa et al.’s 
(1995) analysis of changes in rape victims’ trauma narratives during exposure therapy for 
PTSD.  The authors found that narrative length increased from pre- to post-treatment as 
did percentage of words relating to thoughts and feelings, notably thoughts reflecting 
attempts to organise the trauma memory.  The study also demonstrated a relationship 
between a decrease in narrative fragmentation and a reduction in PTSD symptoms.  Many 
other studies have replicated the finding that disorganised and/or fragmented trauma 
narratives are associated with increased PTSD severity (Halligan et al., 2003; Harvey & 
Bryant, 1999; Jelinek et al., 2009; Jelinek et al., 2010; Jones et al., 2007; Kenardy et al., 
2007; Murray, Ehlers, & Mayou, 2002; O’Kearney et al., 2011; Salmond et al., 2011; 
Van Minnen, Wessel, Dijkstra, & Roelofs, 2002; Waters, Shallcross, & Fivush, 2013; 
Young, 2000; Zoellner, Alvarez-Conrad, & Foa, 2002.).  It has also been demonstrated 
that trauma memories are less conceptually connected than non-trauma memories 
(Ehlers, Hackmann, & Michael, 2004; Krans, Näring, Holmes, & Becker, 2009).  Such 
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impairments in voluntary recall of trauma memories have been shown to predict the 
course of the disorder (e.g., Buck, Kindt, van den Hout, Steens, & Linders, 2007; Ehring, 
Ehlers, & Glucksman, 2008).  
Involuntary, intrusive trauma memories in PTSD have consistently been described 
as perceptually detailed, frequently dominated by visual images (Ehlers et al., 2002; 
Ehlers & Steil, 1995; Hackmann et al., 2004) and typically vividly sensory when 
compared to non-trauma memories (e.g., Hellawell & Brewin, 2002; Holmes, Grey, & 
Young, 2005; Parry & O’Kearney, 2013; Rubin, Feldman, & Beckham, 2004; Speckens, 
Ehlers, Hackmann, Ruths, & Clark, 2007; Whalley, Farmer, & Brewin, 2007).  The sense 
of reliving (‘here-and-now’ quality) characteristic of trauma memories has been shown to 
be more predictive of the course of the disorder than initial symptom levels (Halligan et 
al., 2003; Jones et al., 2007; Kleim, Ehlers, & Glucksman, 2007; Michael, Ehlers, 
Halligan, & Clark, 2005; Speckens, Ehlers, Hackmann, & Clark, 2006) while flashbacks 
are now considered to be causally related to the development of PTSD (Brewin et al., 
2010).  Importantly, these studies have for the most part sampled clinical populations, 
thus adding to their value in terms of clinical implications of findings (Brewin, 2013).   
As such, there exists substantial evidence in support of the central tenets of the 
models of PTSD, particularly with respect to the phenomenological properties of memory 
for trauma.  Some of the earlier studies supporting the inadequate integration position 
(e.g., Foa et al., 1995; Halligan et al., 2003; Harvey & Bryant, 1999; Murray et al., 2002) 
have nonetheless been criticised in terms of their design as they lacked a control either in 
the form of a comparison memory or a control group, such as PTSD versus non-PTSD 
participants (e.g., Rubin, 2011; Robinaugh & McNally, 2011).  More recent studies have 
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therefore employed more rigorous methodology in terms of use of controls (Halligan et 
al., 2003; Jelinek, Randjbar, Seifert, Kellner, & Moritz, 2009). Despite such improved 
design and the existence of findings from multiple studies, data regarding the 
fragmentation, incoherence, and disorganisation of memories for trauma are somewhat 
inconclusive when examined together (e.g., O’Kearney & Perrott, 2006; Rubin, 2011; 
Zoellner & Bittenger, 2004).  It has been proposed, however, that these discrepancies 
may be related to methodological differences between the studies involved (Bedard-
Gilligan & Zoellner, 2012; Brewin, 2013; Megias, Ryan, Vaquero, & Frese, 2007) as 
discussed in section 1.2.8.4 below.  It has also been highlighted that the properties of 
trauma memories established in the studies cited in support of the inadequate integration 
position do not irrefutably imply that traumatic memory is isolated within 
autobiographical memory (O’Kearney et al., 2011).   
The theories and models discussed above, which support the disintegration view, 
inform prevailing treatment programmes for PTSD.  The following section will briefly 
outline current guidelines for treatment of the disorder and will summarily describe the 
core components of certain prominent existing interventions.  
1.2.9 Treatment of PTSD. 
Recent meta-analyses examining the effectiveness of different treatments for 
PTSD indicate that trauma-focussed psychological treatments, such as individual trauma-
focussed cognitive behavioural therapy (TF-CBT) and eye movement desensitization and 
reprocessing (EMDR), are more effective than generic, non-trauma-focussed therapies 
(e.g., Bisson & Andrew, 2009; Cloitre, 2009; Seidler & Wagner, 2006).  In keeping with 
the DRT and Ehlers and Clark’s cognitive model of the disorder, these treatments 
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privilege a focus on the client's memories of the trauma and the personal meanings they 
attribute to these events (Ehlers et al., 2010).   
In line with these findings, current treatment guidelines, both in the UK and 
internationally, recommend trauma-focussed psychological interventions as first-line 
treatments for PTSD (APA, 2013; Foa, Keane, Friedman, & Cohen, 2009; NICE, 2005; 
Stein et al., 2009).  The relative emphasis on various treatment procedures used in these 
interventions differs between protocols, with some focussing on exposure, for example, 
Prolonged Exposure (Foa, Rothbaum, Riggs, & Murdock, 1991), and others prioritising 
cognitive techniques, for example Cognitive Processing Therapy (Resick & Schnicke, 
1992), and Cognitive Therapy (CT) for PTSD (Ehlers, Clark, Hackmann, McManus, & 
Fennell, 2005).  Eye Movement Desensitisation and Reprocessing (EMDR; Shapiro & 
Maxfield, 2002) emphasises the role of bilateral stimulation during brief exposure to 
trauma-related images, which has been demonstrated to help with reprocessing the 
experience of trauma.  Current guidelines in the UK recommend either EMDR or TF-
CBT as the most effective psychological treatments for PTSD (NICE, 2005).   
Of these two trauma-focussed treatments for PTSD, an ever-expanding body of 
empirical findings documents the efficacy of individual TF-CBT; thus providing 
compelling support for this models of treatment (e.g., Foa et al., 2009).  The interventions 
employed in TF-CBT are informed by the inadequate integration theories of PTSD 
outlined earlier.  Typically, such a treatment protocol involves several of the following 
components: psychoeducation, including information about PTSD and its treatment as 
well as a case formulation which is constructed in collaboration with the client; treatment 
engagement strategies; emotion regulation exercises, such as breathing retraining, 
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relaxation exercises, and mastery/pleasure exercises; repeated imaginal reliving of the 
trauma to promote extinction of conditioned fear reactions; confronting the feared 
memory in order to limit negative reinforcement of cognitive and behavioural avoidance 
of trauma-related thoughts, feelings, and reminders; reliving the trauma in a therapeutic, 
supportive setting with the aim of incorporating safety information into the trauma 
memory; focussing on the trauma memory for a prolonged period in order to differentiate 
the trauma from other, non-traumatic events, thereby facilitating realisation that the 
trauma is a specific occurrence rather than a template for all other (future) experiences; 
imaginal reliving to help alter the individual’s appraisal of their PTSD symptoms from 
being a sign of personal incompetence to one of mastery and courage; other forms of 
cognitive restructuring, tailored to the needs of the individual, and preparation of a post-
treatment programme for maintaining gains and preventing relapses (Ehlers et al., 2010; 
Foa et al., 2009; Taylor, 2006).   
1.2.10 Trauma-centred identity and PTSD. 
As highlighted above, the models of PTSD informing current practice 
conceptualise trauma memories in those with PTSD as being inadequately integrated into 
autobiographical memory.  Such lack of integration is deemed fundamental to the 
development and maintenance of PTSD.  In contrast to this disintegration view, however, 
certain cognitive psychologists have recently proposed that due to its distinctiveness and 
emotional impact, memory for trauma in most cases remains highly accessible, and 
further, may form ‘a cognitive reference point for the organisation of autobiographical 
knowledge’ (Berntsen & Rubin, 2007, p. 418).  Moreover, proponents of this view posit 
that mechanisms which are fundamental to everyday, non-traumatic memory can account 
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for the properties of traumatic memories (Rubin et al., 2008; Rubin, Dennis, & Beckham, 
2011).  Models of trauma memory put forward by such theorists tend thus to be single-
system models.  Specifically, such theorists claim that PTSD-specific models are not 
necessary, but rather that the memory difficulties experienced by individuals with PTSD 
can be conceptualized within ordinary memory models.  They argue that memory for 
trauma is essentially similar to general, normal memory as both are the product of the 
same high-level reconstructive processes associated with activity in the medial temporal 
lobes (e.g., Berntsen, Rubin, & Bohni, 2008; Rubin, Berntsen, & Bohni, 2008).    
These contrasting theoretical positions are based on numerous studies that have 
explored the implications, in terms of posttraumatic psychological adjustment, of 
construing trauma as central to one’s identity and to personal remembering (Berntsen & 
Rubin, 2006, 2007).  Early evidence of the detrimental effects of regarding a trauma as 
key to one’s identity was found in McNally et al.’s (1995) study of autobiographical 
memory in Vietnam combat veterans with and without PTSD.  Among veterans with 
PTSD, a sub-group of soldiers who chose to wear Vietnam war regalia during testing 
disproportionately retrieved memories from the war relative to their peers, both those 
with and without PTSD.  The authors suggested that the war regalia was symbolic of the 
centrality of the war (fought 20 years previously) to these participants’ identities, and 
related to their high levels of PTSD symptoms.  Moreover, Sutherland and Byrant’s 
(2005) examination of self-defining memories in trauma survivors with and without 
PTSD demonstrates a clear relationship between trauma-centred identity and PTSD 
symptoms: participants with PTSD reported more self-defining memories that were 
trauma-related and of negative valence than non-PTSD and control participants. 
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Several other studies have found a strong association between trauma forming a central 
component of identity and the life story (as indexed by scores on the Centrality of Event 
Scale, Berntsen & Rubin, 2006) and PTSD symptom severity (see section 1.2.10.1 below 
for details).  Berntsen and Rubin (2006) posit that these studies demonstrate the salience 
of the trauma memory, which, they assert, increases the accessibility and vividness of 
distressing memories of the event. This leads to further rehearsal of the memory, which in 
turn increases the availability of the memory, thereby maintaining and strengthening the 
memory, including its emotional impact, resulting in an increase in PTSD symptoms 
(Berntsen & Rubin, 2006).  This is in keeping with Blagov and Singer’s (2004) assertion 
that self-defining memories are typically highly vivid, affectively intense and repetitively 
recalled.  These phenomenological properties and processes associated with the trauma 
memory, the cognitive theorists argue, are not exclusive to trauma memories, but apply to 
memories for all significant life events (Rubin et al., 2008).   
Of note, the concept of perceived permanent change in self and in life 
expectations is in accordance with contemporary theories of PTSD (e.g., Brewin et al., 
1996; Brewin et al., 2010; Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Ehlers et al., 2000).  The key difference 
between these theories and the ‘centrality’ view is with respect to integration of the 
trauma memory into the autobiographical knowledge base.   
1.2.10.1 Research supporting the centrality position. 
Berntsen and Rubin (2006) developed the Centrality of Event Scale (CES) to 
assess the degree to which an individual construes a traumatic event as key to their 
identity.  It measures the extent to which a memory becomes (i) a reference point for 
everyday inferences; (ii) a turning point in the life story, and (iii) a core component of 
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personal identity.  Since its development, the CES has been employed in several studies 
investigating the relationship between trauma-centred identity and posttraumatic 
adjustment.  The following is an overview of the key findings from some of the main 
studies to date in this area. 
 Berntsen and Rubin have demonstrated that CES scores are positively correlated 
with PTSD symptoms, even when controlling for depression and dissociation (Berntsen 
& Rubin 2006, 2007; Berntsen, Rubin, & Siegler, 2011).  Boals (2010) replicated 
Berntsen and Rubin’s (2006, 2007) findings in a sample of undergraduate students and 
demonstrated a significant relationship between trauma-centred identity and PTSD, 
depression and dissociation. Furthermore, this study explored various phenomenological 
properties of negative/traumatic memories and found that high CES scores were 
significantly related to emotional intensity of the memory, a sense of reliving, and 
visceral reactions while remembering. 
Boals and Schuettler (2011) also found a significant positive correlation between 
CES scores event centrality and PTSD symptoms when controlling for depression, 
cognitive processing of the trauma and coping styles. The authors assert that their 
inclusion of a measure of cognitive processing provides evidence that the CES effectively 
assesses a construct (centrality of event) that is independent of cognitive biases, and thus 
claim to endorse the predictive contribution of event centrality to PTSD.   
Schuettler and Boals (2011), using a large sample of undergraduate students, 
examined the roles of event centrality and coping styles in predicting PTSD symptoms.  
Regression analysis revealed six significant predictors of PTSD which accounted for 66 
per cent of the variance.  Event centrality and avoidant coping were the top two 
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predictors.  Extending this study, Smeets, Giesbrecht, Raymaekers, Shaw, and 
Merckelbach (2010) included coping style in their analysis of the relationship between 
centrality of event and PTSD symptoms, again in a student sample.  Here, however, 
Smeets et al. (2010) focussed on repressive coping style.  Results, as per previous studies, 
indicated a significant positive correlation between CES scores and PTSD symptoms and 
between dissociation and PTSD scores.  Somewhat controversially, this study 
demonstrated that repressive coping correlated negatively with PTSD symptoms.  Of 
note, in Smeets et al.’s (2010) study, repressive coping is conceived of as a “habitual 
emotion regulation strategy” (p. 215), an adaptive response to adverse circumstances, 
thus indicative of resilience.  Smeets et al. contrast the concept of repressive coping with 
that of ‘cognitive reactivity,’ considering their results in the context of previous studies of 
cognitive reactivity and resilience (Bonanno, Papa, Lalande, Westphal, & Coifman, 2004; 
Coifman, Bonanno, Ray, & Gross, 2007).  Importantly, however, such studies have found 
that resilience in the aftermath of traumatic events is determined by the individual’s 
ability to shift flexibly between enhancing and suppressing emotions (Bonanno et al., 
2004).  Repressive coping alone is not typically deemed adaptive.   Nonetheless, Smeets 
et al. (2010) demonstrated in their study that centrality of event, repressive coping and 
dissociation were each found to be independent predictors of PTSD.  Webb and Jobson 
(2011) also replicated findings from previous studies using the CES in a university 
student sample, demonstrating a significant positive correlation between trauma-centred 
identity and PTSD symptoms. 
 Brown, Antonius, Kramer, Root, and Hirst (2010) replicated findings from the 
aforementioned studies in a clinical sample of combat veterans.  Trauma centrality and 
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PTSD symptoms remained significantly correlated when controlling for depression in 
subgroups of veterans with and without PTSD.  Robinaugh and McNally (2011) similarly 
reported on findings from a clinical population of adult females reporting a history of 
childhood sexual abuse. CES scores were significantly positively correlated with PTSD 
symptom severity and depression, and significantly negatively correlated with self-
esteem.  Roland, Currier, Rojas-Flores, and Herrera (2013) found that CES scores and 
PTSD symptom severity were positively correlated in a large sample (n = 257) of 
violence-exposed teachers in El Salvador.    
Lancaster, Rodriguez, and Weston (2011) utilised the CES in a novel way, 
conducting a path analytic examination of various models of the possible relationships 
between posttraumatic cognitions and centrality of a trauma to one’s sense of self in 
predicting PTSD symptoms. The authors thus empirically tested a variant of Ehlers and 
Clark’s (2000) cognitive model of PTSD, incorporating centrality of trauma to identity. 
Although the centrality concept purportedly contradicts the inadequate integration stance 
inherent in Ehlers and Clark’s model, Lancaster et al. (2011) posit that the proposed 
mechanism of PTSD maintenance is similar in both, i.e., both the cognitive model and the 
centrality view purport that PTSD is maintained by a heightened sense of current threat 
resulting from altered appraisals of the world engendered by the experience of trauma.  
The model employed by Lancaster et al. (2011) locates the CES as mediating the 
relationship between cognitions/appraisals and PTSD symptoms.  Results indicate the 
existence of positive relationships between posttraumatic cognitions, centrality of event 
and PTSD symptoms.  Controversially, the authors suggest that this mediating role of 
event centrality calls into question one of the central tenets of Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) 
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cognitive model of PTSD, that of memories for trauma being maintained because they are 
poorly integrated within autobiographical memory.  
 Robinaugh and McNally (2010) investigated levels of PTSD in an online, 
community sample following events inciting shame or guilt and explored the relationship 
between PTSD symptoms and the centrality of the traumatic memory to participants’ 
identity.  The study controlled for depression and also examined visual perspective in 
traumatic memories (field or observer) as well as other phenomenological properties of 
these memories, such as emotional intensity, intrusiveness, reliving, contextual details, 
and personal coherence.  As in previous studies, a significant positive correlation was 
found between PTSD symptoms and centrality of event.  The study also found that CES 
mediated the moderating effect of visual perspective on the relationship between 
emotional intensity of memories and PTSD symptoms.  Based on this, the authors 
proposed that visual perspective (field or observer) is indicative of the congruence 
between an individual’s identity and their autobiographical memory for the shame-/guilt-
provoking event.  Results indicated that from an observer perspective, there was no 
significant relationship between emotional intensity and PTSD symptoms, yet from a 
field perspective there was a significant association, i.e., greater emotional intensity was 
associated with increased severity of PTSD.  Interestingly, from a field perspective, 
participants also reported lower personal coherence, but better memory for the setting and 
spatial layout in which the event occurred. 
  Rubin et al. (2011) also explored the phenomenological properties of both 
voluntary and involuntary memories for stressful events associated with PTSD 
symptoms.  In both voluntary and involuntary memories, they found that emotional 
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intensity, rehearsal of the memory, and centrality of the event to one’s life story were 
positively associated with PTSD.  The authors measured other properties traditionally 
associated with trauma memories, such as incoherence of voluntary memories and 
enhanced availability of involuntary memories (e.g., Brewin et al., 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 
2000).  Results showed that participants with PTSD rated their memories as more 
coherent, a difference which was not modified by voluntary versus involuntary retrieval.  
Moreover, all memories (traumatic/stressful/important/positive) in participants with 
PTSD demonstrated more emotional intensity, higher rates of retrieval (both voluntary 
and involuntary) and were more central to identity.  The authors concluded that this 
implies a tendency for individuals with PTSD to react with intense affect to all memories, 
which in turn increases rehearsal and encoding and therefore also availability.  Of note, 
participants with PTSD were shown to have memories that were more fragmented (‘in 
pieces’) than participants without PTSD, thus supporting the inadequate integration view 
rather than the centrality position, but the authors suggest that this fragmentation may be 
related to alcohol abuse and lack of social support rather than PTSD symptom severity.  
1.2.10.2 Critique of the centrality view. 
Whilst proponents of the centrality view suggest that the findings outlined above 
provide evidence of the significance of centrality of event in both the development and 
maintenance of PTSD, it is not yet clear whether trauma-centred identity plays a causal 
role in the development of the disorder.  Indeed, all of the aforementioned studies are 
cross-sectional in design, thus precluding determination of causality.  Furthermore, 
findings need to be replicated consistently in different populations, particularly clinical 
populations, as the majority of studies cited in support of the centrality view were 
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undertaken in student populations only (Brewin, 2011; Brewin, 2013; Robinaugh & 
McNally, 2011).  As noted earlier, prevalence rates for experiencing a trauma are 
remarkably high, but only a certain number of individuals develop PTSD.  Currently 
influential clinical theories of the disorder (Brewin et al., 2010; Ehlers & Clark, 2000) 
propose that the disturbance in memory that characterises PTSD cannot be established in 
healthy survivors of trauma but rather only in those who display poor traumatic 
adjustment to the extent that they meet criteria for a diagnosis (Brewin, 2013).  
With respect to the debate on inadequate integration versus centrality, it is 
interesting to note that Lancaster et al. (2011) juxtaposed the two apparently 
contradictory concepts in their model of the relationships between cognitions/appraisals, 
CES and PTSD.  They concluded that their findings significantly challenged the integrity 
of Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) model.  Proponents of the inadequate integration view have 
however suggested that this apparent contradiction is false and may be resolved through 
consideration of Conway’s (2005) various levels of autobiographical memory (i.e., the 
working self, the conceptual self, and the autobiographical knowledge base).  Brewin 
(2011, 2013) proposes that it is possible to retain conceptual knowledge of the self after 
experiencing a trauma with the fact of the trauma having happened dominating one’s 
mental life, while also failing to integrate certain episodic memories into the 
autobiographical knowledge base, thus experiencing trauma memories as fragmented and 
disconnected.  Indeed, proponents of the centrality view cite the positive association 
between CES scores and PTSD severity as evidence that greater integration leads to 
greater PTSD (e.g, Berntsen & Rubin, 2007), yet it has been proposed that items on the 
CES addressing the identity and turning point constructs may drive this association rather 
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than those addressing the integration of the trauma with other autobiographical memories 
(Robinaugh & McNally, 2011).  Brewin (2013) has also highlighted that several of the 
CES studies show a problematic reliance on single-item measures to address complex 
concepts such as fragmentation and disorganisation, and also frequently fail to distinguish 
between voluntary and involuntary memory.  
Of the studies discussed above, the four which examined the phenomenological 
properties of trauma memories noted that higher CES scores were related to higher 
ratings of memory vividness, emotional intensity and visceral reactions (Boals, 2010; 
Robinaugh & McNally, 2010; Rubin et al., 2011; Schuettler & Boals, 2011) and rehearsal 
(Rubin et al., 2011).  In contrast, none of these studies reported evidence of fragmented 
or disintegrated memories for trauma (with the exception of Rubin et al., (2011) who 
proposed that the fragmentation they observed was more likely linked to substance 
misuse than incoherence of the trauma memory). 
1.2.10.3 Clinical applications of the centrality view. 
Trauma-centred identity appears to be highly significant in the maintenance, at 
least, of PTSD, and as such, it has been proposed that some individuals may benefit from 
therapy which explicitly addresses the centrality of the trauma to their view of 
self/others/the world (e.g., Lancaster et al., 2011; Robinaugh & McNally, 2010; Rubin et 
al., 2011).  The findings relating to trauma-centred identity highlight the importance of 
considering self-concept in PTSD interventions, such as schema work that addresses 
‘vulnerable identities’ (Brewin, 2003), integrating current views of the self into prior self-
knowledge, and making sense of the trauma with respect to existing aspects of self-
concept (Hembree & Foa, 2004).  Importantly, negative changes in self-concept have 
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been found to predict a greater risk of developing PTSD (e.g., Dunmore et al., 1997; 
Ehlers, Mayou, & Bryant, 1998) and poorer response to exposure in those receiving 
treatment (Ehlers et al., 1998).  It has therefore been proposed that construing a trauma as 
separate from the self may be a necessary step in the effective treatment of PTSD (Boals, 
2010; Robinaugh & McNally, 2010; Webb & Jobson, 2011).  Indeed, Shamai and Levin-
Megged (2006), in their analysis of Holocaust survivors’ therapeutic outcomes, 
concluded that the survivors “achieve[d] a sense of well-being by leaving the traumatic 
narrative in a capsule separated from other parts of the life-story” (p. 708).   Critics of 
this approach nonetheless highlight that the exact role of centrality of event within PTSD 
symptomatology has yet to be elucidated; more substantial evidence supporting the 
effectiveness of separating the trauma memory must be accrued before conclusions can 
be drawn or current treatment programmes altered (Brewin, 2013).   
1.3 Rationale for the current research  
In light of the inadequate integration of PTSD trauma memories versus the 
centrality of PTSD trauma memories debate, the current study proposes to explore further 
the relationship between trauma-centred identity, autobiographical memory and 
adjustment to trauma.  It will endeavour to investigate if indeed the two apparently 
opposing positions of centrality (Bernsten & Rubin, 2006) and inadequate integration 
(e.g., Brewin et al., 1996, 2010; Ehlers & Clark, 2000) can co-exist, as asserted by 
Brewin (2011, 2013).  This will involve analysing the phenomenological properties of 
memory for trauma and memory for a negative, non-traumatic event with a view to then 
investigating the relationship between centrality, autobiographical remembering and 
PTSD symptoms.  The inclusion of a negative, non-traumatic memory as a comparison 
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memory aims to distinguish properties of memory and centrality of event for trauma from 
those of general autobiographical memories. 
Research has consistently shown that trauma narratives of individuals with PTSD 
are dominated by sensory, perceptual and emotional language (see O’Kearney & Perrott, 
2006, for a review).  The evidence relating to the fragmentation and disorganisation of 
trauma memories is, however, less consistent. Certain discrepancies in the literature have 
been explicated in terms of the different methodologies employed.  It has been proposed 
that self-report standardised questionnaires show lower levels of fragmentation and 
disorganisation than analyses of trauma narratives (Brewin, 2013; Megias, Ryan, 
Vaquero, & Frese, 2007; Parry & O’Kearney, 2013).  Accordingly, O’Kearney and 
colleagues (O’Kearney & Perrott, 2006; O’ Kearney et al., 2011) highlight the need for 
further research on trauma narratives in terms of their lexicon and linguistic structure as 
such features may provide significant insights into memory organisation and the 
relationship between trauma memories and AM.  In a related vein, O’Kearney et al. 
(2011) highlight the limitations of using memory self-report questionnaires alone and 
assert that multi-method approaches are critical to assess trauma memory integration 
within AM and the impact of this phenomenon on posttraumatic adjustment.  Recently, 
Brewin (2013) reviewed findings relating to disorganisation and fragmentation of trauma 
memories and similarly proposed that brief, self-report measures have yielded less 
consistent findings than more rigorous, comprehensive studies involving textual analysis 
of trauma narratives as well as self-report measures.  In light of these findings and 
suggestions, the current study hopes to add to existing research by investigating the 
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phenomenological properties of memories for trauma using both self-report measures and 
textual analysis.   
Exploration of these issues may lead to greater understanding of the mechanisms 
at play in the relationship between AM, trauma-centred identity and adjustment to 
trauma.  The results of the study may thus contribute to a theoretical basis for developing 
interventions for PTSD.  If findings support Berntsen and Rubin’s (2006) claim that 
higher levels of trauma integration lead to greater symptom severity, the clinical 
implications are significant.  For example, treatment of PTSD may necessitate 
distinguishing the trauma memory from a client’s self-defining autobiographical memory 
base, i.e., reframing and separating the trauma so that it is no longer a cognitive reference 
point for all other experience, but rather a piece of the individual’s whole life story and 
identity (Webb & Jobson, 2011).  If, however, evidence for lack of integration of trauma 
memory into the autobiographical knowledge base emerges, the implications for 
treatment are, as currently, a continued emphasis on developing conceptual associations 
between memories of the trauma and existing autobiographical memories (e.g., Ehlers et 
al., 2005).  This approach aims to help the individual to integrate the trauma into their 
overall life story and identity in such a way as to allow processing of the trauma memory 
and subsequently, resolution of PTSD symptoms.  
1.3.1 Research Questions. 
The aim of the current study is to investigate whether disorganised/fragmented 
memories can be associated with centrality of event to identity (as indexed by the CES), 
and whether both disorganised/fragmented memories and centrality of event are 
associated with higher PTSD symptoms. 
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Specifically, the following research questions will be addressed: 
1. Are there differences in the phenomenological properties of trauma memories 
when compared to non-traumatic, negative memories (as indexed by self-report 
measures and textual analysis measures)? 
2. What phenomenological properties (indexed by both self-report measures and text 
analysis measures) of trauma memories are associated with higher PTSD 
symptom severity? 
3. What properties of trauma memories (indexed by both self-report measures and 
text analysis measures) are associated with higher levels of centrality of trauma 
event to identity?  
62 
 
CHAPTER 2 
2 Method 
2.1 Overview 
In this chapter, the design of the study is outlined.  Following this, participant 
information and the recruitment process employed in the study are detailed.  The 
measures utilised are described, ethical considerations discussed and the procedure 
reported.  The chapter concludes with a plan for statistical analysis of the data obtained.    
2.2 Design 
The overall objective of the study was to investigate the relationship between 
trauma-centred identity, selected phenomenological properties of trauma memories and 
PTSD symptoms.  To this end, a quantitative, cross-sectional, correlational within-
subjects design was employed whereby all participants completed the same specified set 
of questionnaires (see section 2.5 below).  
2.3 Participants 
Participants aged between 18 and 65 years were recruited from the general 
community population.  Inclusion criteria comprised having a sufficient level of English 
to effectively complete the measures and having experienced a traumatic event.  
Definition of a traumatic event was based broadly on the DSM-IV PTSD criteria (APA, 
1994) as participants’ experience of trauma and subsequent eligibility to participate in the 
study was assessed using the Posttraumatic Stress Diagnostic Scale (PDS).1   
                                                 
1 DSM-5 (2013) is referred to in the introduction to this thesis as this edition of the manual was published 
in the year of submission, and the study sought to provide up-to-date details on the clinical features of 
PTSD.  The PDS, however, was devised based on DSM-IV criteria for diagnosis of PTSD therefore the 
study’s sample was considered with reference to this text as the study was designed prior to the publication 
of DSM-5.   
 
63 
 
Recommended sample sizes were based on calculations using G*Power 3.1 (Faul, 
Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2009).  Assuming a normal distribution in the obtained 
sample, for multiple two-tailed correlations to be carried out, calculations were based on 
a medium effect size of 0.3 (Cohen, 1988), an alpha error probability of .05 and power of 
.80.  The sample size required for analysis was 82 participants.  This sample size was also 
deemed adequate for investigating differences between the trauma memory and negative 
memory using multiple paired t-tests; assuming an effect size of 0.5 (based on previous 
research e.g., Hellawell & Brewin, 2002; Rubin et al., 2011), an alpha error probability of 
.05 and power of .80, a sample size of 34 participants was required to detect a significant 
difference.  Given that prevalence rates for experiencing a trauma are estimated at 
approximately 70 per cent in the general population (Resick, 2001), it was expected that 
while there would be a large number of trauma survivors displaying a range of PTSD 
symptoms among study participants, a small proportion of those recruited would not meet 
the inclusion criteria for trauma exposure, and thus, their data would need to be excluded.  
Allowing for this exclusion of data relating to individuals who had not experienced a 
trauma, the study aimed to recruit a minimum of 100 participants in total.  
2.4 Ethical considerations 
2.4.1 Ethical approval. 
Ethical approval for this study was granted by the UEA Faculty of Medicine and 
Health Sciences Research Ethics Committee (see Appendix A).  
2.4.2 Informed consent. 
Participants who expressed interest in the study were automatically redirected to 
the online survey when they clicked on the link on the advertisement.  In the participant 
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information sheet (See Appendix C), potential participants were informed of the general 
topic of the study and of what participation entailed.  The voluntary nature of 
participation was highlighted and confidentiality of responses assured.  Relevant contact 
numbers and email addresses were also provided.  Participants were next presented with a 
consent form screen (see Appendix D) which clearly explained that by clicking on 
“NEXT,” the participant was giving consent to participate.  At the end of each screen, 
participants were reminded that they had the right to withdraw from the study at any 
point without giving a reason for doing so.  Data belonging to participants who clicked on 
the option to withdraw were destroyed. 
2.4.3 Management of risk and distress. 
Participants were deemed to be at some risk of becoming distressed by their 
involvement in the study as the questionnaires addressed potentially upsetting topics, 
such as previously experienced traumatic events.  As noted above, at the end of each 
screen, participants were informed that they had the right to withdraw from the study at 
any point without giving a reason for doing so.  Moreover, to minimise potential 
participant distress, a debrief sheet was provided to participants following participation, 
regardless of how many questionnaires the participants had completed (see Appendix L).  
This debrief sheet included details on services available to individuals struggling to cope 
with their mood, distress and/or memories; participants were advised to contact their GP 
and were made aware of charitable organisations (e.g., The Samaritans), who may be able 
to offer them support.  Furthermore, telephone numbers and email/postal addresses for 
the researcher and primary supervisor were provided on both the participant information 
sheet and the debrief sheet for any participants who wished to contact them in the event 
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of experiencing distress, or if they had any significant concerns regarding their well-
being and/or questions arising from their participation in the study.   
2.4.4 Data storage and confidentiality. 
Confidential data were held securely.  Following study completion, digital data 
were saved onto the UEA secure hard drive and a password-protected memory stick.  
Data will be retained for five years in accordance with NHS protocol and the Data 
Protection Act (1998), i.e., that the research data be archived and accessible for critical 
review for this period of time (Department of Health, 2005).  Participants’ contact details 
for the prize draw were kept on a second encrypted memory stick, separate from that with 
the digital data from the questionnaires.  These details were destroyed as soon as the draw 
had taken place (immediately after data collection had been completed).    
2.4.5 Communicating study results. 
After completion of the study questionnaires, all participants were given an 
opportunity to request that they receive information about the results of the study by 
providing an email address or contacting the researcher directly via email or telephone.  
Participants could choose to either be included in the prize draw or receive a summary of 
findings or both (see section 2.6 below detailing the study procedure, and Appendix K).  
For the duration of the study, participants’ email addresses were stored on an encrypted 
memory stick and as soon as the summary of findings was sent and the prize winner 
notified, all contact details were destroyed.  
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2.5 Measures 
2.5.1 Measures assessing posttraumatic psychological adjustment. 
2.5.1.1 The Posttraumatic Stress Diagnostic Scale.  
 Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) was assessed using the Posttraumatic stress 
Diagnostic Scale (PDS; Foa, Cashman, Jaycox, & Perry, 1997).  The PDS is a 49-item 
self-report measure which determines the severity of PTSD symptoms related to a single 
identified traumatic event (Foa et al., 1997).  It assesses all DSM-IV criteria for PTSD 
(APA, 1994) and consists of four parts (see Appendix F).  The first part is a trauma 
checklist which, as noted above, was used to ensure all participants had experienced a 
trauma event. The second part asks respondents to describe their most upsetting traumatic 
event.  This part was slightly modified in the current study.  Typically, in the PDS the 
participant is provided with a few lines to describe the trauma event.  In the current study, 
in order to obtain rich trauma narratives conducive to textual analysis, participants were 
given a space of 6,000 characters (approximately 1,000 words) to type to describe this 
event.  The third PDS section assesses the 17 PTSD symptoms outlined in DSM-IV 
(APA, 1994).  Respondents are asked to rate the severity of each symptom on Likert-type 
scales which range from 0 (not at all or only one time) to 3 (5 or more times a 
week/almost always).  The fourth and final part of the PDS assesses interference of PTSD 
symptoms in the individual’s everyday functioning and well-being.  Total severity scores 
range from 0 to 51, with scores of 15 or greater indicating clinical caseness (e.g., Sheeran 
& Zimmerman, 2002).   Levels of severity of PTSD symptoms have been categorised as 
follows: 0 = no rating, 1-10 = mild PTSD, 11-20 = moderate PTSD, 21-35 = moderate-
severe PTSD, >36 = severe PTSD.  The PDS has shown high face validity and high 
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internal consistency (α = .92), with test-retest reliability high over a 2-3 week period 
(kappa = 0.74).  The PDS has also demonstrated good convergent validity (kappa = .65; 
82 per cent agreement with the PTSD module of the Structured Clinical Interview 
(SCID); Spitzer, Williams, Gibbons, & First, 1990).  The measure is widely used in both 
clinical and research settings (Elhai, Gray, Kashdan, & Franklin, 2005) and has been 
consistently validated using samples aged 18-65 years (Keane, Silberbogen, & Weierich, 
2008).  Internal consistency for the PDS in the current study was high (Cronbach’s alpha 
= .91). 
2.5.1.2 The Centre for Epidemiological Studies – Depression scale. 
In order to assess depressive symptoms, participants were asked to complete the 
Centre for Epidemiological Studies – Depression scale (CES-D; Radloff, 1977, see 
Appendix J).  The CES-D consists of 20 items which are rated on a 4-point Likert-type 
scale ranging from 0 (rarely or none of the time) to 3 (most or all of the time).  It 
comprises six scales reflecting major dimensions of depression: depressed mood, feelings 
of guilt and worthlessness, feelings of helplessness and hopelessness, psychomotor 
retardation, loss of appetite, and sleep disturbance.  Responses are based on the amount 
of time in the previous week during which symptoms have been experienced (i.e., 
ranging from less than one day to 5-7 days).  Total score ranges from 0-60 with higher 
scores reflecting greater levels of depression.  The CES-D has been shown to be a reliable 
measure for assessing the number, types and duration of depressive symptoms (Knight, 
Williams, McGee & Olaman, 1997; Radloff, 1977; Roberts, Vernon, & Rhoades, 1989).  
High internal consistency has been reported with Cronbach’s alpha coefficients ranging 
from .85 to .90 across studies (Radloff, 1977).  Both concurrent validity by clinical and 
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self-report criteria and construct validity have been demonstrated (Radloff, 1977).  
Internal consistency in the current study was found to be high (Cronbach’s alpha = .93).  
2.5.2 Measure of trauma-centred identity. 
2.5.2.1 The Centrality of Event Scale. 
Trauma-centred identity was assessed using the Centrality of Event Scale (CES; 
Berntsen & Rubin, 2006, see Appendix H).  The CES is a 20-item Likert-type scale used 
to determine the extent to which an event is integral to an individual’s identity.  It 
assesses the extent to which the event is a turning point in one’s life, the extent to which 
the event is central to one’s identity, and the extent to which the event acts as a reference 
point structuring the organisation of autobiographical memory (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006).  
Responses are scored from 1 (totally disagree) to 5 (totally agree).  Total scores range 
from 20-100 with higher scores reflecting greater centrality of event. The CES has been 
shown to correlate with all three symptom clusters of the DSM-IV PTSD diagnosis 
(Berntsen & Rubin, 2006) (range r = .28–32), and to be highly reliable (range α = .88 – 
.94).  In the current study, participants completed the CES twice; once in relation to a 
trauma, described as part of the PDS, and once in relation to a negative event.  Internal 
consistency was high (Cronbach’s alpha = .96). 
2.5.3 Measures of autobiographical memory quality. 
2.5.3.1 Narratives. 
As outlined above, for the trauma memory, as part of the PDS, participants were 
asked to write about their trauma in as much detail as possible and were given a large 
amount of typing space to do this (6,000 characters/1,000 words).  Participants were 
instructed, as in Jobson (2011), to “write about this event in as much detail as you can.  
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All of your writing will be completely confidential.  As you type, do not worry about 
punctuation or grammar, just write as much as you can and include thoughts, feelings, 
and reflections.” Participants were also asked to describe a negative, non-traumatic event 
as a comparison memory (see Appendix I).  As in the case of their description of a 
traumatic event, participants were given a large amount of space in which to type as 
much or as little as they wished.  Instructions for this task were the same as those for the 
trauma memory. 
2.5.3.2 Phenomenological properties of memory. 
The phenomenological properties of participants’ trauma and negative memories 
were investigated using two methods, a self-report questionnaire and computerised 
textual analysis.  
The self-report measure used was the Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire 
(AMQ; Rubin, Schrauf, & Greenberg, 2003, see Appendix G).  It consists of a set of 
scales to measure the phenomenological properties of autobiographical memories, i.e., 
how such memories are perceived and experienced by the individual.  The AMQ assesses 
features of the memory on a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (not at all, 
completely different) to 7 (as clearly as if it were happening right now). 
Phenomenological properties assessed by the AMQ include sensory detail of the memory 
(e.g., items such as ‘As I remember the event, I can hear it in my mind,’ and ‘As I 
remember the event, I can see it in my mind); a sense of reliving experienced while 
remembering the event (‘As I remember the event, I feel as though I am reliving the 
original event’ and ‘As I remember the event, I feel that I travel back to the time when it 
happened, that I am a subject in it again, rather than an outside observer tied to the 
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present’); coherence of the memory (‘As I remember the event, it comes to me in words’ 
and ‘As I remember the event, it comes to me in words or pictures as a coherent story or 
episode and not just as an isolated fact, observation or scene’); and fragmentation (‘My 
memory of the event is fragmented into specific details with missing bits’).  In keeping 
with the aim of the current study to investigate fragmentation of trauma memories and 
centrality of event in relation to PTSD symptom severity, the analysis carried out 
involved these four AMQ properties as well as ‘detail of the memory’ (‘My memory for 
the event is only as detailed as the general knowledge of this type of event that I would 
expect most people to have’) and rehearsal of the memory (‘Since it happened I have 
thought or talked about this event’).  Of note, the current study grouped together all 
sensory items to form a sensory detail subscale, and similarly a reliving subscale and a 
coherence subscale with the two items pertaining to each (listed above) totalled.  This is 
in keeping with previous research (e.g., Gauer, da Silva Alencastro, & Barbosa Gomes, 
2010; Talarico, LaBar & Rubin, 2004).  
The AMQ has been used extensively in research on autobiographical memory, 
mostly in relation to negative, positive and ‘stressful’ memories; less frequently in 
relation to traumatic memories, but is deemed suitable for this purpose (Rubin et al., 
2011).  As the scale is not totalled, reliability estimates cannot be reported.  In the current 
study, participants completed the AMQ in relation to a trauma memory and also a 
negative, non-traumatic memory.  
Textual analysis of the narratives was carried out using Linguistic Inquiry and 
Word Count (LIWC; Pennebaker et al., 2007), a computerised textual analysis 
programme.  The two narratives were coded using LIWC for the following lexical and 
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syntactic categories: number of words, cognitive processes (including, specifically, 
insight-related and causality-related words), negative emotions, positive emotions, 
sensory words, use of past tense, use of present tense, conjunctions, and contextual 
markers, such as spatial references (see Appendix M for examples of the types of lexical 
items counted by LIWC in these categories).  These LIWC categories were chosen 
because the primary aim of the current study was to investigate trauma memory 
fragmentation in relation to centrality of event.   As outlined earlier, fragmentation and 
disorganisation in trauma memories are typically operationalised as a lack of narrative 
coherence upon intentional recall of the trauma.  The LIWC categories selected in the 
current study were based on the use of similar categories and/or comparable indices in 
previous studies to gauge narrative (in)coherence (e.g., Boals & Perez, 2009; Halligan et 
al., 2005; Jelinek et al., 2009; Jones et al., 2007; O’Kearney et al., 2011).   
2.5.4 Demographics. 
Participants were asked to disclose their age, gender, ethnicity, religious 
affiliation, level of education, and whether or not they had previously been diagnosed 
with PTSD (see Appendix E for the demographic information form).  Apart from details 
relating to age and gender, these demographic items were not obligatory; participants 
could not continue to the study questionnaires if they did not provide their age and 
gender, but they could skip the other items if they so wished.   
2.6 Procedure 
The study was advertised on free online local advertising websites (namely 
www.freeads.co.uk; www.adtrader.co.uk; www.adoos.co.uk; www.freeindex.co.uk) and 
in local newspapers.  Family members and friends of the researcher also posted the study 
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advertisement on social media networking sites, such as Facebook.  The advertisement 
presented the study as an investigation into memory for significant events and how these 
events relate to one’s sense of identity.  It did not explicitly call for trauma survivors in 
order to avoid obtaining a potentially limiting self-selecting sample of individuals who 
defined themselves in terms of their trauma (see Appendix B). 
The advertisement contained the study’s website address, which those interested 
in participating could use to access all necessary information pertaining to the study as 
well as the questionnaires, which were presented to participants in an online format using 
SurveyMonkey®.  Participants were reminded that they should take time to consider their 
participation before consenting to take part.  Once participants agreed to participate by 
completing the consent page, they were brought to the study questionnaires (see 
Appendices D-J), which were presented in the following order (in the majority of cases, 
see below): demographics, PDS (including narrative of trauma memory), AMQ in 
relation to trauma memory, CES in relation to trauma memory, narrative of negative 
memory, AMQ in relation to negative memory, CES in relation to negative memory, 
CES-D (depression scale).  The order of the negative and trauma memories was 
counterbalanced, and thus, the questionnaires were presented to participants according to 
their selection of either “1” (trauma narrative and associated tasks first, followed by 
negative memory and associated tasks) or “2” (negative narrative and associated tasks 
first, followed by trauma memory and associated tasks).  Results showed that less than 5 
per cent of participants chose option 2 therefore the vast majority of responses comprised 
questionnaires completed in the first order.  The questionnaires took approximately 45-60 
minutes to complete.   
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Participants’ online responses were automatically stored on the secured website 
when they clicked on “FINISH.”  On completion of the study, participants were given the 
opportunity to be entered into a prize draw for £80 Amazon.co.uk vouchers as a way of 
thanking them for their participation (see Appendix K).  Those who wished to be entered 
into the draw were asked to provide contact details in the form of an email address (see 
Appendix K).  Participants’ contact details for the prize draw were kept on an encrypted 
memory stick, separate from that holding the digital data from completed questionnaires.  
Following data collection, the researcher randomly selected an email address using ‘The 
Hat,’ a free online computer programme that shuffles data and randomly selects one item.  
Participants’ contact details were destroyed as soon as the draw had taken place and the 
winner was notified.  
2.7 Plan of Analysis  
Data were analysed using the Statistical Package for Social Science for Windows, 
version 21.0 (SPSS, 2012).  Firstly, data were examined for normality.  Given that the 
majority of variables were non-normally distributed and remained non-normally 
distributed after attempts at transformation, non-parametric analyses were employed.  In 
order to address the first research question investigating differences between the 
phenomenological properties of trauma memories and those of non-traumatic, negative 
memories (as indexed by self-report measures and textual analysis measures), Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank tests were used.  In order to address both the second research question (i.e., 
what phenomenological properties of trauma memories are associated with PTSD 
symptoms) and third research question (i.e., what properties of trauma memories are 
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associated with higher levels of centrality of trauma event to identity), Spearman’s Rho 
correlation co-efficients were employed.  
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CHAPTER 3 
3 Results 
3.1 Overview 
This chapter begins by reviewing participant characteristics and the data 
management strategies employed in the study.  Reliability and assumptions for 
parametric analyses are then assessed.  Each research question is considered in turn.  The 
chapter concludes with a summary of the study’s findings.  
3.2 Participant Characteristics  
A total of 162 online participants were recruited between May 2013 and 
September 2013.  Sixty-eight participants discontinued the study after completing the 
consent form (of which four did not give their consent to take part therefore they could 
not access the study questionnaires).  Of the remaining 94 participants, 10 reported no 
experience of trauma and were therefore excluded from analysis.  A further two were 
excluded for significant missing data.  
The remaining 82 participants (male n = 24; mean age = 36.10 years, SD = 10.82 
years) comprised the total number of cases that were analysed.  In terms of ethnicity, data 
were gathered from the open-ended item on the demographic information form which 
enabled participants to describe their ethnicity in their own words.  Twenty-two 
participants chose not to disclose their ethnicity.  The 60 responses obtained were 
grouped into the following categories: White (including White British, White Irish, White 
Other), 49 participants; Asian/Asian British/Asian Other, 4 participants; Mixed 
Race/Multiple Ethnicity, 4 participants; Hispanic, 1 participant; Black/Black 
British/Black Other, 2 participants, and, finally, Other, 2 participants (these two 
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respondents described themselves as American Indian and Middle Eastern).  Twenty-one 
participants chose not to disclose their religious affiliation. Of those who did provide this 
information, the following category totals were observed: Christian (22 participants), 
Jewish (1), Muslim (4), Hindu (2), Other religion (2), and Not religious (30).  
In terms of the highest level of education completed by participants, the following 
data were gathered: primary school (2), secondary school (6), undergraduate 
degree/training (24), and postgraduate degree/training (28). Twenty-two participants did 
not disclose this information.  
Five study participants reported that they had received a diagnosis of PTSD in the 
past. Twenty-one participants did not respond to this item.  The remaining 56 reported 
that they had not received a diagnosis of PTSD.  Participants reported a wide range of 
types of trauma.  The most frequently endorsed category on the PDS was ‘other’ (25 per 
cent of participants).  Participants classed traumas such as domestic violence, traumatic 
childbirth, learning of a suicide of a close friend or family member, and life-threatening 
illness of a close friend or family member as ‘other.’  The second largest category of 
trauma was accident (17 per cent), followed by life-threatening illness (15 per cent), then 
non-sexual assault by a family member and sexual assault by a family member (both 7 
per cent).  Details regarding the numbers of participants who experienced different types 
of trauma are available in Appendix N.  With respect to length of time since occurrence 
of the trauma, the following details were gathered from the PDS, completed by all 82 
participants included in the study’s analysis: 1-3 months (2 participants), 3-6 months (3 
participants), 6 months-3 years (10 participants), 3-5 years (12 participants), and more 
than 5 years (55 participants).      
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The group had a mean PTSD symptom score (as indexed by the PDS) of 11.92 
(SD = 12.07) and a mean depression score (as indexed by the CES-D) of 18.07 (SD = 
12.60).  In terms of PTSD symptom severity, 15 participants had no symptoms of PTSD, 
29 showed mild symptoms of PTSD (i.e. scored between 1-10 on PDS), 18 showed 
moderate symptoms of PTSD (i.e. scored between 11-20 on the PDS), 11 showed 
moderate to severe PTSD (i.e. scored between 21-35 on the PDS) and five participants 
showed severe PTSD (i.e. scored above 35 on the PDS) (Foa et al., 1997).  Twenty-five 
of the study’s 82 participants (31 per cent) obtained a score of 15 or more on the PDS, 
indicating clinical caseness (Sheeran & Zimmerman, 2002).  
The sample had a mean score of 61.29 (SD = 21.62) for the CES in relation to the 
trauma event and a mean score of 45.77 (SD = 19.90) for the CES in relation to the 
negative event, which a Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test indicated differed significantly, Z = 
3.81, p <.001, r = .33.  Furthermore, as found in previous research, Spearman’s Rho 
correlation co-efficient revealed a strong, positive relationship between PTSD symptom 
severity and CES scores in relation to the trauma event, rs (68) = .61, p <.001.   
3.3 Treatment of Data 
 Data were screened and analysed using SPSS 21.0 (SPSS, 2012).  Missing data 
and anomalous values were investigated.  No identifiable errors were found.  Participants 
with missing data were subject to pairwise exclusion (Pallant, 2010; Tabachnik & Fidell, 
2007).   
Data obtained from each measure were examined to ascertain whether or not 
parametric assumptions were met.  Histograms were used to assess data distributions 
visually.  Normality was then tested using skewness and kurtosis values and the 
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Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic, whereby significance values of p >.05 indicate 
normality.  Boxplots were used to identify outliers, of which there were none.   
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests revealed non-normally distributed data for PDS 
scores, AMQ scores in relation to trauma memory, CES scores in relation to trauma 
memory, depression (CES-D) scores, and LIWC scores on both trauma memory and non-
trauma memory narratives.  Log and square root transformations were attempted and 
achieved normality for the PDS and CES-D scores, but did not improve normality for the 
AMQ trauma scores, CES trauma scores or LIWC scores.  Consequently, differences 
between trauma memories and non-trauma memories on the AMQ were examined using 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests.  Correlation analyses which included the AMQ trauma and 
CES trauma were tested using Spearman’s Rho.  
3.4 Research Question Testing 
3.4.1 Research question one. 
1.a. Are there differences in the phenomenological properties of trauma 
memories and negative memories as indexed by the AMQ? 
 Table 1 shows that (with Bonferroni adjustment) there was a significant 
difference between trauma memories and negative memories on the coherence and detail 
subscales of the AMQ, and a trend towards significance on the fragmentation item of the 
AMQ; the trauma memory had significantly less cohesion and detail, and tended to be 
more fragmented than the negative memory.  Table 1 also shows that there was no 
significant difference between trauma memories and non-trauma memories with respect 
to sensory detail, reliving, and rehearsal.     
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Table 1 
Mean (Standard Deviation) and Median scores on the AMQ for Phenomenological 
Properties of Trauma and Negative Memories 
 Trauma 
memory ͣ 
Negative 
memory ᵇ 
Z 
value 
p value ͨ Effect size 
(r) ͩ 
AMQ Subscales 
Mean (SD) 
Mdn 
     
Sensory detail 15.74 (5.40) 
16 
15.60 (6.59) 
16 
-.13 .899 .08 
Reliving 7.36 (3.26) 
8 
7.11 (3.52) 
7 
-.71 .477 .04 
Coherence 6.58 (3.51) 
7 
8.31 (3.82) 
9 
-2.60 .009 .23 
Fragmentation 3.33 (2.06) 
3 
2.63 (1.62) 
2 
-1.82 .069 .06 
Detail 2.52 (1.62) 
2 
3.39 (1.87) 
3 
-2.63 .008 .23 
Rehearsal 4.36 (1.71) 
4 
4.24 (2.04) 
4 
-.30 .762 .07 
Note  ͣ  n for trauma memory = 75 
         ᵇ n for negative memory = 62 
          ͨ  Variant of Bonferroni adjustment  (Shaffer, 1995; Wright, 1992) applied to critical values 
             to account for multiple testing (for details of this procedure, see Appendix O). 
          ͩ  To calculate effect size (r), n = number of cases over the two conditions, df = n-2 
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 1.b. Are there differences in the phenomenological properties of trauma 
 memories and negative memories, as indexed by LIWC?  
Table 2 shows that (with Bonferroni adjustment) Wilcoxon Signed Rank Tests 
indicated significant differences in measures of cognitive processes and spatial 
references, and a tendency towards significance with regard to expressed negative 
emotion; participants scored significantly higher on cognitive processes, lower on spatial 
references, and tended to score lower in terms of negative emotion in relation to their 
trauma memory when compared to their non-trauma memory.  A trend towards use of 
more sensory words in trauma narratives was observed.  There were no significant 
differences, however, between trauma memories and non-trauma memories with respect 
to use of the past tense, use of the present tense, and use of conjunctions.   
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Table 2 
  
Mean (Standard Deviation) and Median Percentage of Total Word Count for 
Phenomenological Properties of Trauma and Negative memories, as measured by LIWC 
 Trauma 
memory ͣ 
Negative 
memory ᵇ 
Z 
value 
p value ͨ Effect size 
(r) ͩ 
LIWC Subscales 
(% of total word count) 
        Mean (SD) 
             Mdn 
    
Total word count 232 (255.3) 
161 
94.39 (89.5) 
79 
-5.94 <.001 .49 
Cognitive processes 8.98 (4.77) 
8.5 
4.93 (3.35) 
4.8 
-6.02 < .001 .51 
Sensory words 2.94 (2.54) 
2.6 
2.48 (3.38) 
1.95 
-1.77 .076 .01 
Negative emotions 5.75 (7.35) 
4.2 
7.50 (5.98) 
7.0 
-2.30 .021 .20 
Use of past tense 10.28 (11.3) 
9.7 
7.83 (5.14) 
9.0 
-.94 .348 .03 
Use of present tense 4.74 (3.98) 
4.0 
5.63 (5.0) 
4.45 
-.24 .809 .07 
Conjunctions 7.22 (3.30) 
7.0 
7.69 (3.63) 
8.9 
-.09 .927 .08 
Spatial references 3.38 (2.05) 
3.3 
4.99 (4.05) 
4.4 
-2.58 .010 .21 
Note   ͣ  n for trauma memory = 82 
          ᵇ n for negative memory = 62  
          ͨ Variant of Bonferroni adjustment (Shaffer, 1995; Wright, 1992) applied to critical                                                                                                                    
 values to account for multiple testing (see Appendix O). 
           ͩ To calculate effect size (r) n = number of cases over the two conditions, df = n-2 
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3.4.2 Research Question Two. 
2.a. What phenomenological properties of trauma memories, as indexed by the 
AMQ, are associated with PTSD symptoms? 
Spearman’s Rho correlation analyses were conducted to investigate the 
relationships between PTSD symptoms and selected phenomenological properties of the 
trauma memory, as indexed by the AMQ.  With Bonferroni adjustment, analyses revealed 
a positive significant correlation between PTSD symptoms and fragmentation, rs (70) = 
.30, p = .008, and a tendency towards significance in the relationship between PTSD 
symptoms and sensory details, rs (70) = .24, p = .04, and a sense of reliving, rs (70) = .26, 
p = .03.  Results also showed a trend toward a negative relationship between rehearsal of 
the trauma memory and PTSD symptoms, rs (70) = -.22, p = .06.  There was no 
significant relationship between PTSD symptoms and coherence, rs (70) = -.01, ns, or 
detail, rs (70) = .08, ns.   
2.b. What phenomenological properties of trauma memories, as indexed by 
LIWC, are associated with PTSD symptoms? 
Relationships between PTSD symptoms and phenomenological properties of the 
trauma memory, as indexed by LIWC, were measured using Spearman’s Rho correlation 
co-efficient analyses.  With Bonferroni adjustment, results indicated a significant positive 
correlation between PTSD symptoms and use of the present tense, rs (77) = .47, p < .001, 
a tendency towards significance regarding use of conjunctions, rs (77) = .23, p =.04, and a 
tendency towards a significant negative relationship between PTSD symptoms and spatial 
references rs (77) = -.25, p =.03.  Results also showed a trend towards a positive 
relationship between PTSD symptoms and sensory detail, rs (77) = .20, p =.08.  Analysis 
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revealed that there were no significant correlations between PTSD symptom severity and 
cognitive processes, rs (77) = .13, ns, expressed negative emotion, rs (77) = .06, ns, and 
use of the past tense, rs (77) = -.10, ns.   
3.4.3 Research Question Three. 
3.a. What properties of trauma memories, as indexed by the AMQ, are 
associated with higher levels of centrality of trauma event? 
Spearman’s Rho correlation co-efficient revealed a medium significant positive 
correlation between centrality of event to identity and a sense of reliving, rs (68) = .29, p 
=.02.  All other trauma memory properties were not significantly correlated with 
centrality of event score. 
3.b. What properties of trauma memories, as indexed by LIWC, are associated 
with higher levels of centrality of trauma event? 
Spearman’s Rho correlation co-efficients revealed a positive significant 
correlation between CES scores and use of the present tense , rs (68) = .30, p = .01 (with 
Bonferroni adjustment), and a tendency towards a significant negative correlation 
between CES scores and spatial references,  rs (68) = -.25, p = .03 (with Bonferroni 
adjustment).  All other trauma memory properties were not significantly correlated with 
CES scores (cognitive processes, rs (68) = .12, ns, sensory, rs (68) = -.06, ns, negative 
emotion, rs (68) = .03, ns, past tense, rs (68) = .01, ns, and conjunctions, rs (68) = .00, ns).  
3.4.4 Post hoc analysis. 
A multiple regression analysis was used to assess the ability of three items on the 
AMQ to predict PTSD symptoms.  The three AMQ items included in the analysis were 
sensory, reliving and fragmentation.  These three variables were selected given the strong 
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theoretical assertions and past empirical findings suggesting those with PTSD have 
significant distortions in the re-living, sensory detail and fragmentation properties of their 
trauma memories (e.g., Brewin, 2011, 2013; O’Kearney & Perrott, 2006).  Preliminary 
analyses were conducted to ensure no violation of the assumptions of normality, linearity, 
multicollinearity, and homoscedascticity.  The total variance in PDS scores explained by 
the model as a whole was 44 per cent, F (3, 68) = 5.53, p = .002.  ‘Fragmentation’ was 
the only variable found to make a significant unique contribution to explaining the 
variance in PDS scores, t (69) = 3.16; β = .34, p = .01.  
A further multiple regression analysis was used to assess the ability of four LIWC 
categories to predict PTSD symptoms.  The four LIWC items included in the analysis 
were sensory, present tense, conjunctions, and spatial references.  These variables were 
selected because previous studies have used similar lexical and syntactic categories as 
indicators of narrative (in)coherence (e.g., Hellawell & Brewin, 2004; Jelinek et al., 
2010; O’Kearney et al., 2011).  Again, preliminary analyses were conducted to ensure no 
violation of the assumptions of normality, linearity, multicollinearity, and 
homoscedascticity.  The total variance in PDS scores explained by the model as a whole 
was 44 per cent, F (4, 74) = 4.51, p = .003.  ‘Present tense’ was the only variable found to 
make a significant unique contribution to explaining the variance in PDS scores, t (75) = 
2.32; β= .27, p = .02.  
3.4.5 Summary of Findings. 
The current study first investigated differences between the phenomenological 
properties of traumatic and negative memories, as indexed by both a self-report measure 
(AMQ) and a textual analysis programme (LIWC).  Using Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests 
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(with Bonferroni correction), trauma memories (as measured by the AMQ) were shown 
to be significantly less coherent and less detailed than negative memories, with a 
tendency towards significantly more fragmentation in trauma memories.  No significant 
differences were found on indices of sensory detail, a sense of reliving, or rehearsal of the 
memory.  Again using Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests (with Bonferroni correction), trauma 
narratives (as rated by LIWC) were found to contain significantly more terms reflecting 
cognitive processes and significantly fewer spatial references than negative narratives, as 
well as a tendency towards significantly less expressed negative emotion and 
significantly more use of sensory terms.  There were no significant differences in terms 
of use of either past or present tense or use of conjunctions.   
Second, using Spearman’s Rho correlation co-efficients, the study analysed the 
relationship between trauma memory properties (as indexed by the AMQ and LIWC) and 
PTSD symptoms and found a significant positive association between PTSD symptom 
severity and both fragmentation and use of the present tense (with Bonferroni correction).  
The study also observed a tendency towards significance in the positive relationship 
between PTSD symptoms and sensory detail (both AMQ and LIWC-rated), a self-
reported sense of reliving, and use of conjunctions.  Trends towards a significant negative 
relationship between PTSD symptoms and rehearsal of the trauma memory and use of 
spatial references were also noted.   
Finally, the study again employed Spearman’s Rho correlation co-efficients to 
examine the relationship between CES scores and trauma memory properties.  With 
Bonferroni correction, results indicated a significant positive association between both a 
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sense of reliving and use of the present tense and CES scores.  All other variables 
analysed produced insignificant results.  
87 
 
CHAPTER 4 
4 Discussion 
4.1 Overview 
 In light of the debate regarding the integration of trauma memories within AM in 
PTSD, the overall objective of this research was to explore the relationships between 
trauma-centred identity, autobiographical memory and adjustment to trauma.  The study 
sought to investigate if the two apparently contradictory positions of centrality of event 
and inadequate integration can co-exist, as asserted by Brewin (2011, 2013).  This 
involved analysing the phenomenological properties of memory for trauma and memory 
for a negative event, and then examining the relationships between trauma memory 
features, PTSD symptoms, and trauma-centred identity.  Importantly, characteristics of 
autobiographical remembering were assessed using both a self-report measure and 
computerised textual analysis of participants’ memory narratives. 
This chapter first considers the results of the study in relation to existing research 
findings.  Following this, the strengths and limitations of the study are considered.  The 
chapter concludes with a discussion of the theoretical and clinical implications of the 
findings and directions for future research.  
4.2 Summary of Findings 
4.2.1 Research Question One. 
The first research question investigated whether there were differences in the 
phenomenological properties of trauma and negative memories, as indexed by a self-
report measure (AMQ) and a computerised textual analysis programme (LIWC).  Using 
the AMQ, trauma memories were found to be subjectively rated as significantly less 
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coherent and less detailed than negative memories with a tendency towards more 
fragmentation.  No differences were found, however, in terms of sensory detail, a sense 
of reliving, or rehearsal of the memory.  Participants’ trauma narratives and negative 
narratives were analysed objectively using LIWC.  Compared to negative narratives, 
trauma narratives were found to contain significantly more terms reflecting cognitive 
processes and significantly fewer spatial references, as well as a tendency towards less 
expressed negative emotion and more use of sensory words.  There were no observed 
differences in terms of use of either past or present tense or use of conjunctions.  
Significant findings are grouped together and discussed in greater detail below under the 
subheadings of sensory-perceptual detail; coherence, disorganisation and fragmentation, 
and expressed negative emotion.  
4.2.1.1 Sensory-perceptual detail. 
While participants’ subjective rating of sensory-perceptual detail in their trauma 
and negative memories did not differ significantly, textual analysis of the narratives 
found that trauma narratives demonstrated a trend towards significantly more sensory 
references than non-trauma narratives. This latter finding is in line with previous findings 
that the trauma memories of those with PTSD are characterised by sensory detail (e.g., 
Ehlers et al., 2002; Hackmann et al., 2004; Speckens et al., 2007; Hellawell & Brewin, 
2002).  The current study’s discrepant findings relating to sensory detail (self-report 
measure versus textual analysis) can perhaps be viewed as consistent with Megias et al.’s 
(2007) proposal that methodological differences in how information about the memory is 
obtained may determine whether or not certain properties are established.  The authors 
refer to several studies which have ostensibly demonstrated contradictory results having 
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used either self-report measures of memory characteristics, or other subjective or 
objective measures (i.e., rater-coded or computer-rated), but not a combination of these.  
The difficulties inherent in using self-report measures which draw on meta-memory and 
those involved in using the ratings of an external ‘judge’ or computer programme in order 
to gauge and code memory properties will be discussed in greater detail below in the 
section on the theoretical implications of the current study’s findings.  
Importantly, in the current study, the sensory subscale of the AMQ lacked an 
olfactory item, yet olfactory details of participants’ narratives were counted by LIWC. 
This omission is particularly significant in the study of trauma memories given that 
triggers for intrusive memories in the form of smells have been reported to be more 
powerful than those prompted by other sensory modalities (e.g., Toffolo, Smeets, & Van 
den Hout, 2012; Vermetten & Bremner, 2003).  Moreover, exploration of the 
sensory/perceptual detail of trauma memories should involve analysis of all types of 
sensory image (e.g., Brewin, 2010; Foa et al., 1995; Hellawell & Brewin, 2004).  
Findings from the linguistic analysis programme in the current study may therefore 
provide a more comprehensive reflection of the sensory detail in participants’ memories 
and a more useful index for comparison with existing literature relating to differences 
between trauma and non-trauma memories, as is perhaps evident from the following 
excerpts taken from study participants’ trauma narratives:  
There are no specific memories of the actual accident. However, there are vivid 
 memories of being in the hospital afterward. […] I remember it being very quiet 
 other than machines beeping and the quick pace of the nurses. I also 
 DISTINCTLY remember the smell. Any time I smell something similar, it takes 
 me right back. Another thing I remember is the taste of the juices I had to drink. 
 Apple juice. (I can't stomach it anymore)  
Participant number 9; PDS score = 25, indicative of moderate-severe PTSD 
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I often have bitty memories of it and wonder if it was real at all but then it feels 
 so real and i can smell his smell(whiskey) and i can feel the sick feeling in my 
 stomach and the dread and the fear and the sense of releif later. i can't see the 
 room but again i can smell the weird mothball small and i can hear a clock ticking 
 and the whole thing just makes me shake even now writing this out.  
Participant number 40, PDS score = 31, indicative of moderate-severe PTSD2 
 
Of note, the LIWC findings of a trend towards significantly more sensory detail in 
trauma narratives than in negative narratives support both clinical theories of PTSD (e.g., 
Brewin et al., 1996, Brewin et al., 2010; Ehlers & Clark, 2000) and the work of cognitive 
psychologists who endorse the centrality view (e.g., Rubin et al., 2008) as both propose 
that trauma memories are more sensory-laden than non-trauma memories. 
4.2.1.2 Coherence, disorganisation and fragmentation. 
As discussed previously, the terms fragmentation and disorganisation are 
frequently used interchangeably in the literature and both constructs are typically 
operationalised as a lack of narrative coherence upon intentional recall of the trauma 
memory.  These phenomena will therefore be considered together here.  Previous studies 
have demonstrated narrative incoherence in PTSD by measuring features such as 
confused temporal order, lack of contextual markers, an inability to recall important 
aspects of the trauma, lack of complexity of the narrative, lack of detail, repetition, 
unfinished thoughts, speech fillers, and an absence of organised thoughts (e.g., Foa et al., 
1995; Halligan et al., 2003).  
In the current study, participants rated their trauma memory as significantly less 
coherent than their negative memory, with a tendency towards greater fragmentation in 
the former, findings that are consistent with previous research using self-report measures 
                                                 
2 Participants’ trauma narratives are presented as typed in their online responses to the study’s 
questionnaires.  Importantly, as the excerpts included in this thesis are direct citations from participants’ 
narratives, errors in spelling and/or punctuation are not corrected.  
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(e.g., Engelhard, Van den Hout, Kindt, Arnz,& Schouten., 2003; Halligan et al., 2003).  
Also significant was the finding that participants rated their trauma memory as 
significantly less detailed than their non-traumatic memory, a result that is again in 
keeping with existing empirical data (e.g., Halligan et al., 2003), and compatible with the 
aforementioned findings regarding self-ratings of coherence and fragmentation.  The 
following excerpt captures the fragmented nature of such trauma memories, highlighting 
how certain details of the memory may be lacking, while also illustrating the intrusive 
nature of involuntary memories. Other elements of incoherence of the narrative are also 
evident, such as errors and unfinished utterances: 
The memories and blurry, choppy, repressed. But every now and then I am 
 burdened with a sudden onset of violation and frustration. I don't remember  
 everything, but I remember enough. I was six years old the first time it ever 
 happened. I used to wet the bed at night. I'd be so afraid to tell my mother... 
 Eventually my step dad caught wind of what was happening and he would help 
 me clean the sheets. Once everything was cleaned up, he would come back to bed 
 with me...I feel as though details ate not necessary, I can barely remember details. 
 The brain is such an intricate, and unique organ. It continues to repress, but the 
 the memories still push on through.  
Participant number 142; PDS score = 19, indicative of moderate PTSD 
 
Further indicative of the incoherence and disorganisation of the trauma memory 
was the current study’s finding that participants’ trauma narratives contained significantly 
fewer spatial references than their non-trauma narratives, demonstrating a lack of 
contextual detail, again concordant with previous findings (e.g., Foa et al., 1995; Jelinek 
et al., 2010; Parry & O’Kearney, 2013), and suggestive of poor elaboration and 
contextualisation of the trauma memory within AM (Conway, 2005; Ehlers & Clark, 
2000). 
An absence of ‘organised thoughts,’ referring to statements indicating realisation, 
decision-making, or planning (Foa et al., 1995; Halligan et al., 2005), is also considered a 
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marker of narrative incoherence, and therefore of disorganisation and fragmentation.  In 
an attempt to measure this property of memories, the current study used LIWC to 
calculate the number of ‘cognitive processes’ observed in trauma and non-trauma 
narratives and found that the former contained more cognitive processes than the latter.  
Importantly, in this category, LIWC counts words relating to cognitive processes, such as 
‘think, realise, know, hence, understand’ (see Appendix M for details).  Research has 
shown that elevated use of such ‘cognitive’ terms to describe stressful experiences is 
typical in the aftermath of such events (Cohn, Mehl, Pennebaker, 2004; Pennebaker & 
Lay, 2002).  Such an increase in cognitive word use has been interpreted as indicating 
that the individual is searching for meaning and understanding of the event (Boals & 
Klein, 2005; Boals & Perez, 2009; Klein & Boals, 2010), a process that is thought to 
precede and contribute to the development of narrative coherence (Boals & Perez, 2009; 
Jelinek et al., 2010).  Indeed, high levels of cognitive word use have been shown to 
reflect adaptive psychological adjustment and effective coping mechanisms in Holocaust 
survivors (Boals & Perez, 2009).  It is nonetheless important to note that the 
measurement of cognitive processes in the current study was limited by the use of LIWC 
as this software does not measure these lexical items in context.  For example, 
expressions containing cognitive words, such as ‘believe, think, know, understand, 
realise, therefore, because’ are not considered in conjunction with any negative qualifiers, 
such as ‘(I don’t) understand.’  The latter phrase would likely indicate a lack of 
‘organised thoughts’ as conceptualised by Foa and colleagues (1995), characteristic of 
poor psychological adjustment, but indicates ‘use of cognitive processes’ according to 
LIWC, which may be interpreted mistakenly as adaptive.  The following excerpt from a 
93 
 
trauma narrative illustrates how neglecting the negatives accompanying indicators of 
cognitive processes renders interpretation of the current study’s results quite difficult: 
I never really realized what had happened until I was 15. I can't comprehend why 
 it happened.  
Participant number 32; PDS score = 22, indicative of moderate-severe PTSD 
 
The methodological limitations encountered through the use of LIWC are discussed in 
greater detail in section 4.4.3.5 below.   
4.2.1.3 Expressed negative emotion. 
The current study found that trauma narratives contained fewer negative emotion 
words than non-trauma narratives, a finding that is inconsistent with certain previous 
studies (e.g., Holmes et al., 2007) while in keeping with others (e.g., Jelinek et al., 2010).  
The relative lack of expressed negative emotion observed in the current study’s trauma 
narratives may be explained in terms of  PTSD sufferers’ tendency to avoid talking or 
thinking about the trauma, and the emotional numbing that can occur following such an 
experience (APA, 2013).  Recent studies (e.g., Jelinek et al., 2010) have also explained 
low levels of expressed negative emotion in terms of the higher levels of alexithymia 
reported in individuals with PTSD (Frewen, Dozois, Neufield, & Lanius, 2008).  As with 
those phenomenological properties of memories discussed above, however, it is 
important to note that LIWC may not have accurately measured participants’ negative 
emotions.  The category ‘negative affect’ is thought to inadequately cover the entire 
range of negative emotions found in sufferers of PTSD; for example, feelings of guilt, 
shame and disgust are not included under this label (Jelinek et al., 2010).  The following 
excerpt clearly illustrates a lack of expressed (and felt) negative emotion, however, and is 
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suggestive of the numbing and alienation characteristic of clinical levels of PTSD (APA, 
2013): 
I was able to recall memories but they were like derivatives - not my own but 
 someone else's. Mentally, I knew they were mine but they felt removed, I had no 
 emotional or direct connection to them. The same was true of how I felt or related  
 to my wife or children.  
Participant 148; PDS score = 16, indicative of moderate PTSD 
 
When considering the current study’s findings regarding differences between 
trauma and non-trauma memories, it is important to note that participants were requested 
to write and think about a trauma memory and a non-traumatic, negative memory, unlike 
many previous studies which elicited positive memories as a comparison to trauma 
memories (e.g., Boals, 2010).  Some of the events detailed as non-traumatic in the current 
study included events such as relationship break-ups, divorce, redundancy, death of a 
life-long pet, and diagnosis of chronic illness, as well as more everyday events, such as 
losing in a sporting event and delays in transport.  The apparent lack of difference 
between the two types of memory observed on some indices may be due to the fact that 
many participants chose events that were highly important to them and had affected them 
quite significantly.  It is easier to find differences between traumatic and positive 
memories; the use of negative, non-traumatic memories as a comparison in the current 
study is thus a strength, but this may also have limited findings of difference.  
4.2.2 Research question two. 
The second research question involved analysing the relationship between the 
phenomenological properties of trauma memories, indexed by the AMQ and LIWC, and 
PTSD symptoms.  Findings will now be discussed under the subheadings of sensory-
perceptual detail, sense of reliving, fragmentation/incoherence, and rehearsal.   
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4.2.2.1 Sensory-perceptual detail. 
The current study revealed a strong tendency towards a significant positive 
association between sensory-perceptual detail (as indexed by the AMQ) and PTSD 
symptoms, thus largely in keeping with findings from several previous studies (e.g., 
Berntsen et al., 2003; Engelhard et al., 2003; Murray et al., 2002; van der Kolk & Fisler, 
1995).  Results also indicated a tendency towards a positive relationship between 
sensory-perceptual detail (as measured by LIWC) and PTSD symptoms.  Inspection of 
the trauma narratives suggests the presence of this relationship, particularly in narratives 
of participants scoring in the moderate-severe and severe ranges of PTSD symptom 
severity, as is evident in the following extracts: 
 [ ] and weirdly i don't remember the pain as much as the smells and the sounds
  and the rag stuffed in my mouth making me gag.  
Participant number 6; PDS score = 41, indicative of severe PTSD 
 
I don't remember the content of the conversation at all or what the remark was 
 that had led to it- the shouting and the way in which he was physically restraining
 me from leaving the bed - thereby escaping him - is what I can recall.  
Participant number 7; PDS score = 29, indicative of moderate-severe PTSD 
 
4.2.2.2 Sense of reliving. 
The current study demonstrated a significant positive association between use of 
the present tense in trauma narratives and PTSD symptoms, and a tendency towards a 
positive relationship between the latter and a self-reported sense of reliving when 
remembering the trauma.  Both findings are in keeping with previous studies (e.g., 
Hackmann, Ehlers, Speckens, & Clark, 2004; Hellawell & Brewin, 2004; Young, 2000).   
Use of the present tense in trauma narratives has previously been interpreted as indicative 
of flashbacks (e.g., Hellawell & Brewin, 2004).  Spontaneous shifting from past to 
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present tense may also be viewed as illustrative of the disorganisation of the trauma 
memory (e.g., Young, 2000).  The current study’s findings therefore pertain to 
discussions on both reliving and disorganisation/fragmentation.  The following narrative 
excerpts illustrate an unambiguous sense of the ‘here-and-now’ quality of trauma 
memories, indicative of the intrusive symptoms of PTSD: 
I can see his face now in a rage, his eyes are really wild and crazy and it's pretty 
 clear he's going to blow and then he starts smashing things and comes over to me 
 and is screaming and pushing me away but coming right up again then and it just 
 goes on lilke that until he clams down by which point he has usussally yanked me 
 around the place and hurt me, i always had these burns on my arms from where 
 he would twist them like capet burns really. I can hear him shouting but i can't 
 make out what he's saying, i just know i'm gonna get it.  
Participant number 28; PDS score = 36, indicative of severe PTSD 
 
 
YOU’RE GOING TO NEED A CAESAREAN. Sign this, consent, bleeding, 
 death, put a line in here, take this tablet, have this medicine, husband go here, 
 wear this. Participant 45; PDS score = 17, indicative of moderate PTSD 
 
 
Interestingly, a recent study found that participants used more past tense 
constructions when describing a previously disclosed event and more present tense 
constructions when describing an undisclosed event (Pasupathi, 2007).  The author 
proposed that use of the past tense could indicate increased psychological distance and a 
higher degree of resolution for disclosed events compared to undisclosed events.  This 
hypothesis may provide further insight into the current study’s findings relating to present 
tense use and PTSD symptom severity, especially when these results are considered in 
conjunction with findings relating to rehearsal of the trauma memory, outlined in section 
4.2.2.4 below.  
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4.2.2.3 Fragmentation and incoherence. 
In keeping with previous research on the subject (e.g., Engelhard et al., 2003; 
Hellawell & Brewin, 2004; Murray et al., 2002; Rubin et al., 2011), the current study 
found a positive relationship between PTSD symptoms and participants’ rating of their 
trauma memory as fragmented.  Indicators of this reported fragmentation are also 
apparent upon inspection of the trauma narratives.  The following excerpts contain 
features such as direct references to the fragmented nature of the memory, abrupt changes 
in tense, temporal disorganisation, lack of detail, lack of complexity of the narrative, and 
lack of contextual markers:  
repeated sexual assault by a great unclue but no idead even how old i was 
 definately young maybe 4 5 6 I'm not so sure. I often have bitty memories of it 
 and wonder if it was real at all but then it feels so real  
Participant number 109; PDS score = 31, indicative of moderate-severe PTSD 
 
I remember a few seconds before the accident, when it was already clear that the 
 car is approaching and the speed is high to stop in time. I couldnt even move and 
 watching it hitting my side of the car like in a slow motion.  
Participant number 87; PDS score = 7, indicative of mild PTSD 
 
Earlier studies have analysed use of conjunctions in narratives as indicators of 
coherence (e.g., Graesser, McNamara, Louwerse, & Cai, 2004; O’Kearney et al., 2011).  
Somewhat unexpectedly, the current study found a tendency towards a significant 
positive association between use of conjunctions in trauma narratives and PTSD 
symptom severity.  As outlined earlier, fragmentation of the trauma memory is typically 
observed as a lack of coherence in the trauma narrative (e.g., Brewin et al., 1996; Ehlers 
& Clark, 2000).  As such, a negative relationship between PTSD symptoms and use of 
conjunctions would be anticipated.  The current study’s findings may be explained, 
however, with reference to the limited sophistication of LIWC’s method for counting 
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such conjunctions.  LIWC simply calculates the percentage of conjunctions relative to 
overall word count without taking contextual details into account.  Certain trauma 
narratives may contain large numbers of conjunctions but may not present as ‘coherent,’ 
as is the case in the following excerpt containing 12 conjunctions within one sentence: 
It's all a bit jumbled and all over the place and i don't realy know the exact order 
 of what went on but i can smeel the smells and hear the sounds and it is all just so 
 horrible and disgusting and feels interminable biut obviously it did stop at some 
 point although i think i kinda zoned out out during it coz it just seeemed like the 
 best thing to do and weirdly i don't remember the pain as much as the smells and 
 the sounds and the rag stuffed in my mouth making me gag.  
Participant number 6; PDS score = 41, indicative of severe PTSD 
 
The current study also found that participants with higher PTSD scores used 
fewer spatial references in their trauma narratives, thus in keeping with certain previous 
studies’ findings regarding lack of contextual detail in trauma memories (e.g., Parry & 
O’Kearney, 2013), while inconsistent with others typically cited in support of the 
centrality view (e.g., Robinaugh & McNally, 2010).   
4.2.2.4 Rehearsal. 
The current study used an item on the AMQ to measure rehearsal of the trauma 
memory (‘I have thought or talked about the event since it happened’).  Previous studies 
using the AMQ have found greater rehearsal to be associated with higher levels of PTSD 
symptoms (e.g., Rubin et al., 2011), and have cited these findings in support of the 
centrality view which asserts that increased rehearsal leads to increased availability of the 
memory and thus raises PTSD symptom levels (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; 2007).  The 
current study found the opposite, i.e., participants with greater PTSD symptom severity 
reported less rehearsal of their trauma memory.  This finding is perhaps suggestive of 
higher levels of avoidance in participants with greater PTSD symptom severity, an 
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interpretation that would be consistent with the concept of poor elaboration of the trauma 
memory, central to prominent clinical theories of PTSD (e.g., Brewin et al., 1996; 2010; 
Conway, 2005; Ehlers & Clark, 2000).  This finding may also perhaps be understood 
with reference to Pasupathi’s (2007) proposal that present tense use is greater in trauma 
narratives for undisclosed (therefore unrehearsed) events, particularly as the current study 
found that greater present tense usage was significantly associated with higher levels of 
PTSD.  Inspection of the trauma narratives obtained in the current study suggests that 
participants with higher levels of PTSD attempted to suppress and avoid their trauma 
memories rather than rehearse them.  Thought suppression and avoidance of talking 
about the trauma are examples of the cognitive and behavioural responses in which 
trauma survivors with PTSD typically engage in an attempt to reduce their fear and 
distress, but which ultimately lead to increased symptom severity as the trauma memory 
cannot be elaborated or contextualised with AM (Ehlers & Clark, 2000).  The following 
excerpts illustrate such attempts at thought suppression and avoidance: 
When i remember it I usually get to the bit where he grabs my arms and i try to 
 not think about it but can see it, my 2 arms in in just one of his to stop me from 
 hitting back and i can feel the clench (he was very strong, had a tight hold of me) 
 and his face is up in mine and i am terrified,i know i'm in for some serious pain 
 and i guess sometimes i'm like, oh my god, i could actually die this time or maybe 
 he will injure me so badly that i will never be physically ok and i worry that i 
 might get brain damage and turn into a vegetable, i would definitely prefer to die. 
Participant number 37, PDS score = 40, indicative of severe PTSD 
 
 
I am still not sure if I can describe this as an assault or attempted assault which is 
 why I find it so hard to come to terms with it and why I havent told anyone about 
 it - Its also why I ticked both boxes because I dont know if it falls into both 
 categories. I am deeply ashamed of it though.  
Participant number 68; PDS score = 8, indicative of mild PTSD 
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In contrast, other trauma narratives conveyed the positive effects of rehearsal in terms of 
posttraumatic adjustment: 
I began to acknowledge that I was angry scared and resentful to the event my 
 reaction and the perpetrators. I spoke with my friends about it, the court case was  
 dragged out for almost two years. The support of my parents through that made a 
 huge difference to me. I am a healthcare professional myself now and the 
 interactions with the various professions had a big effect. My GP followed up a 
 few days after the event and he acknowledged that I was lucky in terms of my 
 injuries and the main effect was going to be psychological. Acknowledging this 
 made a huge difference. I now openly talk about my experience and I think it has 
 in a strange way added to my character in a positive manner.  
Participant number 72; PDS score = 0, indicative of no PTSD 
 
4.2.3 Research question three.  
The third research question examined the association between selected 
phenomenological properties of trauma memories and centrality of event scores.  
Informing this exploration were the current study’s findings that PTSD symptom severity 
and centrality of event were strongly correlated, and that the trauma event reported by 
participants was significantly more central to identity than the negative event.  Both of 
these findings were in keeping with previous research (e.g., Brown et al., 2010; Lancaster 
et al., 2011; Roland et al., 2013; Rubin, 2011).  Of the memory properties included in the 
current analysis, the ‘reliving’ item from the AMQ and the ‘present tense’ category in 
LIWC were found to have a significant positive association with CES scores, i.e., 
participants who rated their trauma as more central to their identity experienced a greater 
sense of reliving when remembering the trauma and used more present tense 
constructions to describe it.  In addition, the LIWC category of spatial references was 
found to show a tendency towards a significant negative association with centrality of 
event.    
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Given that use of the present tense is considered indicative of reliving experiences 
(e.g., Hellawell & Brewin, 2004), it is perhaps logical that ‘present tense use’ and 
‘reliving’ would function in a similar fashion and that therefore both or neither would 
correlate with CES scores.  The sense of reliving reported by participants with higher 
CES scores and observed in their trauma narratives may be viewed as concordant with 
both the inadequate integration theory of PTSD and the centrality view, as is discussed in 
4.6 below.  The study’s findings regarding the relationship between CES and 
reliving/present tense are consistent with those of the few existing studies that have 
investigated this relationship (e.g., Boals, 2010; Robinaugh & McNally, 2010).  Of note, 
present tense use, and in particular, spontaneous shifting from past to present tense, is 
also regarded as indicative of disorganisation and fragmentation of the memory (e.g., 
Hellawell & Brewin, 2004; Young, 2000).  Moreover, a lack of spatial references, 
observed in the current study to be related to higher CES scores, may perhaps also be 
considered to demonstrate some level of disorganisation and/or fragmentation of the 
memory.  As such, though moderate, these findings may tentatively be taken to suggest 
that centrality of event and fragmentation (as indexed by characteristics of the trauma 
memory, such as present tense use) may co-exist, although such results may depend on 
whether the fragmentation in question is established through self-report or textual 
analysis, and, importantly, on how constructs such as fragmentation, disorganisation and 
coherence are defined, as is discussed further in section 4.6 below.    
Previous studies that have used both the AMQ and CES in relation to trauma have 
assessed other phenomenological properties of the trauma memory, such as vividness, 
emotional intensity, visceral reactions, rehearsal and contextual detail, and have reported 
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higher levels of all as related to trauma-centred identity (Boals, 2010; Robinaugh & 
McNally, 2010; Rubin et al., 2011; Schuettler & Boals, 2011).  Of these memory 
properties, the present study examined the relationship between rehearsal of the trauma 
memory and centrality of event scores and found a non-significant negative relationship.  
This result is inconsistent with the aforementioned studies’ findings and with the 
centrality view that increased rehearsal is associated with greater centrality of event, and 
subsequently, greater PTSD symptom severity (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; 2007; Rubin, 
Berntsen, & Bohni, 2008).  The present study chose not to examine items such as 
emotional intensity and visceral reactions as these properties of trauma memories are 
well-documented in the literature as associated with high levels of PTSD symptom 
severity (e.g., Brewin, 2011; O’Kearney & Perrott, 2006) and are not of pertinence to the 
primary aims of this study.  
Importantly, the current study found no relationship between centrality of event 
and the other AMQ properties of the trauma memory analysed.  These were: sensory 
detail, coherence, fragmentation, and level of detail of the memory.  Likewise, the study 
failed to establish a relationship between centrality of event and the other LIWC variables 
analysed (cognitive processes, sensory words, negative emotions, use of past tense, and 
use of conjunctions).  Therefore, whilst the positive relationship between present tense 
use in trauma narratives and centrality of event may be deemed illustrative of a certain 
level of fragmentation/disorganisation, consideration of this result in light of other 
findings obtained in the study is imperative.  Findings regarding the lack of relationship 
between traditional indices of fragmentation/disorganisation (e.g., self-reported 
coherence, fragmentation, and level of detail of the memory) and centrality of event 
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would suggest that the current study failed to provide substantial evidence that 
fragmentation and trauma-centred identity can co-exist.  However, as noted earlier, 
certain memory properties typically cited as evidence for the centrality view, such as self-
reported rehearsal of the memory (e.g., Rubin et al., 2011), equally showed no 
relationship to CES scores in the current study.  Also of note, the current study found 
significant relationships between PTSD symptoms and each of fragmentation, present 
tense use (also indicative of fragmentation and disorganisation) and centrality of event.  
When viewed together, these latter findings suggest that fragmentation and centrality of 
event may possibly co-exist in individuals with PTSD.   Indeed, inspection of the trauma 
narratives obtained in the study suggests that individuals reporting high levels of trauma-
centred identity may experience this altered sense of self as a form of ‘permanent 
change,’ as described by Ehlers et al. (2000) and outlined in the introduction to this study.  
The following excerpt illustrates the perceived sense of irrevocable damage and 
permanent change engendered by trauma: 
I always think of myself as bad and ruined, damaged in a way that I can never 
 move beyond.  
Participant number 155; PDS score = 34, indicative of moderate-severe PTSD; 
 CES score = 79, indicative of high trauma-centred identity.  
 
Such permanent change has previously been observed in trauma sufferers also 
reporting high levels of fragmentation and disorganisation of their trauma memories (e.g., 
Ehlers et al., 2000).  Importantly, the ramifications of construing a trauma as integral to 
one’s identity are acknowledged and detailed by both clinical theories of PTSD and the 
centrality position, as is discussed further in section 4.6 below.  
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The study’s collective findings regarding the interrelations between trauma-
centred identity (as measured by the CES), fragmentation, and PTSD symptom severity 
are nonetheless inconclusive, and must be interpreted with caution.    
4.2.3 Subsidiary analyses.  
A multiple regression analysis was carried out to assess the fit of a model of three 
self-report (AMQ) items (sensory detail, reliving and fragmentation) in terms of 
predicting PTSD symptoms.  These three properties of the trauma memory were selected 
because of the existing evidence base demonstrating a relationship between such memory 
features and PTSD symptom severity (e.g., Brewin, 2013; O’Kearney & Perrott, 2006).  
Taken together, the model predicted 44 per cent of variance in scores suggesting that 
these memory properties did, to a considerable extent, account for PTSD symptoms.  Of 
these, ‘fragmentation’ was the only variable to make a unique significant contribution (34 
per cent).  This finding, though tentative and exploratory in nature, may conceivably be 
interpreted as in keeping with studies supporting inadequate integration theories of PTSD 
(e.g., Brewin et al., 1996; 2010; Ehlers & Clark, 2000).  The finding is therefore 
inconsistent with results from studies indicating no predictive role for fragmentation in 
PTSD symptom severity, i.e., studies that advocate the centrality view (e.g., McNally, 
2003; Rubin, 2011; Rubin et al., 2010). 
A further multiple regression analysis was used to evaluate the relationship 
between PTSD symptom severity and four textual analysis (LIWC) categories of interest 
(sensory, present tense, conjunctions, and spatial references).  Again these items were 
chosen for analysis because of the extant literature documenting these properties as 
indicators of narrative (in)coherence/fragmentation/disorganisation  (e.g., Foa et al., 
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1995; Hellawell & Brewin, 2004; O’ Kearney et al., 2011).  Again, as a whole, the model 
explained 44 per cent of the variance in PTSD scores.  ‘Present tense’ made a significant 
unique contribution to explaining the variance in PTSD scores (27 per cent).  As already 
noted several times, use of the present tense is considered to indicate narrative 
incoherence, a marker of fragmentation (e.g., Hellawell & Brewin, 2004; Jelinek et al., 
2010), therefore it is perhaps unsurprising that both fragmentation and present tense were 
the strongest unique predictors found in these two subsidiary analyses.  Importantly, 
present tense use also signals the presence of  reliving symptoms of PTSD and previous 
studies have found intrusive memories to be the strongest predictor of long-term PTSD 
severity and poor treatment response (e.g., Brewin et al., 2010; Brewin, 2013; Kleim et 
al., 2007; Michael et al., 2005; Speckens et al., 2006).  The current study’s post hoc 
analysis findings, though moderate and exploratory in nature, may be interpreted as 
providing support for the clinical theories of PTSD that conceptualise the disorder in 
terms of inadequate integration and contextualisation of the trauma memory within AM.  
4.3 Overall summary of findings 
Trauma memories were found to be significantly less coherent, less detailed and 
to contain fewer spatial references and less expressed negative emotion than negative 
memories.  These findings suggest that within AM trauma memories are less 
consolidated, less contextualised and less elaborated than negative memories.  Such 
results thus support the contemporary clinical theories of PTSD which propose that 
disturbance in memory, in terms of both encoding and recall, result in a trauma memory 
that is inadequately integrated and poorly elaborated within AM, and that this process is 
fundamental to the development and maintenance of the disorder (e.g., Brewin et al., 
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1996; 2010; Ehlers & Clark, 2000).  The study’s finding that trauma memories contained 
less expressed negative emotion than negative memories was inconsistent with certain 
previous studies while in keeping with others.  This was interpreted in terms of the 
avoidance and emotional numbing symptoms of PTSD (APA, 2013) and in terms of the 
documented increased levels of alexithymia in sufferers of the disorder (Frewen et al., 
2008).  The study observed certain discrepancies in findings obtained from the AMQ and 
those obtained from LIWC.  For example, participants reported no difference between 
their trauma memories and negative memories on the AMQ in terms of sensory detail, yet 
LIWC observed a near-significant difference.  Such disparities were explored in terms of 
the difference in construct being measured (i.e., lack of an olfactory item on the AMQ 
versus all sensory modalities included in the LIWC analysis), with brief mention of the 
difficulties inherent in comparing self-report findings with other-rated findings, an issue 
that will be discussed in greater detail in section 4.6 below.  
  The inadequate integration position espoused by contemporary clinical theories 
of PTSD was further supported by the current study’s findings of a significant positive 
association between symptoms of the disorder and both self-reported fragmentation and 
use of the present tense in trauma narratives.  The study also noted a tendency towards 
significance in the relationship between PTSD symptoms and sensory detail (both self-
report and LIWC-rated) and a self-reported sense of reliving.  These latter findings are in 
keeping with previous studies and are consistent with both clinical theories of PTSD 
(e.g., Brewin et al., 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000) and recent cognitive psychologists’ 
conceptualisations of the disorder (e.g., Rubin et al., 2008).   The study revealed an 
unexpected finding that increased use of conjunctions in the trauma narrative was 
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associated with greater PTSD symptom severity.  Greater use of conjunctions is typically 
interpreted as a mark of narrative coherence.  Consideration of the impact of LIWC’s 
limited method of counting such syntactical features without taking context into account 
was essential when interpreting such findings.  Finally, the study revealed a tendency 
towards a significant negative association between PTSD symptoms and use of spatial 
references in the trauma narrative, again suggesting a certain lack of contextualisation of 
the trauma memory within AM.  
In keeping with previous research, the study revealed a strong positive correlation 
between PTSD symptom severity and CES scores, and a significant difference between 
CES scores for the trauma memory and negative memory, whereby the trauma was more 
central to identity than the negative event.  Centrality of event was then found to be 
significantly positively associated with a self-reported sense of reliving and use of the 
present tense in the trauma narrative.  Certain theorists and clinicians purport that present 
tense use in trauma narratives, and in particular, spontaneous shifting from past to present 
tense, indicates disorganisation and fragmentation of the memory (e.g., Hellawell & 
Brewin, 2004; Young, 2000).  In this sense, the finding regarding the relationship 
between CES scores and present tense use may possibly suggest that trauma-centred 
identity and fragmentation are not wholly incompatible.  It is essential, however, to 
consider this finding in relation to the observed lack of relationship between CES scores 
and self-reported fragmentation, and indeed other traditional indices of 
fragmentation/disorganisation/incoherence.  The study’s findings in this respect are 
therefore inconclusive and must be interpreted with caution.   
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The post hoc analysis undertaken provided some support for the role of both 
fragmentation and use of present tense in trauma narratives in predicting PTSD symptom 
severity.  These findings were again considered to endorse clinical theories of the 
disorder in terms of both fragmentation and use of present tense, and to support the work 
of proponents of the centrality view in terms of present tense use as an indicator of 
reliving symptoms of PTSD.  These results were considered in light of the established 
predictive role of intrusive, reliving symptoms in terms of long-term PTSD severity and 
poor response to treatment. 
Collectively, the study’s findings may be seen to partially support prominent 
clinical models and theories of PTSD, but nonetheless fail to provide substantial evidence 
regarding the co-existence of centrality of event and fragmentation of the trauma 
memory, as proposed by Brewin (2011, 2013).  Moreover, as previously noted, the 
sample size in question in the current study was relatively small, and certain analyses 
undertaken were exploratory in nature; the findings outlined above should thus be 
interpreted with caution.   
4.4 Methodological strengths and limitations 
4.4.1 Design. 
The design employed in the current study had certain strengths.  The 
advertisement recruiting participants did not explicitly call for trauma survivors thus 
reducing selection bias.  With a view to promoting ease of participation, use of online 
questionnaires enabled participants to take part in the study at their own convenience.  
Furthermore, it allowed for complete anonymity, an important consideration given the 
sensitive nature of information disclosed by participants in the study.  The online nature 
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of the study also facilitated wide distribution which allowed the researcher to obtain a 
diverse sample thereby increasing ecological validity.  Moreover, online research 
prevents experimenter demand effects and social conformity bias as there is no 
interaction with the experimenter or with other participants (Kraut et al., 2004).  This was 
particularly important in the current study given ethical considerations with regard to 
participants’ option to discontinue at any point during completion of the questionnaires.  
The current study compared trauma memories with negative, non-traumatic 
memories.  Most previous studies in the area have used positive memories as a 
control/comparison (e.g., Boals, 2010; Bohanek, Fivush, & Walker, 2005).  It has 
previously been proposed that PTSD may be associated with deficits in neutral, positive 
or negative memories which are not uniquely related to trauma (McNally, 2003).  The 
current study’s selection of a negative memory as a comparison memory aimed to 
distinguish properties of memory for trauma from those of general autobiographical 
memories.  The choice of a negative memory is a strength as it comprised a strict 
comparative given that the memories should be quite similar in terms of valence, thereby 
facilitating exploration of exceptional and anomalous features of trauma memories.  This 
design has been employed effectively in a small number of previous studies (e.g., 
Halligan et al., 2003; Jelinek et al., 2010).  Another important strength of the current 
study is its use of both self-report measures and a computerised textual analysis 
programme.  Moreover, the study obtained rich data in the form of participants’ trauma 
and non-trauma narratives. These measures are discussed in greater detail in section 4.4.3 
below.  
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The current study also had several design limitations.  The cross-sectional, 
correlational design prevented assessment of change over time, a factor possibly 
influencing PTSD presentation and precluded the possibility of drawing causal 
inferences.  As a retrospective study of memory, time elapsed since the recalled events 
may also have comprised a confounding variable, thus potentially introducing bias on 
memory through distortion and selective recall (e.g., Gray & Lombardo, 2001).  Future 
analyses may benefit from controlling time since event to limit this bias.  Typical of 
online studies, attrition rates were quite high (e.g., Kraut et al., 2004); large numbers of 
participants chose not to continue after completing the consent form.  It is possible that 
the estimated length of time involved in participation (45-60 minutes) deterred some 
participants.  Admittedly, the study involved a certain level of participant burden given 
the number of questionnaires to be completed.  The progress bar at the top of each screen 
allowed participants to see how much of the study they had completed; as such, what 
might have seemed like slow progress may have discouraged them from continuing.  
Regrettably, the progress bar did not reflect the different types of task involved; rather, it 
counted each screen as equal thereby inaccurately representing the amount of the study 
the participant had completed in certain sections relative to the overall task.  For example, 
the trauma narrative and negative narrative involved more time and effort than other 
sections, but the progress bar did not capture this.  It is also possible that some 
participants felt emotionally drained after describing their trauma and may therefore have 
chosen to discontinue and/or withdraw from the study at this point or soon thereafter.  
Unfortunately, demographic details of those who chose to withdraw their participation 
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were not available therefore it is not possible to speculate as to possible reasons for this 
attrition.  
Importantly, the study did not control for several variables which may have 
influenced findings, such as treatment received/therapy undertaken, IQ, verbal fluency, or 
literacy levels.  These variables may have comprised confounding variables with respect 
to analysis of participants’ trauma narratives as well as their ratings of the 
phenomenological properties of their trauma memories (e.g., Bedard-Gilligan & Zoellner, 
2012; Gray & Lombardo, 2001; Rubin, 2011; Zoellner et al., 2002). 
To the researcher’s knowledge, this was the first study to use LIWC, AMQ and 
the CES to explore trauma memories in an adequately powered, community sample; 
Rubin (2011) carried out a study using these three measures with 30 undergraduate 
university students with an age range 18-22 years.  As an online project, the current study 
used written (typed) narratives rather than verbal narratives.  This rendered it difficult to 
measure certain phenomenological properties of memory typically associated with 
trauma, such as speech fillers, repetition and unfinished thoughts, thereby also somewhat 
limiting comparisons with certain iconic studies in the area, such as Foa et al. (1995) and 
Halligan et al. (2003).   Also inconsistent with certain previous studies, the current study 
used a within-subjects design rather than a between-groups design of participants with 
PTSD versus participants without PTSD.  An ‘extreme groups’ approach was considered 
for analysis of the data obtained but was deemed inappropriate in light of the well-
documented criticisms of this methodology (e.g., Preacher, Rucker, MacCallum, 
Nicewander, 2005) and given the relatively small sample size.  Future studies would 
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benefit from recruiting a larger sample to allow for analyses of separate groups (PTSD 
versus non-PTSD).   
Overall, the design of this study reflected previous literature and enabled total 
anonymity with minimal pressure to participate as individuals could opt-in from 
advertisements and take part in their own time in their own homes.  Several limitations 
are also identified, such as the omission of measures of verbal fluency and a relatively 
large number of tasks/questionnaires possibly producing a significant level of participant 
burden.  The correlational, within-subjects design was also a limitation with respect to 
both inferences of causality and drawing conclusions regarding differences in memory 
for trauma in individuals with PTSD and without.   
4.4.2 Sample. 
Initial power calculations required a total sample size of 82; this sample was 
successfully recruited and provided an adequate number of participants to power the 
analyses undertaken (Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests, correlations and multiple regression 
analyses involving four predictor variables).  Ideally, further participants would have 
been recruited to increase the power and the reliability of conclusions drawn from the 
study’s findings, but this was beyond the practical limitations of the project.  The 
community sample obtained covered a wide age-range (19-65 years, M = 36.1 years, SD 
= 10.8) and reported an extensive range of trauma types, both interpersonal and other, 
including one-off events and chronic, ongoing trauma, such as child sexual abuse and 
intimate partner violence (see Appendix N for details).  The inclusion of mixed trauma 
types may however have posed certain limitations.  It is possible that self-relevant 
information from certain types of trauma, such as trauma involving interpersonal abuse, 
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may be especially difficult to reconcile with pre-existing autobiographical knowledge and 
therefore such types of trauma may produce different results to other, one-off events (e.g. 
car accidents) that are not interpersonal in nature (O’Kearney et al., 2011).  Given the 
sample size in the current study and the limited scope of the project, it was not possible to 
group participants according to trauma type for analysis.  Future studies may consider 
this option of selecting a more homogeneous group in terms of trauma experience.  The 
gender ratio in the current study was consistent with previous research; typically more 
female than male participants tend to take part in research on trauma, which may be a 
reflection of the well-documented increased incidence of PTSD in females compared to 
males (e.g., Olff et al., 2007).  Importantly, the current study’s sample contained a 
significant proportion of participants who displayed clinical levels of PTSD, meeting 
DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for the disorder.  Moreover, twenty-five of the 82 participants 
(30 per cent of the sample) scored 15 or above on the PDS, a documented cut-off score 
indicating clinical caseness (Sheeran & Zimmerman, 2002).  These same 25 participants 
also met DSM-IV criteria for PTSD (APA, 1994).  Details of the severity level of 
participants’ PTSD scores are given in section 3.2 above.  To date, the majority of studies 
investigating trauma-centred identity have tested undergraduate student samples (e.g., 
Berntsen & Rubin, 2006, 2007;  Boals, 2010; Boals & Schuettler, 2011; Smeets et al., 
2010) with a relatively restricted age-range and subclinical levels of PTSD, prompting 
criticism from prominent clinicians and researchers in the area (e.g., Brewin, 2013).  A 
strength of the current study is that the sample contained participants with a range of 
PTSD symptoms, including a significant proportion with high levels of PTSD.  
Furthermore, there was diversity in terms of age, nationality, and ethnicity (see section 
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3.2 above).  Finally, the study also included participants who cited a traumatic event 
other than those listed as A criteria events in DSM-IV, as is explained in section 4.4.3.1 
below.  The inclusion of these participants may be considered a strength based on the 
growing evidence base that inclusion based solely on A criteria events may lead to under-
detection of PTSD (e.g., Bedard-Gilligan & Zoellner, 2008; Boals & Schuettler, 2009). 
4.4.3 Measures. 
The measures selected in this study were drawn from previous research in the 
field (e.g., Brown et al., 2010; Robinaugh & McNally, 2010, Rubin et al., 2011; 
Schuettler & Boals, 2011).  The CES and CES-D were used routinely and their strong 
published psychometric properties were supported with good reliability in this study.  As 
the PDS and AMQ were adjusted slightly from their previously published form, they will 
first be discussed in some detail before a brief note on the CES and CES-D.  Following 
this, the use of LIWC in the current study will be explored.  
4.4.3.1 PDS. 
The PDS is a well-established standardised measure of PTSD symptoms, widely 
used in both clinical and research settings.  The current study adapted it slightly to 
include certain events that are not typically deemed traumatic, such as diagnosis of a non-
life-threatening, chronic illness, and divorce.  Reliability assessment remained very good 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .91). The inclusion of these events reflects current debate in the 
literature regarding what constitutes a trauma (e.g., Mol et al., 2005; Van Hooff, 
MacFarlane, Baur, Abraham, Barnes, 2009) and is informed by theory on how the 
individual’s perception/appraisal of the event as traumatic is more predictive of outcome 
than an external rating of the classification of the event (e.g., Boals & Schuettler, 2009; 
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Breslau & Davis, 1987; Magnus, Diener, Fujita, & Pavot, 1993).  Admittedly, in the 
current study, only two of the 82 participants included in the analysis undertaken cited 
events that were outside of those typically listed as traumatic; their inclusion thus likely 
had little impact on the results obtained.  Finally, the current study increased the amount 
of space traditionally provided in the PDS for participants to write about their trauma 
with a view to gathering rich data conducive to textual analysis.  It may perhaps be 
argued that allowing participants a larger space to write about their traumatic experience 
may potentially have primed them to think about these traumas in a more deliberate 
manner and in greater detail than would have been the case with the original PDS.  As 
such, this modified PDS may possibly have influenced perceptions of centrality of event 
and/or the phenomenological properties of the memory.  It is noteworthy, however, that 
trauma narrative length varied greatly (see details on the total word count of trauma 
narratives, section 3.4.1); several participants did not avail of the extra space provided.  
4.4.3.2 AMQ. 
The AMQ was employed to assess participants’ phenomenological properties of 
trauma and non-trauma memories.  As the measure is not typically totalled, psychometric 
properties are not reported, which is a distinct limitation of the questionnaire.  The 
current study found the subscales used (detailed below) to have moderate-acceptable 
reliability (Cronbach’s alpha ranged from .58 to .77) although such figures are difficult to 
interpret given the small number of items in each subscale.   In keeping with previous 
research (e.g., Talarico et al., 2004), to facilitate analysis by reducing the number of 
statistical procedures performed, certain items on the questionnaire were grouped 
together to form subscales, such as a sensory subscale and a reliving subscale.  As 
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previously noted, however, the sensory subscale of the AMQ lacked an olfactory item, an 
omission that was potentially significant in the current study, particularly as sensory 
detail on the AMQ was compared with sensory detail of participants’ narratives, as 
gauged by LIWC, and which accounted for olfactory elements.  Moreover, although 
previously considered together as a measure of coherence, it has recently been suggested 
that the AMQ items ‘in words’ and ‘as a coherent story’ may tap different constructs, i.e., 
that ‘in words’ may measure language processes while ‘story’ gauges narrative 
organisation (Gauer et al., 2010).  It may therefore be inappropriate to group them 
together as the current study did, although further research regarding this matter is 
required.  The use of self-report measures such as the AMQ in studies of memory for 
trauma will be discussed in detail in section 4.6 below. 
4.4.3.3 CES.  
The Centrality of Event Scale (CES) was used in the current study to assess 
trauma-centred identity.  The measure showed good reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = .96) 
in the study sample.  The length of the questionnaire (20 items) may perhaps be seen as a 
weakness contributing to some participant burden, particularly as the measure was 
completed in relation to both a trauma memory and a negative memory.  Recent studies 
(e.g., Roland et al., 2013) have used the short form of this questionnaire containing seven 
items (CES-SF; Berntsen & Rubin, 2006) and have reported good reliability estimates 
although more evidence exists regarding the psychometric properties of the longer 
version.  Future studies may consider the short form option to reduce participant burden.  
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4.4.3.4 CES-D.  
The depression measure used (CES-D) showed good reliability in the current 
sample (Cronbach’s alpha = .93).  A weakness of the study is that the data relating to 
depression were not used in the primary analyses undertaken.  As a depression measure is 
typically included in PTSD studies, it was considered appropriate to do so in the current 
study in order to provide further information regarding participants’ profile and general 
symptomology.  Several studies investigating centrality of event and PTSD symptoms 
covary out depression in their analyses (e.g., Boals, 2010; Brown et al., 2010; Robinaugh 
& McNally, 2011), but as depression was not included in the current study’s analyses this 
was not necessary.  Moreover, it has been proposed by some researchers and clinicians 
(e.g., O’Donnell, Creamer, & Pattison, 2004) that covarying out depression in this way 
may remove some of the PTSD symptoms (see Miller & Chapman, 2005, for a general 
discussion of the potential problems engendered by the use of analysis of covariance in 
psychopathology research).  
4.4.3.5 LIWC.  
As a computerised textual analysis programme, LIWC avoids the potential bias of 
a subjective rater, is easy to use and can analyse large amounts of data in seconds (O’ 
Carroll Bantum & Owen, 2009; Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010).  Despite these 
advantages, LIWC has many limitations, some of which were of particular significance to 
the current study, as highlighted earlier.  Of relevance, in its basic format, LIWC cannot 
measure errors, or features such as confused temporal order, lack of complexity of a 
narrative, level of detail of a narrative, repetition, or set phrases, such as ‘I don’t 
remember…’ or ‘I can’t understand.’  The software designers succinctly convey some of 
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LIWC’s shortcomings by stating that the programme “ignores context, irony, sarcasm, 
and idioms” (Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010, p. 30).  LIWC has been criticised for its 
findings being at odds with human-rated findings (e.g., Alpers et al., 2005; O’Carroll 
Bantum & Owen, 2009).  Those evaluating LIWC’s effectiveness (e.g., O’Carroll 
Bantum & Owen, 2009) have highlighted that the programme’s ability to distinguish 
between words which are frequently used to convey quite different meanings could be 
substantially improved through use of more advanced computational linguistic coding 
strategies, such as word disambiguation (Agirre, & Edmonds, 2006) or key word in 
context (Weik, 1996). 
It is nonetheless possible to create a tailored dictionary for LIWC to use in its 
analyses.  The scope of the current study did not allow for this, but future studies may 
consider issues such as those described earlier in relation to the measurement of cognitive 
processes, i.e., it may be more helpful to programme LIWC to count cognitive processes 
in conjunction with negative qualifiers, such as ‘I don’t understand, can’t think’ etc.  Of 
note, however, there have been no studies to date analysing the use of such additional 
rules; it is difficult to predict how much these features would improve LIWC’s 
performance.  
In the current study LIWC’s ‘sensory detail’ category was potentially more valid 
than the AMQ sensory subscale as LIWC detected olfactory detail as well as the other 
sensory modalities.  A further limitation of use of LIWC, however, is that word 
categories are rarely normally distributed and they have low base rates; consequently, 
standard measures of reliability are not appropriate (Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010).  In 
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the current study, use of LIWC necessitated the use of non-parametric statistics to 
conduct the proposed analyses. 
4.4.4 Data analysis.  
The number of participants in the current study provided adequate power for all 
proposed analyses as well as some subsidiary analyses to be carried out.  Given the 
study’s moderate findings and the exploratory nature of certain analyses, however, results 
obtained must be viewed as preliminary and therefore must be interpreted with caution.  
As noted earlier, analysis involving a between-groups design of participants with and 
without PTSD would likely have added to the study’s findings, but this was not feasible 
given the sample size in question in these groups (25 participants qualified for the PTSD 
condition; 57 for the non-PTSD group) and an extreme groups approach would have led 
to very small sample sizes for comparison (25 in each group).  Also, as previously 
highlighted, the extreme groups approach has attracted a certain amount of criticism in 
the literature.   
The first research question was assessed using a series of Wilcoxon Signed Rank 
tests; the second and third using the non-parametric correlation co-efficient, Spearman’s 
Rho.  Non-parametric tests are less powerful than parametric tests; the use of these was 
therefore a slight weakness of the study.  Of note, in order to reduce the increased risk of 
Type I errors caused by multiple testing, a variant of the Bonferroni adjustment was 
applied (see Appendix xx for details).  This variant was employed instead of the 
traditional Bonferroni as the latter method is considered too conservative by many and 
thought to substantially increase the risk of occurrence of Type II errors (e.g., Cohen, 
1988; Holm, 1979; Perneger, 1998; Rice, 1989).   
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The post hoc analysis undertaken involved two multiple regressions.  These were 
adequately powered as they included only four and three predictor variables, however a 
more sophisticated regression analysis was not possible given the sample size.  It is 
nonetheless a strength of the study that these basic regression analyses were carried out as 
they provided more information about the relationship between the variables of interest 
and also demonstrated the role of certain properties of memory in predicting PTSD 
symptom severity.  
4.5 Procedure 
The questionnaire-based design employed in the current study was in keeping 
with previous research (e.g., Robinaugh & McNally, 2011) while also adding to extant 
findings by incorporating textual analysis of participants’ trauma and non-trauma 
narratives.  As an online study, participants could take part at their own convenience, 
however, as already stated, online studies tend to have higher rates of attrition than in 
vivo studies.  A clear strength is the use of validated and established measures, yet it is 
important to note that the delivery order of these questionnaires may have influenced the 
results obtained.  Attempts to limit this were made as counterbalancing procedures were 
incorporated into the study’s design to ensure balanced delivery of trauma and non-
trauma conditions.  This was achieved via random selection of order within the online 
design (participants were asked to select ‘1’ or ‘2’ to determine question delivery order).  
The vast majority of returned datasets completed the trauma memory first.  As 
participants could discontinue at any point, completion of the trauma section first meant 
that there were more data relating to trauma memories than negative memories.  Future 
studies may gain from counterbalancing in a more controlled manner, monitoring 
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completed questionnaires and ensuring that the online order is either randomly allocated 
or that selections are not weighted, for example, rather than choosing ‘1’ or ‘2,’ 
presenting the participant with a selection of neutral shapes may be preferable.  
4.6 Theoretical implications 
As highlighted in the introduction to this study, the integration of trauma within 
AM is currently an area of some debate in the field of PTSD studies.  Prominent 
contemporary PTSD theories (e.g., Brewin et al., 1996, 2010; Ehlers & Clark, 2000) posit 
that memories for trauma in those with PTSD are unique in that they are poorly 
elaborated and inadequately contextualised and integrated into AM.  Findings from recent 
studies by cognitive psychologists, however, suggest that memories for trauma are not 
unique and, as such, can be explained using standard cognitive models of memory (e.g., 
Berntsen & Rubin & Rubin, 2006, 2007; Rubin et al., 2011).  Such theorists claim that 
due to their distinctiveness and emotional impact, trauma memories remain highly 
accessible, and form a cognitive reference point for the organisation of autobiographical 
knowledge (i.e., they are highly integrated into AM).  They cite studies that have 
demonstrated how, in the aftermath of trauma, one’s identity can become trauma-centred, 
which in turn is associated with PTSD symptoms, and claim that such findings imply that  
the trauma memory is overly integrated into one’s AM and sense of self (Berntsen & 
Rubin, 2006; 2007).   
In response, Brewin (2011, 2013) has proposed that this apparent contradiction is 
false and may be resolved through consideration of Conway’s (2005) SMS, outlined in 
section 1.2.8.1 above.  Brewin (2011, 2013) contends that it is possible to retain 
conceptual knowledge of the self after experiencing a trauma, while simultaneously 
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lacking episodic knowledge of elements of the trauma.  To elucidate, the author 
highlights how the fact of the trauma having happened may dominate one’s mental life 
(as evidenced, for example,  in the intrusive symptoms of PTSD), while at the same time, 
the individual may fail to integrate certain episodic memories of the trauma into the 
autobiographical knowledge base.  The dominance of the trauma memory in the form of 
reliving symptoms may lead to the individual developing a sense of identity that is 
trauma-centred.  To clarify, as outlined in the introduction to this study, Conway’s SMS 
purports that within AM, the working self has a reciprocal relationship with the 
autobiographical knowledge base, allowing for the integration of experience with existing 
knowledge (Conway, 2005).  New knowledge enters long-term memory through the goal 
hierarchy of the working self, and it is also via this pathway that access is gained to pre-
existing knowledge and that memories are formed.  The goal hierarchy of the working 
self thus determines the encoding and accessibility of knowledge in long-term memory, 
and the construction of memories (Conway, 2005).  In terms of PTSD, Brewin (2011, 
2013) emphasises that the detrimental impact of trauma on an individual’s sense of self 
and identity is a phenomenon that has been repeatedly observed and reported by 
clinicians and researchers alike for many years (e.g., Ehlers et al., 2000; Herman, 1992; 
Pillemer, 1998; Sutherland & Bryant, 2005).  Trauma-centred identity, as such, is not a 
novel concept, but rather one that makes sense within Conway’s AM framework (Brewin, 
2013).  Trauma typically shatters previously held assumptions about the self, others and 
the world (e.g., Ehlers & Clark, 2000, Janoff-Bulman, 1992), and therefore cannot be 
accommodated or interpreted by one’s corresponding goal hierarchy (Conway, 2005; 
Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).  As a result, the trauma memory cannot be integrated 
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into the autobiographical knowledge base but instead remains associated with the 
working self and is triggered when the individual’s goals are activated, leading to 
development of the intrusion symptoms of PTSD (Conway, 2005; Ehlers & Clark, 2000).  
This unresolved association with the working self, which leads to the pervasive 
awareness of the occurrence of the trauma, may be understood as trauma-centred identity.   
Lack of integration within AM also results in increased retrieval of the trauma 
memory in response to triggers/cues (Conway, 2005); as such, involuntary trauma 
memories are typically experienced intrusively and possess a ‘here-and-now’ quality, 
often lacking temporal and/or spatial detail (Ehlers & Clark, 2000), i.e., the individual 
retains perceptual memory of the event while lacking certain episodic memories.  The 
poor elaboration within AM, often exacerbated by avoidance of the trauma memory, 
further leads to the experience of trauma memories as fragmented and disconnected, yet  
knowledge of the trauma having occurred may remain intact and may determine the 
individual’s sense of self (i.e., trauma-centred identity).  
The current study endeavoured to investigate if indeed the two apparently 
opposing positions of centrality and inadequate integration can co-exist.  Of note, the 
study’s analyses were preliminary and exploratory in nature; the results obtained must 
therefore be interpreted with caution.  The (tentative) theoretical implications of these 
findings with respect to the positions of centrality/inadequate integration will now be 
summarily outlined, followed by a brief discussion of the significance of findings in 
relation to construct definition and measurement.  
Results from the current study were in keeping with some of the central tenets of 
prominent clinical theories of PTSD.  For example, the study found evidence of 
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impoverished voluntary recall of traumatic events when compared to negative memories 
(e.g., Brewin et al., 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000) as opposed to the highly accessible 
memories proposed by the centrality view to characterise memory for trauma (e.g., 
Berntsen & Rubin, 2007).  Participants also rated their trauma memories as less coherent 
and more fragmented than their negative memories, again in keeping with current clinical 
conceptualisations of PTSD but inconsistent with the detailed recall reported in certain 
studies cited in support of the centrality position (e.g., Lancaster et al., 2011; McNally, 
2003).  Participants expressed less negative emotion and used fewer spatial references in 
their trauma narratives than in their negative narratives, also concordant with the 
inadequate integration position (Brewin et al., 1996; Conway, 2005; Ehlers & Clark, 
2000).  Importantly, positive (albeit moderate) relationships were established between 
PTSD symptoms and certain phenomenological properties of trauma memories typically 
cited in support of clinical models of the disorder (fragmentation, sensory detail, a sense 
of reliving, and use of present tense verbs when describing the trauma).  Also of note, the 
study found a trend towards a negative relationship between spatial references in trauma 
narratives and PTSD symptoms, and a trend towards less rehearsal of the trauma memory 
in those with greater PTSD symptom severity.  Regression analysis revealed that 
fragmentation and use of the present tense each made a unique, significant contribution to 
explaining the variance in PTSD scores; the former finding may be viewed as consistent 
with the inadequate integration position, while the latter supports both clinical theories of 
PTSD and the centrality position.  
Taken together, these findings, though moderate and preliminary in nature, may 
be considered indicative of the disruption to certain phenomenological properties of the 
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trauma memory outlined in clinical models of PTSD, deemed to illustrate the inadequate 
integration and poor contextualisation of the trauma memory with AM (Brewin et al., 
1996; Conway, 2005; Ehlers & Clark, 2000).  Among these findings supporting the 
clinical theories of PTSD, however, the current study also revealed certain apparent 
discrepancies, which may be viewed as inconclusive.  For example, participants reported 
no difference between their trauma and non-trauma memories in terms of sensory detail, 
but analysis using LIWC indicated a difference between the two.  The difficulties 
encountered in interpreting data obtained using different methodologies will be explored 
in greater detail below in a discussion on the study’s implications for construct 
measurement.   
With respect to centrality of event, the current study’s findings were in keeping 
with theoretical and empirical accounts of the positive association between trauma-
centred identity and PTSD symptoms (e.g., Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; McNally et al., 
1995; Sutherland & Bryant, 2005; Rubin et al., 2008) participants with higher PTSD 
scores showed greater centrality of event.  Moreover, the sense of reliving, both reported 
by participants with higher CES scores and observed in their trauma narratives in the use 
of the present tense, may be viewed as concordant not only with the centrality view but 
also the inadequate integration theories of PTSD.   Both positions highlight the ‘here-and-
now’ aspect of intrusive symptoms of the disorder as indicative of how the trauma 
memory comes to dominate mental life.  As outlined earlier, reconciling the trauma 
memory with previously held assumptions about the self can prove highly problematic as 
the individual struggles to resolve these discrepancies (Brewin, 2011; Conway, 2005; 
Ehlers & Clark, 2000).  In this way, the reliving symptoms are both constituted by and 
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constitutive of this mental dominance of the trauma memory, which may also be 
conceived of as trauma-centred identity.  The current study’s finding that lower levels of 
rehearsal of the trauma memory were associated with higher levels of PTSD symptom 
severity is, however, inconsistent with the centrality view that increased rehearsal leads to 
higher PTSD scores.  
Also of significance was the finding that use of the present tense in trauma 
narratives was positively correlated with CES scores.  As discussed earlier, such use of 
the present tense is frequently interpreted as a marker of fragmentation of the trauma 
memory, indicative of its inadequate integration within AM.  Interpreting the finding in 
this way lends some support to Brewin’s (2011, 2013) claim that fragmentation and 
centrality of event can co-exist, i.e., that identity may become trauma-centred without 
memories for the event necessarily remaining highly accessible.  The presence of this 
relationship may, however, be contingent on whether the fragmentation in question is 
established through self-report or textual analysis measures, as is discussed below.  
Furthermore, as also highlighted earlier, it is necessary to consider this finding in relation 
to the observed lack of relationship between CES scores and self-reported fragmentation, 
and between CES scores and other traditional indices of fragmentation/disorganisation.  
The study’s findings in this respect are therefore inconclusive as they do not provide 
strong evidence to substantiate Brewin’s (2011, 2013) assertion that the alleged 
contradiction between inadequate integration and centrality of event is false; nor, 
however, does the study provide evidence that trauma memories are not unique or 
fragmented, as posited by advocates of the centrality view (e.g., Rubin et al., 2008).   
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Also of critical importance in terms of the theoretical implications of the current 
study, it has been highlighted that the properties of trauma memories established in 
studies cited in support of the inadequate integration position do not irrefutably imply 
that traumatic memory is isolated within autobiographical memory (O’Kearney et al., 
2011).  Contributing to this controversy are the substantial challenges posed by the 
measurement of constructs such as fragmentation, disorganisation and coherence.  As 
previously noted, reviews have shown that data regarding the fragmentation, incoherence, 
and disorganisation of memories for trauma are somewhat inconclusive when examined 
in their totality (e.g., O’Kearney & Perrott, 2006; Zoellner & Bittenger, 2004), and it has 
been proposed that these discrepancies may be explained in terms of the different 
methodologies employed (Bedard-Gilligan & Zoellner, 2012; Brewin, 2013; Megias et 
al., 2007).  Brewin (2013), for example, has suggested that certain disparities in findings 
may be due to a lack of distinction in such studies between voluntary and involuntary 
memories and consequent ambiguity regarding the properties pertaining to each.  Other 
explanations of incompatible results include findings that self-report measures show 
lower levels of fragmentation and disorganisation than analyses of trauma narratives 
(Brewin, 2013; Megias et al., 2007).  Indeed, Brewin (2013) very recently reviewed 
findings relating to disorganisation and fragmentation of trauma memories and proposed 
that brief, self-report measures, and in particular, single-item measures, have yielded less 
consistent findings than more rigorous, comprehensive studies involving textual analysis 
of trauma narratives as well as self-report measures.  O’Kearney et al. (2011) also 
highlight the limitations of using self-report questionnaires alone, and assert that multi-
method approaches are critical to assess trauma memory integration within 
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autobiographical memory and the impact of this psychological process on posttraumatic 
adjustment. 
Recent studies using both standardised questionnaires and textual analysis to 
examine phenomenological properties of memories have, however, observed noteworthy 
discord between results obtained from self-report measures and those based on narrative 
analysis.  Bohanek et al. (2005), for example, examined memories of positive and 
negative emotional events and found little relation between the objective content of 
narratives (computer-coded) and participants’ subjective ratings of their memory 
experiences.  O’Kearney and colleagues (2011) found that participants’ self-ratings of the 
disorganisation of their trauma memories were strongly associated with PTSD symptom 
severity while computer-rated and rater-coded disorganisation showed no such 
relationship.  Bedard-Gilligan and Zoellner (2012) reviewed findings on the association 
between peri-traumatic dissociation and trauma narrative fragmentation and found that 
this relationship was prominent when analysing participants’ own ratings of memory 
fragmentation, but not computer-rated or rater-coded measures.  Kindt and colleagues 
(Kindt & van den Hout, 2003; Kindt, van den Hout, & Buck, 2005) likewise observed 
divergence between participants’ subjective ratings and computer-coded objective ratings 
of memory fragmentation when examining the relationship between dissociation and 
memory disturbances, noting again that significant results were observed only in relation 
to subjective, self-report ratings.   
In light of such research, theorists and clinicians are considering the importance 
of meta-memory findings that illustrate participants’ perception of their trauma memories 
relative to actual/observable memory quality gauged through textual analysis (Bedard-
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Gilligan & Zoellner, 2012).  Within the field of AM studies, it has been suggested that 
the two methods (self-report/textual analysis) may in fact measure different constructs 
which may not necessarily map on to each other as closely as was previously assumed 
(Bohanek et al., 2005; Gauer et al., 2010).  Such researchers urge nonetheless that 
findings from both types of measurement be taken into account as both provide relevant 
information to understandings of autobiographical memory even if referring to different 
aspects of the phenomenon, the unique features of which remain as yet undefined 
(Bohanek et al., 2005; Gauer & Gomes, 2010).  In the context of PTSD studies, it may 
prove profitable to consider how various factors affect memory and meta-memory for 
trauma differently, and this may necessitate analysis of the construct validity of certain 
measures currently in use.  It is widely acknowledged, for instance, that a comprehensive 
method of assessment that truly captures the clinical phenomenon of fragmentation has 
not yet been devised (Bedard-Gilligan & Zoellner, 2012; Brewin et al., 2010; Brewin, 
2013). 
Nonetheless, whilst fragmentation is admittedly challenging to measure, it is also 
important to recognise that fragmentation, and the related concepts of coherence and 
(dis)organisation, do not necessarily accurately capture or reflect integration into AM 
(O’Kearney et al., 2011).  Contributing to the complexity of the debate is the 
heterogeneity of definitions of these constructs (O’Kearney et al., 2011).  For example, 
despite the operationalisation of the fragmentation and disorganisation of trauma 
memories in terms of coherence, there is no agreed upon definition of narrative coherence 
in the literature (Baker-Ward et al., 2007).  It has also been proposed, however, that the 
relative lack of convincing evidence gathered to date regarding the fragmentation of 
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trauma memories may signal that the construct is not as robust as clinical observations 
would suggest, a viewpoint espoused by proponents of the centrality view (e.g., McNally, 
2003; Rubin et al., 2008).  In response, leading clinical theorists (e.g., Brewin, 2011, 
2013) have highlighted that centrality of event does not necessarily indicate coherence or 
a lack of fragmentation of the trauma memory.  The claim that voluntary memory for 
trauma is fragmented and disorganised thus remains highly controversial (Brewin, 2013), 
and further research is required to elucidate and unravel the many complexities of the 
debate.  
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4.6 Clinical implications  
Overall, the current study’s findings, though moderate, appear to be 
predominantly consistent with contemporary clinical conceptualisations of the inadequate 
integration of trauma memories within AM in PTSD.  As such, these findings support 
current practice guidelines (NICE, 2005), adding to the large body of existing research 
underpinning prevailing approaches to the treatment of PTSD, outlined in the 
introduction to this study.   
A sense of reliving when remembering trauma has been shown to predict long-
term PTSD severity and poor treatment response to exposure-based treatment (Speckens 
et al., 2006; Michael et al., 2005).  The current study found that reliving was positively 
correlated with both PTSD symptom severity and centrality of event.  These results 
support current treatments of PTSD which target the individual’s experience of reliving 
symptoms and also facilitate the construction of an integrated, comprehensive trauma 
narrative, thereby elaborating and contextualising the trauma memory within AM 
(Brewin et al., 1996; Conway, 2005; Ehlers and Clark, 2000; Ehlers et al., 2010; Foa et 
al., 2009; Taylor, 2006).  The current study’s findings regarding the relationship between 
trauma-centred identity and reliving symptoms also suggest that certain sufferers of 
PTSD may require schema work that addresses their ‘vulnerable identities’ (Brewin, 
2003), and indeed a greater emphasis on appraisal work focussing on the meaning of the 
trauma for the individual in terms of sense of self and identity.  Unlike conclusions drawn 
from certain previous studies (e.g., Boals, 2010; Robinaugh & McNally, 2010; Shamai & 
Levin-Megged, 2006), the current study’s findings do not indicate that the trauma 
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memory needs to be construed as separate from the self in order to achieve healthy 
posttraumatic adjustment. 
Fragmentation of trauma memories is frequently clinically observed and remains 
an important focus in current treatments of PTSD (e.g., Becker, Zayfert, & Anderson, 
2004; Foa et al., 2009; van der Kolk, Roth, Pelcovitz, Sunday & Spinazzola, 2005).  If, 
however, as the current study’s findings appear to suggest, the perception of 
fragmentation (as assessed by self-report measures) is more related to PTSD symptom 
severity than actual/observed fragmentation, then perhaps treatment of the disorder 
should emphasise beliefs about the memory rather than actual memory quality (Bedard-
Gilligan & Zoellner, 2012).  Such an approach would further highlight the role of 
appraisals, as in Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) cognitive model of PTSD and corresponding 
cognitive therapy treatment programme.   
 With respect to the issues regarding the measurement of fragmentation explored 
in the current study, it is essential that clinicians treating PTSD are aware of not only the 
empirical evidence supporting or contradicting the theories underpinning current practice, 
but also the methodological strengths and limitations of research studies informing such 
interventions.  As such, there is a greater need for transparency in published findings 
regarding the definition and measurement of different constructs of pertinence to clinical 
studies of PTSD, AM, and trauma-centred identity. 
4.7 Future Research 
The discussion of findings and of the methodological and theoretical issues raised 
by the current study has highlighted some of the possibilities for future research in the 
area.  A summary of these central points is now provided. 
133 
 
Future investigations into the relationship between trauma-centred identity and 
the fragmentation of trauma memories may benefit from using all three possible methods 
of assessing memory properties (i.e., self-report, computer- and rater-coded measures).  
Such an approach would allow future studies to examine memory quality and experience 
in a more comprehensive manner, which may provide some insight into the potentially 
different constructs being assessed by each type of measure.  
The current study encountered several difficulties through the use of LIWC in its 
most basic format.  Future studies may consider creating a dictionary that would allow 
for more in-depth analysis of categories, such as counting ‘cognitive processes’ in 
conjunction with any negative qualifiers evident in the text.  Moreover, future studies 
could potentially create lists of set phrases that would pertain to analyses of certain 
phenomenological properties of trauma narratives, for example, a ‘fragmentation’ 
category, including items such as ‘in pieces, bitty, choppy, disjointed, shattered,’ some of 
which were observed upon inspection of the current study’s trauma narratives.  Several 
such relevant categories could be devised, including a list of terms connoting 
‘incoherence/disorganisation,’ such as ‘jumbled, unclear, fuzzy, muddled, blurry, 
confused…’ and so on.  
In a related vein, future studies may consider eliciting verbal rather than written 
narratives from participants.  As noted earlier, the current study could not gauge certain 
indices of fragmentation/disorganisation, such as speech fillers, repetitions, and non-
fluencies as these are typically absent from written text.  Inclusion of such markers of 
fragmentation may add value to future findings.  Interestingly, LIWC has categories for 
such linguistic properties therefore use of the programme may be more suited to analysis 
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of verbal speech.  Moreover, such a study would necessitate in vivo research, which may 
also allow the research to better distinguish between participants’ voluntary and 
involuntary memories by asking participants to retrospectively highlight relevant sections 
of their narratives that are flashbacks, similar to in Hellawell and Brewin’s (2004) study. 
Admittedly, such a study would comprise a vast piece of work, and the disadvantages of 
removing the anonymity element afforded by online research would need to be carefully 
considered.    
As previously noted, future studies would gain significantly from recruiting larger 
samples and employing a between-subjects design involving a PTSD group and a non-
PTSD group as certain phenomenological properties of trauma memories may only be 
ascertainable in individuals presenting with clinical levels of the disorder (Brewin, 2013).  
Needless to say, a larger sample would also be better powered for more sophisticated 
statistical analysis. Moreover, a number of variables in the current study showed 
borderline significance; more highly powered studies would likely clarify these findings.  
 Finally, future studies should limit confounding variables by including, and 
controlling for, measures of verbal fluency, IQ, time elapsed since event, and PTSD 
treatment undertaken.  Such studies may also consider analysing by trauma type, 
differentiating between interpersonal trauma and other (Allen, 2001).  
4.8 Conclusion 
The integration of memory for trauma within AM remains a contentious issue in 
the field of PTSD studies (Brewin, 2013).  In particular, the claim that voluntary memory 
for trauma is fragmented and disorganised continues to be controversial (Brewin, 2013), 
with several studies reporting seemingly contradictory findings (O’Kearney & Perrott, 
135 
 
2006).  In light of Brewin’s (2011, 2013) proposal that the ostensibly contradictory 
positions of the centrality view, advocated by recent cognitive psychologists (e.g., Rubin 
et al., 2008), and the theory of inadequate integration of trauma memories, outlined in 
contemporary clinical theories of PTSD (e.g., Ehlers & Clark, 2000), the current study 
endeavoured to shed light on the complex relationships between PTSD symptoms, AM, 
and centrality of trauma event to identity, and to examine findings for evidence in 
support/contradiction of Brewin’s (2011, 2013) proposal.   
The study’s findings were primarily consistent with contemporary clinical 
conceptualisations of PTSD indicating disturbed memory processes underpinning the 
disorder (e.g., Brewin et al., 1996; 2010; Ehlers & Clark, 2000), while also replicating 
findings relating to the strong association between PTSD symptoms and centrality of 
trauma event to identity.  When examined critically, the study’s findings provided no 
clear, strong evidence supporting Brewin’s (2011, 2013) claim that the two positions of 
centrality and inadequate integration can co-exist.  A number of methodological issues, 
including a relatively small sample size, and difficulties encountered through the use of 
LIWC, a computerised textual analysis programme, prevented firm conclusions from 
being drawn.  Interestingly, the study noted that textual analysis and subjective self-report 
measures of the phenomenological properties of trauma memories may provide different 
perspectives on the individual’s experience.  In view of the importance accorded to the 
psychological processes implicated in PTSD in current conceptualisations of the disorder, 
further empirical investigation is required in order to better clarify the mechanisms 
underpinning how trauma is encoded and recalled, with recourse to the role of AM within 
such processes, and the impact of these phenomena on one’s sense of identity.  To 
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elucidate the disparities between findings obtained from different methodologies, and to 
further explore Brewin’s (2011, 2013) assertion that inadequate integration and centrality 
are not wholly incompatible positions, more rigorous, comprehensive designs using 
precise definitions of the constructs under investigation are called for.   
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Invitation to Participate in a Research Study 
looking at Memory for Significant Life Events 
  
 
 
Would you like to participate in research on how we remember 
significant life events? 
 
The study is looking at how we remember these events and how they affect our identity 
and sense of self.  It will explore memories of important life events, such as memories of 
trauma, as well as other, everyday, non-traumatic events. 
 
The study is looking for adults from the general population, male or female, aged 
between 18 and 65 years, whose English is fluent enough to complete the questionnaires. 
 
Volunteering will take approximately 45-60 minutes and requires filling in some 
questionnaires and completing two memory writing (typing) tasks. You can fill in the 
questionnaires online on a secure webpage.  
 
Participants will be entered into a prize draw to win £80 Amazon.co.uk vouchers! 
 
If you are interested in taking part and would like some more information, then please 
contact me using the details below, or click on this link 
http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/Memory_for_Life_Events_Study to learn more about 
what taking part would involve. 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information.  I look forward to hearing from 
you soon. 
 
Emma Ronayne 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist  
School of Medicine, Health Policy and Practice 
University of East Anglia 
Email: E.Ronayne@uea.ac.uk Phone: 07725 031486 
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Primary Researcher: Emma Ronayne                                             
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
Norwich Medical School  
University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ  
email: E.Ronayne@uea.ac.uk 
phone: 07725 031486 
 
Primary supervisor: Dr Laura Jobson 
Norwich Medical School 
University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ  
email: L.Jobson@uea.ac.uk 
phone: 01603 591158 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
A Study Investigating Memories of Significant Life Events 
I would like to invite you to take part in a research study.  Before you decide, I would like 
to explain why the research is being carried out and what it will involve for you.  Please 
read the following information carefully. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to 
take part. 
1. What is the purpose of the study? 
The aim of this study is to investigate how people remember events in their lives, 
including trauma (events such as serious accidents, sexual assault, natural disasters, 
combat).  I would like to find out how people relate these events to their identity and 
sense of self. I am therefore looking for adults aged between 18 and 65 years from the 
general population to participate. I am interested in seeing how memories for different 
types of events, both traumatic and non-traumatic, differ, and how these differences relate 
to psychological adjustment following trauma. The study is being carried out by a trainee 
clinical psychologist, Emma Ronayne, and a clinical lecturer, Dr Laura Jobson, at the 
University of East Anglia.  
 
2. Why have I been invited? 
You have been invited as you have indicated an interest in the research by responding to 
the advertisement for it.  I am hoping to include a total of 67 participants in the study. 
 
3. Do I have to take part? 
No.  It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. Your participation is totally 
voluntary. After you have read this information, you will be asked to complete a consent 
form to show that you are happy to take part. 
 
4. What will happen if I take part? 
After reading this information sheet, you will be directed to a consent form. You will be 
asked to take your time to consider your participation before clicking on ‘NEXT’ at the 
bottom of the consent form screen. You can save the form, close it, think about whether 
you want to take part and open it again later.  By completing the consent form and 
clicking on ‘NEXT’, you are agreeing to take part.  If you choose to take part, you will 
then be directed to an online link with the study questionnaires. The questionnaires will 
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take approximately 45-60 minutes to complete. Please note that some tasks ask you to 
think and write about a trauma event. The other tasks relate to other types of memory. 
Participants must be able to complete the tasks in English.  
 
5. Can I stop taking part if I change my mind? 
If you decide to take part in the study you can change your mind about participating and 
withdraw from the study at any point. There will be a ‘WITHDRAW’ option at the 
bottom of every screen. If you choose to withdraw from the study you do not have to 
provide a reason and there will be no consequences. If you choose to withdraw, the 
information you have already provided will be destroyed and not used in the research. 
 
6. Will my taking part in this study be anonymous and kept confidential? 
Yes. All collected data will be anonymous and treated as confidential. This means that I 
will not ask you to provide your name or address on the questionnaires you complete.  
The questionnaires completed by you will be password-protected on a secure webpage. 
Once the study is completed, the information will be stored on an encrypted memory 
stick in a locked drawer at the University of East Anglia for 5 years, in line with current 
policy. The consent form information will be stored on a separate memory stick and 
destroyed on completion of the research. It will not be possible to link the consent forms 
to your questionnaires. 
 
7. What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The information collected will be written into articles and may be published in a relevant 
journal. You will not be identified in any of these articles. If you are interested in finding 
out about the results from the study you will be given a chance at the end of the study to 
leave your email or postal address. These details will be kept separate from your 
completed questionnaires and it will not be possible to link the two in any way. After I 
have sent you information about what I have found, your email/postal addresses will be 
destroyed.  
 
8. What are the possible disadvantages or risks of taking part? 
The study does include some questions about trauma. Research shows that, in general, 
questions about trauma are not harmful to participants’ well-being; in fact, several studies 
have even shown that writing about traumatic events can improve how people feel about 
the events in question.  It is possible, however, that you may feel some distress during or 
following the task. If you feel upset during the study, you may withdraw at any point. If 
you feel distressed during or after the research, then I would encourage you to contact me 
(Emma Ronayne, Trainee Clinical Psychologist), your local General Practitioner (GP) or 
a mental health support service, such as: MIND (UK) [Phone: 08457 660 163] or the 
Samaritans (UK) [Phone: 08457 909 090], Samaritans (ROI) [Phone: 1850 60 90 90], 
Samaritans (US) [Phone: 1(800) 273-8255]. 
 
9. What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
There are no direct benefits in taking part, however it is hoped that this research will 
improve our understanding of memory and adjustment to trauma. It may help to develop 
better interventions for people who are suffering from post-traumatic stress. 
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10. Complaints 
If you have any further concerns about any aspect of the study you should contact Dr 
Laura Jobson, Clinical Psychologist, EFRY 2.17, University of East Anglia, Norwich 
NR4 7TJ (Email: laura.jobson@uea.ac.uk Tel.: 01603 591158) or Professor David 
Crossman, Head of Norwich Medical School, MED 1.07A, University of East Anglia, 
Norwich NR4 7TJ (Email: d.crossman@uea.ac.uk Tel.: 01603 593971)  
 
11. Who is organising and funding the research?   
This research is organised by Emma Ronayne and Dr Laura Jobson and is funded by the 
University of East Anglia Doctoral Programme in Clinical Psychology. 
 
12. Has this study been approved? 
Ethical approval for this study was granted by the UEA Faculty of Medicine and Health 
Sciences Research Ethics Committee. 
 
13. Further information  
If there is anything that is not clear, or if you would like more information, please ask me.  
 
 
Thank you for taking time to read this information sheet, please click here if you would 
like to save this information for your records. 
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PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM                                                 
 
Title of the project:  
A study investigating memory for significant life events 
 
Researchers and contact details: 
Emma Ronayne (E.Ronayne@uea.ac.uk / 07725 031486) 
Dr Laura Jobson (l.jobson@uea.ac.uk / 01603 591158) 
 
Please click on each box if you agree to participate. 
 
1. I have read the Participant Information Sheet relating to this study. I understand 
what my role will be in this research, and all of my questions have been answered 
to my satisfaction. 
 
2. I understand that I am free to withdraw from the research for any reason and 
without prejudice. 
 
3. I have been informed that the confidentiality of the information I provide will be 
safeguarded. 
 
4. I understand that relevant sections of my data collected during the study may be 
looked at by individuals from regulatory authorities where it is relevant to my 
taking part in this research.  
 
5. I understand that I am free to ask any questions at any time before and during the 
study, and have the contact details of the researcher should I wish to discuss any 
aspect of the study. 
 
6. I am an adult, aged between 18 and 65 years. 
 
7. I understand that by reading the participant information sheet, this consent form, and 
clicking on “Next” to take me to the online link with the study questionnaires, I am 
giving my consent to participate. 
 
 
Please save a copy of this for your own records (click here) 
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INSTRUCTIONS: 
Please complete the following information 
 
Age:_________________ years old 
 
 
Gender (please click to highlight):    MALE   FEMALE 
 
 
What is your ethnicity? ____________________________________ 
 
 
What is your religious affiliation? _________________________________ 
 
 
How many years have you spent in education?  _____________ years 
 
Have you ever been given a diagnosis of PTSD from a medical or mental health 
professional? (please click) 
  YES      NO 
How difficult did you find filling in these questionnaires? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at all                                     Moderately                                       Extremely 
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Task 1: INSTRUCTIONS 
Part 1 
Many people have lived through or witnessed a very stressful and traumatic event at 
some point in their lives. Below is a list of traumatic events. Click on the box next to 
ALL of the events that have happened to you or that you have witnessed. 
 
1 Serious accident, fire, or explosion (for example, an industrial, farm, car, plane, 
or boating accident)  
 
2 Natural disaster (for example, cyclone, flood, tornado, hurricane, flood, or 
major earthquake) 
 
3 Non-sexual assault by a family member or someone you know (for example, 
being mugged, physically attacked, shot, stabbed, or held at gunpoint) 
 
4 Non-sexual assault by a stranger (for example, being mugged, physically 
attacked, shot, stabbed, or held at gunpoint) 
 
5 Sexual assault by a family member or someone you know (for example, rape or 
attempted rape) 
 
6 Sexual assault by a stranger (for example, rape or attempted rape) 
 
7 Military combat or war zone 
 
8 Sexual contact when you were younger than 18 with someone who was 5 or 
more years older than you (for example, contact with genitals, breasts) 
 
9 Imprisonment (for example, prison inmate, prisoner of war, hostage) 
 
10 Torture  
 
11 Life threatening illness 
 
12 Other traumatic event 
 
13 If you marked item 12, specify the traumatic event below: 
 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Part 2. 
 
14 If you marked more than one traumatic event in Part 1, click on the box next to 
the event that bothers you the most. If you only clicked one traumatic event in 
Part 1, click the same one below. 
 
 Accident  
 
 Disaster  
 
 Non-sexual assault by a family member or someone you know  
 
 Non-sexual assault by a stranger  
 
 Sexual assault by a family member or someone you know  
 
 Sexual assault by a stranger  
 
 Combat 
 
 Sexual contact when you were younger than 18 with someone who was 5 or 
more years older  
 
 Imprisonment  
 
 Torture  
 
 Life threatening illness 
 
 Other  
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Now please think about the traumatic event you just selected.  Please write about this 
event in as much detail as you can.  All of your writing will be completely confidential. 
As you type, do not worry about punctuation or grammar, just write as much as you can 
and include thoughts, feelings, reflections etc.  
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Below are some questions about the traumatic event you just described above. 
 
15 How long ago did the traumatic event happen? (click on ONE) 
 
1 Less than 1 month 
 
2 1 to 3 months 
 
3 3 to 6 months 
 
4 6 months to 3 years 
 
5 3 to 5 years 
 
6 More than 5 years 
 
 
For the following questions, click Yes or No. 
 
During this traumatic event: 
 
16 Were you physically injured?     YES  NO 
 
17 Was someone else physically injured?   YES  NO 
 
18 Did you think your life was in danger?   YES  NO 
 
19 Did you think someone else’s life was in danger?  YES  NO 
 
20 Did you feel helpless?      YES  NO 
 
21 Did you feel terrified?      YES  NO 
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Part 3. 
Below is a list of problems that people sometimes have after experiencing a traumatic 
event. Read each one carefully and click on the number (0-3) that best describes how 
often that problem has bothered you IN THE PAST MONTH. Rate each problem with 
respect to the traumatic event you described in Item 14. 
0 Not at all or only one time 
1 Once a week or less/once in a while 
2 2 to 4 times a week/half the time 
3 5 or more times a week/almost always 
22 Having upsetting thoughts or images about the 
traumatic event that came into your head when 
you didn’t want them to 
0 1 2 3 
 
      
23 Having bad dreams or nightmares about the 
traumatic event 
0 1 2 3 
      
24 Reliving the traumatic event, acting or feeling as 
if it was happening again 
0 1 2 3 
      
25 Feeling emotionally upset when you were 
reminded of the traumatic event (for example, 
feeling scared, angry, sad, guilty, etc.) 
0 1 2 3 
      
26 Experiencing physical reactions when you were 
reminded of the traumatic event (for example, 
breaking out in a sweat, heart beating fast) 
0 1 2 3 
      
27 Trying not to think about, talk about, or have 
feelings about the traumatic event 
0 1 2 3 
      
28 Trying to avoid activities, people, or places that 
remind you of the traumatic event 
0 1 2 3 
      
29 Not being able to remember an important part of 
the traumatic event 
0 1 2 3 
      
30 Having much less interest or participating much 
less often in important activities 
0 1 2 3 
      
31 Feeling distant or cut off from people around you 0 1 2 3 
 
32 Feeling emotionally numb (for example, being 
unable to cry or unable to have loving feelings) 
0 1 2 3 
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33 Feeling as if your future plans or hopes will not 
come true(for example, you will not have a 
career, marriage, children, or a long life) 
0 1 2 3 
      
34 Having trouble falling or staying asleep 0 1 2 3 
      
35 Feeling irritable or having fits of anger 0 1 2 3 
      
36 Having trouble concentrating (for example, 
drifting in and out of conversation, losing track of 
a story on television, forgetting what you read)  
0 1 2 3 
      
37 Being overly alert (for example, checking to see 
who is around you, being uncomfortable with 
your back to the door, etc.) 
0 1 2 3 
38 Being jumpy or easily startled (for example, 
when someone walks up behind you) 
0 1 2 3 
 
 
39 How long have you been experiencing the problems that you reported above? 
(click on ONE) 
 
1 Less than 1 month 
 
2 1 to 3 months 
 
3 More than 3 months 
 
 
40 How long after the traumatic event did these problems begin? (click on ONE) 
 
1 Less than 6 months 
 
2 6 or more months 
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Part 4 
Indicate below if the problems you rate in Part 3 have interfered with any of the 
following areas in your life DURING THE PAST MONTH. Click YES or NO. 
 
41 Work       YES  NO 
 
42 Household chores and duties     YES  NO 
 
43 Relationships with friends      YES  NO 
 
44 Fun and leisure activities      YES  NO 
 
45 Schoolwork        YES  NO 
 
46 Relationships with your family     YES  NO 
 
47 Sex life       YES  NO 
 
48 General satisfaction with life     YES  NO 
 
49 Overall level of functioning in all areas of your life YES  NO 
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Appendix G 
 
Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire (AMQ)  
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Task 2: INSTRUCTIONS 
Please indicate in the appropriate box a response to each statement in relation to the 
memory you wrote about in Task 1 (the ‘event that bothers you the most’). Click on the 
box to indicate your choice.  
 
1. As I remember the event, I feel as though I am reliving the original event. 
1 
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not 
at all 
 Vaguely  Distinctly  As clearly 
as if it 
were 
happening 
right now 
       
2. As I remember the event, I can hear it in my mind. 
1 
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not 
at all 
 Vaguely  Distinctly  As clearly 
as if it 
were 
happening 
right now 
3. As I remember the event, I can see it in my mind. 
1 
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not 
at all 
 Vaguely  Distinctly  As clearly 
as if it 
were 
happening 
right now 
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4. As I remember the event, I or other people are talking. 
1 
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not 
at all 
 Vaguely  Distinctly  As clearly 
as if it 
were 
happening 
right now 
5. As I remember the event, I know its spatial layout. 
1 
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not 
at all 
 Vaguely  Distinctly  As clearly 
as if it 
were 
happening 
right now 
6. As I remember the event, I can feel now the emotional intensity that I felt 
 then. 
1 
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not 
at all 
 Vaguely  Distinctly  As clearly 
as if it 
were 
happening 
right now 
7. As I remember the event, I can recall the setting where it occurred. 
1 
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not 
at all 
 Vaguely  Distinctly  As clearly 
as if it 
were 
happening 
right now 
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8. Sometimes people know something happened to them without being able 
 to actually remember it. As I think about the event, I can actually 
 remember it rather than just knowing that it happened. 
1 
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not 
at all 
 Vaguely  Distinctly  As clearly 
as if it 
were 
happening 
right now 
9. As I remember the event, it comes to me in words. 
1 
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not 
at all 
 Vaguely  Distinctly  As clearly 
as if it 
were 
happening 
right now 
10. As I remember the event, I feel that I travel back to the time when it 
 happened, that I am a subject in it again, rather than an outside observer 
 tied to the present. 
1 
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not 
at all 
 Vaguely  Distinctly  As clearly 
as if it 
were 
happening 
right now 
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11. As I remember the event, it comes to me in words or in pictures as a 
 coherent story or episode and not as an isolated fact, observation, or 
 scene. 
1 
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not 
at all 
 Vaguely    Distinctly 
12. My memory of the event is fragmented into specific details with missing 
 bits. 
1 
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not 
at all 
 Vaguely  Distinctly  As clearly 
as if it 
were 
happening 
right now 
13. My memory for the event is only as detailed as the general knowledge of 
 this type of event that I would expect most people to have. 
1 
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not 
at all 
 Vaguely  Distinctly  As clearly 
as if it 
were 
happening 
right now 
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14. My memory of the event has a personal coherence: it fits easily into a 
 story I would tell about that part of my life. 
1 
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not 
at all 
 Vaguely  Distinctly  As clearly 
as if it 
were 
happening 
right now 
15. Please rate the emotional valence of the memory: 
1 
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
100% 
Negative 
  Neutral   100% 
Positive 
       
16. I believe the event in my memory really occurred in the way I remember 
 it and that I have not imagined or fabricated anything that did not occur. 
1 
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
100% 
Imaginary 
  Neutral   100% 
Real 
 
17. Since it happened, I have thought or talked about this event. 
1 
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all    As often as any 
event in my life 
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Centrality of Event Scale (CES) 
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Task 3: INSTRUCTIONS 
Please think about the event you just wrote about and answer the following 
questions by clicking on a number from 1 to 5.  
 
1.  This event has become a reference point for the way I understand new 
 experiences. 
 
Totally disagree  1  2  3  4  5  Totally agree 
 
2.  I automatically see connections and similarities between this event and 
 experiences in my present life. 
 
Totally disagree  1  2  3  4  5  Totally agree 
 
3.  I feel that this event has become part of my identity. 
 
Totally disagree  1  2  3  4  5  Totally agree 
 
4.  This event can be seen as a symbol or mark of important themes in my life. 
 
Totally disagree  1  2  3  4  5  Totally agree 
 
5.  This event is making my life different from the life of most other people.  
 
Totally disagree 1  2  3  4  5   Totally agree 
 
6. This event has become a reference point for the way I understand myself and the 
 world. 
 
Totally disagree  1  2  3  4  5  Totally agree 
 
7. I believe that people who haven’t experienced this type of event think differently 
 than I do. 
 
Totally disagree  1  2  3  4  5  Totally agree 
 
8. This event tells a lot about who I am. 
 
Totally disagree  1  2  3  4  5  Totally agree 
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9. I often see connections and similarities between this event and my current 
 relationships with other people. 
 
Totally disagree  1  2  3  4  5  Totally agree 
 
10. I feel that this event has become a central part of my life story. 
 
Totally disagree  1  2  3  4  5  Totally agree 
 
11. I believe that people who haven’t experienced this type of event, have a different 
 way of looking upon themselves than I have. 
 
Totally disagree  1  2  3  4  5  Totally agree 
 
12. This event has coloured the way I think and feel about other experiences. 
 
Totally disagree  1  2  3  4  5  Totally agree 
 
13. This event has become a reference point for the way I look upon my future. 
 
Totally disagree  1  2  3  4  5  Totally agree 
 
14. If I were to weave a carpet of my life, this event would be in the middle with 
 threads going out to many other experiences. 
 
Totally disagree  1  2  3  4  5  Totally agree 
 
15. My life story can be divided into two main chapters: one is before and one is after 
 this event happened. 
 
Totally disagree  1  2  3  4  5  Totally agree 
  
16. This event permanently changed my life. 
 
Totally disagree  1  2  3  4  5  Totally agree 
 
17. I often think about the effects this event will have on my future. 
 
Totally disagree  1  2  3  4  5  Totally agree 
 
18. This event was a turning point in my life. 
 
Totally disagree  1  2  3  4  5  Totally agree 
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19. If this event had not happened to me, I would be a different person today. 
 
Totally disagree  1  2  3  4  5  Totally agree 
 
20. When I reflect upon my future, I often think back to this event. 
 
Totally disagree  1  2  3  4  5  Totally agree 
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Instructions for Writing about a Negative, non-traumatic Event 
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Task 4: INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Now please think about a negative, everyday event that took place in your life. It needs to 
be a negative, but non-traumatic event.  Please write about this event in as much detail as 
you can. All of your writing will be completely confidential. As you type, do not worry 
about punctuation or grammar, just write as much as you can and include thoughts, 
feelings, reflections etc. 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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Centre for Epidemiological Studies – Depression Scale (CES-D) 
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Ces D in separate doc 
 
 
  
210 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix K 
 
Participant Opt-in Form for Prize Draw and/or Summary of Results
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If you are interested in finding out about the results of the study, please 
type your email address here _____________________ 
 
(Remember, your email address will be kept separate from your completed 
questionnaires and it will not be possible to link the two in any way. After I 
have sent you information about what I have found, your email address will 
be destroyed.) 
 
 If you would like to take part in the prize draw for £80 Amazon.co.uk 
vouchers, please type your email address here 
_____________________ 
 
(Remember, your email address will be kept separate from your completed 
questionnaires and it will not be possible to link the two in any way.) 
 
If you choose to participate in the prize draw, but do not wish to receive 
information about the results of the study, please click here ______ (If you 
choose this option, your email address will be destroyed after the prize draw 
has been held.) 
     OR 
If you choose to participate in the prize draw, and also wish to receive 
information about the results of the study, please click here ______ (If you 
choose this option, your email address will be destroyed after I have sent you 
information about what I have found.) 
 
If you would like to talk about anything regarding the study, please contact: 
 Emma Ronayne       email: E.Ronayne@uea.ac.uk  
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Debriefing Sheet for Participants 
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THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME IN PARTICIPATING IN THIS RESEARCH 
Thank you for participating in this research.  The aim of the study is to further our 
understanding of the way that people process and remember trauma – by taking part you 
have helped us with this important task. 
As part of the study you answered questionnaires about difficult experiences and low 
mood.  I hope that it is not the case, but it would be understandable if these 
questionnaires caused you some distress at the time of completing them.  If you did 
experience distress, it may take a little while for you to feel better.  Again, this would 
be wholly understandable.  
If, however, you continue to experience distress on an ongoing basis after taking part 
in this study, it is very important that you contact someone who can help.  Below is 
some information on different ways of getting help. In addition, this online link (click 
here) contains these same details so that you can save them and access them more 
readily at a later date. 
 
People/services you can contact if you feel you need some help: 
 Researcher: Emma Ronayne, Trainee Clinical Psychologist, University of East 
Anglia          
Email: E.Ronayne@uea.ac.uk               
Phone: 07725 031 486 
 Your GP or GP Out of Hours Service (Phone: 01603 488488 for 
Norwich/Norfolk area) 
 
 A mental health support service, such as: 
 - MIND (UK)  Phone: 08457 660 163 
 - Samaritans (UK) Phone: 08457 909 090 
- Samaritans (ROI) Phone: 1850 60 90 90 
- Samaritans (US)  Phone: 1(800) 273-8255 
 
Again, many thanks for participating in this study.  
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Examples of lexical items from LIWC categories used in study  
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LIWC Category Item Examples 
 
 Examples Number of Words in 
Category 
Category   
Linguistic Processes   
     Word Count   
     Past Tense Went, ran, had 145 
     Present Tense Is, does, hear 169 
     Conjunctions And, but, whereas 28 
Psychological Processes   
     Positive Emotion Love, nice, sweet 406 
     Negative Emotion Hurt, ugly, nasty 499 
          Anxiety Worried, fearful, nervous 91 
          Anger Hate, kill, annoyed 184 
          Sadness Crying, grief, sad 101 
     Cognitive Process Believe, thus, understand 730 
          Insight Think, know, consider 195 
          Causation Because, effect, hence 108 
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Sensory/Perceptual Processes Taste, see, smell, odour 273 
     See View, look, blind 72 
     Hear Listen, hear, noise 51 
     Feel Feel, touch, smooth 75 
     Space Down, in, thin, setting 220 
     Time End, until, season 239 
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Details of Types of Trauma reported by Participants 
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 Number  
of Participants 
Percentage of 
overall sample 
Type of trauma   
Accident 14 17.1 
Disaster 3 3.7 
Non-sexual assault by a family 
member or someone you know 
6 7.3 
Non-sexual assault by a stranger  5 6.1 
Sexual assault by a family 
member or someone you know 
6 7.3 
Sexual assault by a stranger  5 6.1 
Combat 3 3.7 
Sexual contact when you were 
younger than 18 with someone 
who was 5 or more years older 
 
6 7.3 
Torture 1 1.2 
Life-threatening illness 12 14.6 
Other Trauma* 21 25.6 
Total 82 100 
 
* Participants classed traumas such as domestic violence, traumatic childbirth, learning of 
a suicide of a close friend or family member, and life-threatening illness of a close friend 
or family member as ‘other.’  
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Variant of Bonferroni adjustment applied to critical values to account for multiple 
testing 
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Variant of traditional Bonferroni correction method (see Shaffer, 1995; Wright, 1992) 
 
 
1. Rank p values from smallest to largest 
2. Accept smallest as it is, with no correction 
3. Divide the position in rank by number of analyses 
4. Multiply result by alpha (0.05) 
5. Then do same with all of the p values 
 
Example: 
 
You have 5 p values of 0.001, 0.0125, 0.04, 0.05 and 0.06  
 
0.001 stays as significant, no correction 
0.0125 multiply 0.05 by 2/5   which=0.02;  still significant (because 0.0125 is < 0.02) 
0.04 multiply 0.05 by 3/5       which = 0.03;  not significant (0.04 is >0.03) 
0.05 multiply 0.05 by 4/5       which=0.040;  not significant (0.05 is >0.04) 
0.06 not significant anyway 
 
If the traditional Bonferroni correction had been applied (required p = 0.01), there would 
be only one significant result. 
 
This variant of the Bonferroni adjustment gives a good balance between finding 
significant effects and controlling for Type 1 errors.  It takes into account not just the 
number of analyses performed, but also the order of the p values obtained. 
 
 
